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-Pefer Jaszz 
Most academics can agree that intellectual property warrants legal protection, 
especially in an educational context where their own publications are often traded for 
promotion and tenure. However, academics would also agree that a reliable exemption is 
required, allowing them to use copyright protected work for educational purposes. Copyright 
law has historically satisfied both these needs by protecting academic publications from 
unauthorized use, and by providing an educational exemption that allows educators access to 
copyright protected work in their classes, without Grst gaining permission or paying a royalty. 
In attempting to update current copyright law to match technological advances and to 
harmonize with international copyright law, the United States Congress recently passed a body 
of legislation that weakens the educational exemption and impedes educational access to 
copyright protected work. And, as Peter Jaszi indicates in his warning above, not everyone, 
including many academics, are pleased with this legislative attempt to protect "individual 
proprietorship." Among the discontented are academic organizations like NCTE (National 
2 
Council of Teachers of English), CCCC (Conference on College Composition and 
Communication), and AAUP (American Association of University Professors) and the reasons 
they cite relate directly to the erosion of the educational exemption, impeded access to creative 
works for teaching purposes, and a diminishing "cultural commons."^ They share the view that 
recent legislation has ignored the educational stakeholder, insofar as this legislation seems to 
have increased burdens in classroom applications, while the benefits of copyright appear to 
remain few. If what the aforementioned organizations charge is true, then the balance of 
burdens and benefits has shifted for educators and students in the classroom environment This 
shift in balance undermines Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, which 
implies that the reason for establishing copyright law is to benefit all stakeholders. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, I focus mainly on recent changes in copyright 
protection of digital intellectual property. This focus is both timely and appropriate to 
education because more academic publications and creative work are being stored in digital 
form, more discipline specific journals are moving online and classrooms and instruction have 
become more wired. Therefore, to understand, more specifically, how dzgifa/ copyright 
legislation burdens academic authors and audiences, I analyze the 1998 Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) and selected text representing academic positions on recent digital 
copyright legislation. 
The physical DMCA (or H.R. 2281) is 101 pages long and the version used for my 
analysis is the last of six drafts, issued on October 20,1998 by the 106* Congress. This 
1 Chapter 3 outlines the concerns of these organizations (AAUP, CCCC, and NCTE) through an analysis of 
written documents that discuss objections to the 1998 legislation previous to its passage. 
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version of the DMCA was integrated into the United States Code. An appendix and a short 
legislative act (H.R. 2215) concerning distance education passed are also included for analysis 
with these materials. Supporting the appendix and HJL 2215 is a statement from the Register 
of Copyrights, Marybeth Peters, reporting recommendations concerning distance education 
regulations to the Senate on May 25*, 1999. 
The primary research question driving this study and analysis is: Amy Am recenf cqpyrzgAf 
ZegWafzon aA#kd fAe 6a/ance q/" znfef/ecfzwz/ 6gne/9ff and ybr acadeznzc 
az^Aorf and az#6encas? Secondary questions derived 6om my investigation of the primary 
research question are: 
* What areas of regulation have shifted this balance? 
« If a trend can be identified, how will present and future legislation continue to affect 
academic concerns like distance education, online syllabi, and WebCT courses? 
* What would a digital copyright law look like that is fair to corporations, as well as to 
educators and their students? 
To answer these questions, I analyze the text and rhetorical strategy embedded in both legal 
and non-legal documents. However, this analysis is further complicated because, unlike the 
traditional "hard copy" environment, the digital environment is subject to legislative control at 
three levels—including the physical infrastructure, the digital coding, and the content or text 
that appears on a computer screen. For this reason, I employ Yochai Benkler's 
4 
communication theory of layers to help me identify and unpack regulations of all three 
dimensions on education. Benkler's method is further explained in Chapter 3. 
For the sake of efficient management of my topic, I focus only on copyright law, 
excluding discussions of both patent and trademark law. The reasons for these exclusions are 
as follows. First of all, the term of protection for patented materials is much shorter than the 
term for copyrighted materials. Term of protection afïects academic access to materials and 
the shorter patent term would unnecessarily complicate any discussion of academic access? 
Also although some gray areas exist between patent and copyright, patents generally protect 
only the plans or design of an invention or process, a range of materials too narrow to be useful 
to my analysis. Copyright coverage is much broader, as discussed later in this work. 
I exclude discussion of trademark from my analysis for two reasons. First, even though 
trademark law represents yet another type of intellectual property protection, its application in 
academia is very limited? Although trademark law protects such property as university logos 
and university published titles, these items are mostly administrative concerns. Academics 
2 The online legal terms dictionary, Law.com Dictionary, defines patent as follows: 
There are three types of patents: a) "utility patent" which includes a process, a machine (mechanism with 
moving parts), manufactured products, and compounds or mixtures (such as chemical formulas); b) "design 
patent" which is a new, original and ornamental design for a manufactured article; and c) "plant patent" which 
is a new variety of a cultivated asexually reproduced plant. Example: Secretary of Agriculture and later Vice 
President Henry A. Wallace developed hybrid corn which made him rich for life. A utility or plant patent lasts 
17 years and a design patent lasts 14 years, but all types require payment of "maintenance' fees payable 
beginning 3 1/2 years after the issuance to keep them up. Patent law specialists can make a search of patents to 
determine if the proposed invention is truly unique, and if apparently so, can file an application, including 
detailed drawing and specifications. 
3 The 6* Edition of Mass Communication Law by Gilmor, Barron, and Simon further defines the function of 
trademark law as follows: "Trademark or service mark law protects a business's interest in a clearly identifiable 
sign, symbol, or slogan representing the company. Book titles, stage names, and even the call letters of 
broadcast stations can be registered with the Patent and Trademark Office" (601). 
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and their students, especially in the humanities, rarely engage in trademark use and creation; 
copyrighted materials are more frequently used and created. Second, unlike copyright, the 
term of trademark is unlimited in that, for a registered trademark, legal protection endures as 
long as that trademark is actively used and maintained. Discussion of unlimited length of 
trademark protection would unnecessarily complicate the issue of academic access to materials, 
just as it would for the more limited term of patent protection. 
The remainder of this chapter discusses the issue of academic benefits and burdens in 
U.S. copyright law, identifies the problem of the imbalance of benefits with regard to 
corporations and education, and offers a brief history of copyright for the purpose of 
establishing a historical rationale for the problem, beginning with the earliest recognition of 
singular authorship up to our current body of protectionist copyright law. However, first I 
provide definitions of primary legal terms occurring repeatedly throughout this work in the 
section below. Other less frequently used legal terms and concepts will be defined or described 
when they first appear within the text or in footnotes? 
Definitions of Frequently Used Legal Terms Pertaining to Intellectual Property Law 
* Copyng&f: The legally protected right of a creator to control the reproduction, use and 
manipulation of his or her creations. Some of the types of protected works are "text, 
drawings, musical works, architectural plans, motion pictures, so Aware, multimedia 
4 These terms are used for both digital and traditional intellectual property law. 
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works, and internet-distributed content" (Valauskas and Innés 1). Animation and 
digital computer code are also protected under copyright law. 
* fbir use: As described in Section 107 of the Copyright Act, the "fair use" provision 
suggests that copyright protection is not absolute and exclusive. The use of protected 
work for teaching, criticism, research, news reporting, or comment does not constitute 
copyright infringement. This provision is, however, no guarantee of free use of 
copyrighted material for the above-described uses, especially in a digital medium. 
While guidelines for fair use of traditional materials are covered by copyright law, 
these suggestions do not mandate fair use with regard to digital intellectual property 
use. To determine whether any particular case is covered by the fair use provision, the 
courts (according to Sec. 107) must consider the following four Actors as guidelines to 
their decisions: 
1. the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes (sometimes called 
the educational exemption) 
2. the nature of the copyrighted woik (e.g., criticism, parody, reviews) 
3. the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
word as a whole (e.g., if a 10% of a work defines most of the weight or meaning 
of a work, the portion of a copyright work may be considered to constitute 
much more than 10%) 
7 
4. the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work (i.e., how much money the creator might lose if fair use is assigned) 
* Me/kcfW ^ rqperfy. Any work that is eligible for copyright protection is can be called 
intellectual property, including traditional and digital written work, charts, maps, 
musical compositions, photographs and negatives, paintings drawings, statuary, 
models, motion pictures, sound recordings, computer programs, boat hull designs and 
architectural works. Section 102a of the copyright code says that to be eligible for 
copyright protection, a work must be "original," and a "work of authorship" that is 
"fixed in any tangible medium of expression" that can be "perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 
* fwA/fc dbmmM: A depository for works for which the term of copyright (70 years 
beyond death for an individual; 95 years for a corporation, in most cases) has expired. 
Public domain is not a physical depository, but rather a legal and conceptual one and is 
sometimes called the public commons. Works in the public domain may be used freely 
for any purpose, in any context without gaining permission from the original author or 
current owner and without fear of punishment for copyright infringement. When a 
work is in the public domain it is no longer considered an intellectual "property," in 
that legal ownership or proprietorship rights have been terminated. 
* (Fort/ôr Aire; The work for hire provision was defined by the 1976 Copyright 
legislation. According to the provision's wording, an intellectual property can be 
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defined as a work for hire and thus, belongs to the employer, if the following three 
primary criteria are met: 
1. Work has been prepared by the employee within the scope of employment 
2. Work has been specially ordered or commissioned for use as contribution to a 
collective work. 
3. Work has been expressly agreed to by involved parties on both sides in writing 
saying that the work shall be considered a work for hire. 
The court looks at an even more detailed list of thirteen additional factors in determining 
legal challenges in a work for hire context/ 
An additional definitional note: For the purposes of this paper, the pairs of terms "author" and 
"creator;" "audience" and "user;" and "public (or cultural) commons" and "public domain" 
will be used interchangeably. 
5 The Supreme Court decision in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989), 
established that the following 13 factors must be considered by courts before ownership of intellectual property 
can be determined in a potential work for hire context: 
• Whether the hiring party had a right to control the manner and means by which the product is 
accomplished 
• The level of skill required to create the property 
• Whether the instruments and tools used were provided by the hiring party or the hired party 
• Whether the hired party worked at the hiring or hired party's place of business 
• The duration of the relationship between the two parties 
• Whether the hiring party had the right to assign additional projects to the hired party 
• The extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work 
• The method of payment 
• Whether the hired party had a role in hiring and paying assistants. 
• Whether the work was part of the regular business of the hiring party 
• Whether the hiring party was doing business 
• Whether employee benefits were provided by the hiring party for the hired party 
• How the hiring party treated the hired party for tax purposes 
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The Problem of Balance 
According to legal philosopher, Herbert Morris, one of the keys to an effective system 
of laws is fairness. In his essay, "Punishment and Fairness," Morris explains that "This system 
is one in which the rules establish a mutuality of benefit and burden and in which the benefits 
of noninterference are conditional upon the assumption of burdens." In other words, the law 
will not interfere with an intellectual property user, as long as he or she avoids infringing on the 
copyrights of the owner. Morris's system applied to intellectual property law more specifically 
means that the benefit of use should equal the burden of regulation and subsequent punishment 
for copyright infringement He argues that such a legal structure must protect its fundamental 
integrity. "Fairness dictates that a system in which and Awrdbw [italics mine] are 
equally distributed have a mechanism designed to prevent a maldistribution in the benefits and 
burdens" (322). 
Unfortunately, the only mechanism available to "prevent the maldistribution of benefits 
and burdens" in the context of intellectual property law is the very brief constitutional directive 
that allows Congress to create copyright law and an equally brief rationale for why creation of 
copyright is a positive component to our marketplace-driven economy (see Fig. 1 below). This 
directive, comprising Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, explains that 
copyright law must protect the ownership of intellectual property so the author realizes 
financial gain and thus, will be motivated to create. Although not explicitly stated, this 
constitutional provision implies a balance of burdens and benefits, suggesting that while 
stimulating creativity, copyright law must also not stymie the audience's access to intellectual 
property through overprotective and/or overreaching legislation. Simply put, authors need to 
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profit from their labor and audiences need a ready supply of creative work in order to establish 
equal benefits to both parties—a quid pro quo exchange of profit for creativity. 
Fig.l 
AUTHOR/AUDIENCE BALANCE AS EXPRESSED IN THE ARTICLE 1, SECTION 8 OF THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION (#T TWO) 
Audience/User Provision 
"To promote the progress of science and useful arts," 
Author/Creator Provision 
"by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective 
writings and discoveries." 
Although Article 1 (shown in figure 1 above) expresses an implicit overriding goal of 
universal fairness by suggesting that all United States citizens must benefit from a copyright 
system, the Article gives no direction about how to ensure this fairness. To paraphrase Herbert 
Morris, copyright law must be established on a foundation of equal distribution of benefits and 
burdens; however, because no concrete mechanism exists to regulate that distribution, those 
who create intellectual property law must be vigilant on two fronts. 1) Legislators must ensure 
that neither audience nor author is privileged one over the other. 2) They must also make sure 
that the law does not privilege one group at the expense of another (e.g., corporations over the 
academy). 
11 
According to many educators, the notion of universal fairness regarding the benefits 
and burdens of copyright does not underpin recent copyright legislation, according. Preceding 
Congressional passage and the presidential signing of the CTEA and the DMCA, academics 
objected to what they saw as a corporate privileging. These objections occurred in inter-
academy discussions, as well as in written and verbal protests addressed to government, legal 
and corporate communities, but the plaints yielded little legislative attention. The CTEA and 
the DMCA were passed without integrating the suggestions of educators and the organizations 
representing them (CCCC, NCTE, AAUP) because no mechanism was in place to ensure that 
all stakeholders' interests were protected/ 
In her book, ZWgzfa/ Copyright Jessica Litman describes how certain stakeholders 
historically have been included in the copyright lawmaking process. She explains that for the 
past hundred years, Congress has allowed corpora# stakeholders to hash out legislative 
changes and then to submit their own proposals to the House and Senate. 
By the 1920's, the process was sufficiently entrenched that whenever a member 
of Congress came up with a legislative proposal without going through the 
cumbersome prelegislative process of multiparty negotiation, the affected 
industries united to block the bill. Copyright bills passed only after private 
stakeholders agreed with one another on their substantive provisions. The 
pattern has continued to this day. (23) 
Despite the conventional process of including corporate stakeholders in the legislative process, 
academic stakeholders were not invited to negotiations resulting in revisions to the 1998 
6 Chapter 3 contains a more complete discussion of the NCTE, CCCC, and AAUP protests against the DMCA 
awl CTEA. 
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DMCA and the CTEA^ because no law ensured that all stakeholders would be heard during the 
three-year collaborative creation of the DMCA and, predictably, much academic reaction to the 
resulting legislation was negative/ 
The Balance and the Academy 
A primary reason for educators' strident opposition is that the balance of burdens and 
benefits is crucial to the creative atmosphere of academia where educators and their students 
simultaneously interact as authors and audiences. Instructors author textbooks, creative works, 
research, articles, course packs, derivations, adaptations, criticism, syllabi, online course 
materials, and other collaborative and individual works. And their students produce written 
assignments, as well as journal articles and presentations, both individually and collaboratively. 
Both students and instructors require others' works to inform their own writing and to advance 
their professional development. Evidence of this use of others' works can be found in the 
practice of meticulous attention to attribution.* As authors, educators and students' own works 
of intellectual property must be protected, but as audiences, who must read to stay alive 
7 Academic stakeholders were, however, consulted by the Register of Copyrights in establishing guidelines for 
distance education. These guidelines (H.R. 2215) were passed by Congress as an addendum to the DMCA in 
1999. 
8 Congress began considering the DMCA in 1995 when it was called H.R. 244lor the Nil (National Information 
Infrastructure) Copyright Protection Act. 
9 Although it is an academic convention, attribution is not mandated by copyright law. The only reference to 
attribution is found in Title 17, Section 106a of the U.S. code. This section titled, "Rights of Certain Authors to 
Attribution and Integrity," refers to visual art, such as paintings, drawings and sculpture. According to the 
section, authors of this type of work have the right "to claim authorship of that work, and to prevent the use of 
his or her name as the author of any work of visual art which he or she did not create; [and] shall have the right 
to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion, 
mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation." 
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professionally, educators and students require easy access to other works, access that should be 
and has traditionally been protected by the educational exemption in the fair use doctrine and a 
healthy public domain. In other words, a desirable balance of benefits and burdens in an 
educational setting is one where academic authors and audiences have reasonable access to 
healthy a public domain and legislation that protects creativity, but does not constrain academic 
activity. 
Figure 2 below illustrates the intellectual property needs of the academic audience and 
author with regard to both the use and creation of written woik. Notice that the items in both 
Fig. 2 
ACADEMIC AUDIENCE/USER NEEDS ACADEMIC AUTHOR/CREATOR NEEDS 
Reasonable Public Domain Profit, Prestige, Credibility, Approbation 
Reasonable restrictions on copying for 
teaching (educational exemption) 
Protection from theft, 
(ownership, agency) 
Work readily accessible for compilation, 
derivation, criticism, re-creation ^ 
Motivation to Create 
columns interact with each other as academic authors and audiences assume both roles or as 
they go from the author to the audience role and vice versa in Figure 2. 
What the figure above suggests is that educators and student audiences need readily 
accessible work for their personal edification, as well as for creative fuel in their roles as 
writers. A reasonable public domain and a strong educational exemption enhance motivation 
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to create because works are available to provide support for academic essays, compilations, 
derivations, criticism and other academic activities. Subsequently, these activities produce 
work that ends up in the public domain or that become available under the educational 
exemption—in an endless cycle of academic production and consumption. 
Organizations like CCCC, NCTE, and AAUP protest that the DMCA sets hurdles to 
academic author and 
restricting access to work that could be the creative basis of new work for both educators and 
students.10 This complaint hints at a shift in benefits and burdens. If true, then the DMCA 
legislators have put educators and their students at a disadvantage and have overlooked the 
implicit reason for copyright law—the equal distribution of benefits and burdens to all 
stakeholders. The DMCA privileges the financial interests of corporate authors, while ignoring 
the creative needs of academic authors and audiences. 
A clear example of legislative privileging of corporate author to the disadvantage of 
academic authors is the DMCA's anti-circumvention provision, one of two main provisions 
that provide foundational structure to the digital legislation.11 The provision forbids any 
circumvention or manipulation of the code that prevents user access and which, 
10 Although they no longer exist in 2003, all three organizations (NCTE, CCCC, and AAUP) had pages on their 
websites objecting to public domain and fair use impediments in the DMCA. These objections are further 
discussed in Chapter 4. The URLs for each organization are as follows: 
• NCTE http://www.ncte.org/homepage.' 
• CCCC http://www.ncte.org/cccc-ip/ (This is the Intellectual Property Caucus page of the CCCC) 
• AAUP http://www.aaup.org/ 
11 The other provision prohibits any manipulation or alteration of digital copyrighted information without owner 
permission—"information identifying a work, its author, its copyright owner, and any terms and conditions of 
use" (Litman 136). 
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simultaneously, restricts access to work that had been previously available to academic and 
general audiences.12 For example, a student can no longer access all archived articles in the 
Mew Tort online newspaper because code prevents access and DMCA restrictions 
prevent circumvention of that code. The student researching online must buy a subscription to 
access archived articles that may be needed for a term paper. Here, the fair use educational 
exemption does not apply. 
The anti-circumvention provision affects educator and student stakeholders in two 
ways. First, it unintentionally allows strict ownership of all components of a digital realm, if 
the owner has a coded guard at the portal designed to prevent the access of unauthorized 
persons to the "property." Consequently, the anti-circumvention provision effectively 
diminishes work in the digital public domain by broadening that which can be rendered 
inaccessible. In some cases, intellectual property that has lost its copyright protection due to an 
expired term of copyright can, because of circumvention controls, become a protected property 
once again. Second, an anti-circumvention provision essentially destroys the concept of 
educational fair use because even non-profit organizations are prevented from using a work 
guarded by an anti-circumvention code or device. Consequently, and most significantly, this 
provision restricts access to work that could provide the basis for new digital products. Thus, 
12 Section 1201 of the DMCA defines circumvention in the following: 
(A) to 'circumvent a technological measure ' means to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an 
encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technolosical 
measure [underline mine], without the authority of the copyright owner; and 
(B) a technolosical measure [underlining mine] 'effectively controls access to a work ' if the measure, 
in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the application of information, or a process or a 
treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work. 
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the balance of benefits shifts away from educational players and toward owners of work 
protected by circumvention so Aware or devices. 
Numerous digital creations, like the virus protection software we rely on today, have 
been a result of the now-prohibited practice of reverse engineering,^ a practice that involves 
circumvention of digital protective measures like code or password. Much reverse 
engineering activity takes place on college campuses for the purposes of security research and 
development.^ ^ The Felten case below clearly demonstrates how recent digital regulations 
like anti-circumvention, mandated by the DMCA, can interfere not only with research through 
the now prohibited process of reverse engineering, but also with academic activities like 
research, publication, and conference presentation. 
In the Felton case, Princeton engineering graduate student Scott A. Craver, in August of 
2001, researched, wrote, and planned to present a paper that described how, as a result of a 
challenge from the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI), he, computer scientist Edward 
13 Reverse engineering literally means to take something apart to see how it works, to modify it in some way or 
to duplicate it. For software, a person would disassemble the machine code (or binary system of l's and 0's) to 
discover the source code (specific programming code). Knowing the source code helps a person modify to 
improve software performance or modify to allow the software to operate in a different computer. Reverse 
engineering is also used to locate and identify viruses, to fix a bug, and to discover the code for the purpose of 
duplication. 
14 There is one exception to the prohibition of reverse engineering that could apply to education. The Copyright 
Office Summary of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 explains it this way: "this exception permits 
circumvention, and the development of technological means for such circumvention [or reverse engineering], 
by a person who has lawfully obtained a right to use a copy of a computer program for the sole purpose of 
identifying and analyzing elements of the program necessary to achieve interoperability with other programs, to 
the extent that such acts are permitted under copyright law" (5) 
15 Admittedly, there is an educational exception to anti-circumvention described in Section 1201 d of the 
DMCA. Unfortunately, the exception is very narrow. The section reads: "The prohibition on the act of 
circumvention of access control measures is subject to an exception that permits access control measures is 
subject to an exception that permits nonprofit libraries, archives and educational institutions to circumvent 
solely for the purpose of making a good faith determination as to whether they wish to obtain authorized access 
to the work." 
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Felten,16 and eight other researchers on his team cracked a code embedded in special 
"infringement proof compact discs. The following is an excerpt of SDMI's open letter 
challenge to the "Digital Community" to crack the code: 
PPe ore mow in qffeadMg Abe fecAw/ogias f&af W/o//owf&eae 
jprofecfzow. fec/zw/ogzef rmwf fevero/ f fringe/^ fea#/ 7%ey 
TMMSf&e iMmwRMe, rofwcf, nme^ciemffy o% vanoMg/?/aï/bf7?K, 
6e feafecf&yyou. 
&) Aere fAe iWfaffon. v4Moct f/K fecA»o/og%ef. Croct fAem. ("Open 
Letter") 
The "infringement-proof' code was to have prevented users from reproducing 
copyrighted music from file-sharing MP3 download sites through the embedding of a coded 
watermark.^ The Felten group accepted the challenge, "attacked the proposed technologies," 
and cracked the embedded code and wrote up their findings for presentation and publication. 
However, in response, the music industry threatened the group with legal action under the 
DMCA anti-circumvention guidelines if findings were revealed in an academic conference 
presentation. The Felten group was forced to turn down the cash prize offered in the challenge, 
so they could present their research to their colleagues, but to avoid future litigation, Felten's 
16 Edward Felten, the leader of the group who participated in the SDMI challenge, is a computer science 
professor at Princeton University and an activist currently trying to persuade Congress to overhaul its repressive 
DMCA regulations. He is currently involved in protesting the proposed Consumer Broadband and Digital 
Television Promotion Act, which "would require manufactures to add copy-control systems to computer 
hardware and software" (Foster). 
17 Sites like LimeWire and Kazaa allow users to share music files. These are called peer-to-peer sites because 
the sites don't store copyright-protected music; instead, they provide a conduit for user/peers to share music 
(MP3 files) directly with each other. Kazaa and LimeWire, therefore, are not technically violating the law. In 
retaliation, the music industry designed CD's that will not accept copies of protected music. 
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attorneys asked a Federal Court to rule on whether the group could be allowed to publish and 
to present their results from the SDMI challenge at future conferences without fear of 
punishment. On February 6,2002, the court dismissed the case because both the prosecutor 
and SDMI withdrew their complaint However the court also advised that scientific research 
should not be threatened by the DMCA—a ruling that supports educational research (Cherry 
and Siang 26-28)/* 
Despite the court's ruling, fair use, an academic copyright benefit, is not specifically 
provided for in the DMCA; therefore, more legal challenges from both owners and users 
should be expected ("Security Researchers"). The Felten case not only calls attention to the 
DMCA's potential to interfere with academic research, but, more importantly to this paper, it 
also implies a shift away from academia in the balance of copyright benefits. Additionally, this 
case clearly illustrates how necessary a digital public commons can be to academic research. 
In his book, The Control Revolution, Andrew L. Shapiro insists that the anti-
circumvention provision, as it stands, has a deleterious effect on the preservation of the digital 
commons. Shapiro calls for new rules that would relax the DMCA's strict protectionism and 
open up the domain to creative potential. 
Applying this principle [of maintaining a digital commons] in content means 
that the code of trusted systems and clickwrap19 contracts must be altered to 
preserve the ability of individuals to copy and otherwise use a work for a few 
socially beneficial purposes—parody, commentary, personal use—that would 
18 The Felten case is discussed further in Chapter 5. 
19 
"Clickwrap" contracts are those agreements embedded in software that one must agree to on screen before the 
activation of the software. Recently, two states have passed the Uniform Computer Information Transactions 
Act that makes legally binding "clickwrap" contracts that can include restrictions not mandated by copyright 
law, like the strict denial of the educational exemption in the "fair use" provision. 
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not unduly interfere with society's overall goal of encouraging creativity. (178-
179) 
One could also add another socially beneficial purpose—academic research. Current and 
future digital copyright law is of great significance to academia, not only because the necessity 
of preserving a public commons, but also because of the increasing number of hypertextual 
materials and expanding technology as more academic journals convert to online sites, as more 
sources and resources for research move online, and as more colleges become "wired"—all 
areas regulated by the DMCA. 
However, even though the academic copyright issues listed above might appear to 
unify the educational system behind one cause, universities are not monolithic. That is, 
academic, students, staff, and administrators do not think with one academic mind. 
Universities and educators as profit-making authors are inextricably woven into the fabric of 
the market economy, but universities as corporations are capable of reaping copyright benefits 
even at the expense of educators and their students. For example, the DMCA specifically 
refers to "distance education," in an amendment to the U.S. code,^ describing both authorial 
rights and the limitations of those rights in vague and sometimes contradictory wording that 
could be used to strengthen a university's "work-fbr-hire" rights to educators' online works, 
while weakening copyright protection for that educator. Therefore, because most court 
decisions, up to this point, favor corporate claims to copyrights, it is not unreasonable to 
assume that the courts would favor the corporate university over the educator in some or even 
most copyright claims. 
* Title 17, Sec. 1203. 
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Another specific DMCA reference that separates corporate universities from educators 
and students is its specific regulation of college Online Service Providers (OSP's), and the 
"cyber-distribution" of online materials. This separation is defined very specifically in the 
following section: 
When a public or nonprofit institution of higher education is a service provider, 
and when a faculty member or graduate student who is an employee of such 
institution is performing a teaching or research function,... such faculty 
member or graduate student shall be considered to be a person other than the 
institution, and... such faculty member's or graduate student's knowledge or 
awareness of his or her infringing activities shall not be attributed to the 
ins t i tu t ion .  (T i t l e  I I ;  e l )  
The DMCA exempts educational institutions' OSP's from responsibility for copyright 
infringement by their employees provided they meet a list of criteria. However, now individual 
graduate students and faculty members may be held accountable for violations.21 One of the 
peripheral reasons this liability is troubling is that, like "regular" Acuity, under copyright law 
graduate students are considered employees with all the legal responsibilities. However, in 
reality, grad students have few of the same employment rights (fair salary, tenure, promotion 
and so on) in their roles as educators. Also, grad students are, in essence, still students—still 
learning and still making mistakes. Nonetheless, the DMCA still separates student/educator 
responsibility and university responsibility in the context of the OSP, placing much of the 
21 Section 512e exempts the university Internet Service Provider and holds faculty members or graduate 
assistants liable for copyright infringement 1) if (during the course of infringement) faculty or ga's were not 
providing access to required or recommended online course material, 2.) if the educational institution has not 
been notified at least twice over three years of faculty or graduate student infringement, and 3.) if "the 
institution provides all of its users with informational materials describing and promoting compliance with 
copyright law" (U.S. Copyright Office, "Summary" 13). All three conditions must be met. 
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burden on individual grad students and instructors, thus benefiting the corporate university 
through an exemption from punishment for copyright infringement. 
Additionally, because there is no clear delineation of fair use contexts in the DMCA, 
the educational exemption with regard to cyber-distribution can no longer be depended upon. 
Instructors may safely post one copy of a protected intellectual property on a code-protected 
online library reserve, a homepage, or a WebCT site, but there is no guarantee that sending a 
link to a copyrighted site to twenty students on a class email list is not copyright infringement. 
The DMCA's multitude of specific exemptions for publishers, the entertainment 
industry, and libraries points to an increase in benefits. At the same time the burdens seem to 
have increased for academic authors and audiences because fair use has been set aside in the 
DMCA document and because Court opinions like that in Basic Books v. Kinko's have further 
weakened the educational exemption. Because of this recent erosion of the Air use doctrine, 
coupled with current legislation privileging the author over the audience, educators struggle to 
meet royalty demands for course packs and attempt to work their way through overreaching 
and ambiguous digital copyright legislation that touches everything from distance education 
courses to first-year composition computer lab courses. 
Taking into consideration academic concerns for the preservation of fair use, the need 
for a healthy public domain, and DMCA legislation supporting strict anti-circumvention 
restrictions, I argue that the legal balance between author and audience benefits has shifted 
deliberatively toward the corporate copyright author/owner since the beginning of United 
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States copyright protections, but especially in light of the recent passage of the CTEA and the 
DMCA. 
At this point, I outline the historic evolution of intellectual property protection and 
corresponding cultural attitudes toward authorship and audienceship to aid in understanding the 
trend of increasing protectionism toward the corporate author. This overview briefly 
documents the emerging individuation of the author, coinciding with the beginnings of 
intellectual property protection. The following section traces copyright and authorship history 
from the classical period through Medieval and Renaissance Europe to the current digital 
environment in the United States. 
A History of Copyright 
The notion of copyright is embedded in western civilization's evolving cultural 
attitudes toward authorship. And without a cultural concept of the proprietary author, 
intellectual property protection would not exist, as illustrated by the "copyright-free" early oral 
culture, which did not lend itself effectively to the concept of individual authorship or 
copyright law. With the exception of a few, like Hesiod in the 8th century and Homer from the 
9* century, individual poets and writers were not usually distinguished in ancient culture. 
Authors were, instead, parts of a collective whole. Ronald V. Bettig credits Arnold Hauser for 
identifying 6th century Athens as the period during which the creator as an individual began to 
emerge. Hauser attributes urbanization and the resulting commercial trade for the new 
emphasis on individuality (Bettig 11-12). However, individuation of the author was not yet 
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fully evolved; therefore, copyright did not exist. Claims to profit rights from intellectual 
property did not occur until the late Middle Ages. 
Early intellectual property rights attained through registration with the government 
and/or the Church probably materialized in the early 1400's for those who were favored by 
Royal patents in Italy according to Mark Rose in his book, jdwf/zorf wwf Owners." 
Tmwifzo» of Cqpyng&f. Profit was a side benefit, but Church and state censorship was the 
regulatory motivation, in that the Church or state retained the power to punish the registered 
owner of intellectual property for, what they might deem, objectionable or seditious material 
(Rose 12-15). 
Despite early intellectual property registration, both the medieval author and 
medieval society viewed the author as a collaborating member of a productive group (i.e., 
papermakers, compilers, book-binders, etc.), rather than as an individual creative genius 
(Bettig 14). "The notion that the writer is a special participant in the production process—the 
only one worthy of attention—is of recent provenience," comments Martha Woodmansee 
(16). The last 300 or so years of copyright law, represents a relatively short period in the 
approximately 2500-year history of written authorship. Because authors were not perceived 
as individual owners, up until the late Middle Ages, literary work as property-fbr-profit did 
not exist—a decidedly non-capitalist perspective. Additionally, the medieval audience was 
small because few people could read, so little profit was available for authors anyway; 
therefore, no need existed for a body of intellectual property law protecting the balance of 
author and audience concerns. 
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Ronald Bettig believes that the origin, of the concept of singular authorship and 
intellectual property is linked to the simultaneous "emergence of the printing press and the 
rise of capitalism" (14). The printing press was introduced into England in 1476, changing 
the painstaking system of hand copying to a machine copying process that was faster, 
required less labor, and increased profit potential. The printing press also enabled increased 
literacy and expanded the potential audience for a work. 
In 1557, England's Queen Mary gave exclusive publishing rights through a 
registration system to the Stationers Company, a group of booksellers, who bought sole 
rights to written work from the authors for a one-time flat fee. Through this registration 
system, the government was able to monitor the Stationers for any seditious works, making 
the registration program a de facto system of censorship, as well as a mode of profit for the 
publishers and booksellers. The Stationers retained this monopoly until the 1710 Statute of 
Arme and for decades after its passage because they, not the authors, owned much of the 
extant work. In fact, individual British authorship was not fully protected until England's 
Copyright Act of 1814. 
In his essay, "From Rights in Copies to Copyright: The Recognition of Authors' Rights in 
English Law and Practice in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," John Feather says that 
the 1710 statute rewarded the corporate owners more than individual creators until the early 
19th century.^ He argues "just as the 1710 Act was little more than a statutory recognition 
of the rights of the trade, the Act of 1814 was an even more belated recognition that authors 
22 Here, I am distinguishing corporate owners from corporate author/owners here. The former had no 
connection to the creation of the work. Today's corporate author/owners provide the environment and tools for 
creativity of their employees. The law recognizes this creative connection through the copyright work-for-hire 
provision. 
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ha<\ always played their part in the commerce of letters" (209). In other words, the balance 
of benefits did not reach all audiences and all types of authors in 1710 because early 
copyright law mainly protected the business rights of publishers and printers. The individual 
author, however, did gain some ground through the 1814 act 
Today, the coiporate author/owner still benefits more than the individual author even 
though the early rationale for the 1710 statute—the balance of benefits—has carried through 
to the 21" century. The Statute of Anne, subsequent British and American laws, and modem 
U.S. copyright law all share a similar "balance" foundation. In their booklet, Cqpyr/g&f 
Profecfmn AWfzmaAa, oW Of&er PFbrAs; Charles 
Valauskas and Catherine Innes describe this foundation as a twofold balance of benefits: 
First, it [copyright law] serves to encourage individuals to devote themselves 
to intellectual and artistic creation by providing them with the opportunity to 
secure a fair return for their efforts. Second the more far-reaching and 
ultimate goal is to advance public interest through the talents of these creators. 
(3) 
In 1788, seventy-eight years after the Statute of Anne, the right of the U.S. 
government to create copyright law was first publicly considered in Federalist Paper number 
43 written by James Madison. This paper was one of a series of 85 essays published in 1787 
and 1788. Each essay was an argument written for the purpose of gaining popular and 
political support for various concepts proposed for inclusion into the new U.S. Constitution/* 
23 This booklet's target audience is academic authors in higher education. 
24 The Federalist Papers were originally printed under the pseudonym, Publius, in two New York newspapers, 
The Independent Journal and The New York Packet. The essays were submitted by Alexander Hamilton, John 
Jay, and James Madison. Number 43 appeared in the Independent Journal. For more information, see the web 
page http://lcweb2.loc.gov/const/fed/abt fedpapers.html, which appears in the Congressional Record website. 
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In its wording, Essay Number 43 closely resembles the rationale embedded in the Statute of 
Anne (see Fig. 3 below). In 1791, this essay, evolved into Article 8, Section I of the new 
Constitution and provided a rationale that gave Congress the right to form laws protecting the 
intellectual property of authors and inventors. 
Fig, 3 
A COMPARISON OF TEXT OF 3 MAJOR COPYRIGHT TEXTS 
1710 Statute of Anne 
jdn ,4cfJbr fAe Encowrogemenf oflearning, Ay Fesfing fAe Copies ofPrinfec/ 
Booty m fAe v4%ifAors or f wrcAasers ofswcA Copies. [Rights are granted the 
owner or author] yôr Fowrfeen Tears, fo commence _^om fAe Day of fAe Firsf 
fwMisAing fAe same, aw/ no Zonger. 
Essay Number 43 of the Federalist Papers (1788) 
[Congress should have the power] fo j?romofe fAe progress of science aw/ 
Mse/W arfs, Ay securing, _/ôr a /imife^/ fime, fo aufAors aw/ fnvenfors, fAe 
exc/wsive rigAf fo fAeir respecffve wrings aw/ (/iscoveries. Die «fi/ify of fAw 
/xnver wi// scarcely Ae gwesfionee/ 7%e cqpyrigAf ofawfAors Aas Aeen 
so/emn/y ##wd[ged in Greaf Brifain, fo 6e a rigAf of common /aw. 7%e rigAf 
fo wse/i/7 invenfions seems wifA e^wa/ reason fo Ae/ong fo fAe invenfors. 
Article 8, Section I of the U.S. Constitution (adopted 1789; effective 
1790) 
Congress sAa// Aave fAe power... 7b /?romofe fAe Progress of Science aw/ 
wse/W/4rfs, 6y seci/ring^br /imife</ Times fo .<4«fAors aw//nvenfors fAe 
ezc/wsive jfigAf fo fAeir respecfive fFrifings aw/ Discoveries. 
As illustrated in Figure 3, three identifiable foundational elements emerge in all three 
documents. The first is that the public should benefit through "the encouragement of 
learning" (Statute of Anne) and by the promotion of "the progress of science and useful arts" 
(Number 43 and U.S. Constitution). The second element is that the author should be allowed 
to benefit from exclusive rights. The final and third element is that these rights be secured 
for "limited times" (Number 43 and the U.S. Constitution). The Statute of Anne describes 
that limited time as fourteen years and the earliest United States provision for term of 
copyright was also fourteen years. 
European-based intellectual property legislation beginning with the British 1710 
Statute of Anne up to the current Berne Convention laws (the modem internationalization of 
copyright law) and the United States' 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act have served to 
strengthen the individual corporate owner's right to profit, while (at least in theory) 
stimulating creativity for the benefit of citizen consumers. 
In addition to the DMCA, the CTEA also benefits the corporate copyright owner by 
lengthening the term of copyright by twenty years. Up until a century ago, authors could 
control copyrighted material for a renewable fourteen-year term. This term guaranteed that, 
in most cases, the living author would benefit financially. In 1831, the term of copyright was 
extended to 28 years with a 14-year renewable term that was extended to a 28-year 
renewable term in 1907. In 1976, the term of copyright was extended to the life of an 
individual author plus 50 years or for a corporation, 75 years from publication. Because of 
the CTEA, the term of copyright is now 70 years for single authors and 95 years for 
corporate authors, a period during which the work is kept out of the public domain. Also, 
and more importantly, even though educators can use term protected property in the 
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classroom under the fair use exemption during, academic audiences and authors cannot use 
the protected property for compiling, copying or manipulating for parody without authorial 
permission and also payment of royalties. 
Lengthening the term of copyright is not the only legal Actor that privileges the 
corporate owner/author. Over the last century, copyright legislation and Supreme Court 
opinions have increasingly upset the balance of benefits by restricting free access to 
protected works, by weakening the fair use doctrine, and by widening the definition of what 
constitutes both intellectual property and thus, intellectual property infringement. All of 
these legal actions result in a diminished public domain. 
Lack of regulation due to rapid expansion of the Internet and computer technology 
inadvertently provides a very large public commons for creative activity. Recent legal 
changes attempt to limit the size of this public commons through control of technological 
architecture, a trend that provides increasing profit for corporate concerns like Microsoft. 
Lawrence Lessig warns that allowing corporations to succeed in controlling Internet 
architecture will be at the expense of technological creativity, and, one could assume, that by 
extension academic authors and audiences would be especially affected because of their 
intense involvement in technological creativity. Lessig offers the following choice with his 
warning: 
We can embrace this return to the architecture of creativity that has defined 
modern American life—perpetual control by homogeneous corporations of a 
system for creativity focused primarily on a mass audience. Or we can 
embrace the architecture the Net was. This is a choice we cannot avoid. 
(239) 
Even though corporate authors have greatly benefited from recent copyright law, 
many technologically inclined groups and individuals are attempting to undermine these 
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benefits. Scores of legal actions and counter-actions demonstrate emphasize a perceived 
shift in benefits toward the corporate author and a resulting grass roots rebellion against strict 
digital regulation that marginalizes individual and academic authors and audiences. Some of 
the activities that exemplifying the tension that exists between the two opposing camps are: 
* Rapid improvements in computer technology and the corresponding increase in 
technological knowledge among non-experts have facilitated the authorship of all 
who have a computer and access to the Internet Today anyone can be an author, a 
publisher, and a user simultaneously. Computer users are not just passive consumers 
of what media has to offer (e.g., as in TV watching); they actively interact and 
manipulate media offerings (Benkler 562). Therefore, authorship in this 
technological age is less "sacred" than it has been within the "Romantic" view of 
authorship, a view that is not reflected in current legal attitudes. Corporations see 
profit potential in the digital public domain, and Internet rebels perceive this push for 
ownership as an abridgement of fair use rights. In her article, "Gen X Occupies the 
Cultural Commons: Ethical Practices and Perceptions of Fair Use," Joan Livingston-
Webber describes this tension: 
[T]his cultural commons [is] an area under siege, currently and most 
vigorously by corporate holders of copyright who work to transform the 
function of copyright law from enlarging the public domain to guaranteeing 
private profit. Those who have taken the term "GenX to name themselves and 
their cohorts are another group active in the skirmish, seeing themselves in 
direct engagement through practices that they believe are ethical—though 
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they also believe these practices run contrary to laws governing fair use. 
(263) 
* Attempts to protect the digital intellectual property of corporate authors through the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) have resulted in a flurry of legal 
challenges, especially from the "GenX"ers that Livingston-Webber describes above. 
Although court decisions seem to focus more on corporate creator/owner concerns 
than citizen/audience concerns, some recent decisions, as illustrated by the Felten and 
Brunner cases (discussed in Chapters 3 and 5), weaken this trend somewhat. ^ 
* Technology-sawy individuals, who create file-sharing sites and who reverse engineer 
access-controlled electronic intellectual property and publish the codes to these works, 
challenge individual, corporate authorship (e.g., Napster, DeCSS, Gnuttella, and 
Aimster). These underground actions directly challenge the 18* century notion of the 
singular corporate author and shift the emphasis to a collaborative and interactive 
audience who simultaneously use and author these works, despite pro-author 
legislation. Users become authors as they manipulate and redesign software, and then 
pass it on to others who do the same in a potentially never-ending cycle. 
To analyze how and the extent to which digital copyright law burdens and benefits have 
shifted for academic authors and audiences—I examine certain primary source documents. 
25 On November 1,2001 the Sixth Appellate District Court decided in favor of Andrew Brunner, who used a 
reverse engineered DVD code written by 15-year old Norwegian, Jon Johanson, who posted the code to an 
Internet bulletin board. The defendant, Brunner, asked the Court to reverse the injunction of a lower court on 
the basis that the ruling violated his 1st amendment rights. For more information, see DVD Copy Control 
Association v. Andrew Brunner. 
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They include the sixth version of the DMCA plus Appendix V of the DMCA and an addendum 
(H.R. 2215), both of which concern distance education issues. 
In the next chapter, I review multidisciplinaiy scholarship on authorship and audience, 
the commodiGcation of intellectual property, and finally current copyright legislation. 
Chapter 3 briefly describes the NCTE, CCCC, and AAUP documents I use to identify 
academic burdens and balances in the digital copyright environment, and explains my research 
methodological approach—Benkler's theory of layers—which is employed to analyze the three 
layers of DMCA regulation—the physical infrastructure, the code layer, and the content layer. 
The results of my research are unpacked in Chapter 4. Findings include an 
identification of DMCA controls that affect educators and their students in three layers of 
digital technology—the content, the code, and the infrastructure layer. I will summarize 
chapter with a discussion of the shifting burdens and benefits, as is revealed by the findings 
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes with an expanded discussion of recent legislation and the 
legal trends and discusses possible current and future digital copyright legislation and their 
potential effects on the academic authors and audiences. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A REVŒW OF LITERATURE 
The literature that informs my research and argument is multidisciplinary. Intellectual 
property issues aGect all fields in the academy, motivating a rich diversity of scholarship. 
Using a variety of perspectives helps me paint a more complete picture of academic concerns 
and also underscores the common concerns different academic Gelds share regarding digital 
copyright law. The following is a list of the fields that support my research and also what these 
fields contribute to my research. 
* RHETORIC AND COMPOSITION. For a perspective on audience and author 
interaction and for issues specifically relating to teaching of writing 
* LITERARY CRITICISM. For historical perspectives on law and literature and also 
for critical perspectives on authorship 
* PROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATION. For issues relating to the practice and teaching 
of Professional Communication, as well as work-fbr-hire issues 
* CULTURAL STUDIES. For a view that articulates law as a cultural artifact 
* LAW. For an understanding of abstract legal issues, as well as information about 
concrete legal information 
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Methods from the above Gelds contribute to discussions of digital intellectual property 
regulation and the question of constitutional balance by unpacking the following 
constituent themes: 
* authorship and its relationship to audience 
* the commodification of creative work 
* the fair and/or unfair regulation of creative works 
The remainder of this chapter mixes the different academic fields' scholarship in an 
organization that follows these themes, in the order listed above. Approaching my literature 
review in this manner allows me to emphasize the common ground that different fields of 
scholarship share, while developing a picture of the exigencies motivating a multi-disciplinary 
academic protest against current digital copyright legislation. First, I begin with a discussion 
of authorship and audience. 
The Author and Audience 
lef fAe ancie/zf serve f&e ^resemf, /ef f/ze /ôreigrz serve f&e fzafzoyza/, 
deve/qpzfzg f/zaf Wzzc/z Aas 6een accomp/zs&ed owe creafes somef/zifzg f/zaf is 
mew. -A6zo Zedb?zg 
Much academic discussion of copyright law centers on who makes the most valuable 
contribution to textual meaning—the author or the audience. An understanding of how value 
occurs is important because whomever law perceives to be the most important contributor to 
culture through the construction of textual meaning is best served by copyright law. In the 
epigraph above, Mao Zedong de-emphasizes the value of the author in this equation, 
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suggesting that the author's unique genius is not necessary in the creation of something new. If 
one accepts that cultural and historical contributions contribute to creation, one may then 
reasonably assume that few completely new works of creativity exist. If that is the case, then 
peihaps the audience itself creates textual inimhability in its interpretation. 
Copyright law did not privilege the author as a unique creative entity until the Romantic 
era (i.e., late 18* century to the early 19* century). During the early years of the 1710 Statute 
of Anne, copyright law typically protected those who owned the presses and publishing houses, 
at least until the late 1700's. Today, a Romantic view of the singular, originary, genius 
endures and this view motivates the increasing legal protection of the individual. Educators in 
disciplines such as linguistics, literary criticism and composition, on the other hand, have 
began to recognize collaboration and the fundamental contributions of the audience to textual 
meaning in the last century, a recognition that is antithetical to dominant cultural attitudes 
toward authorship, as well as to the resulting construction of law protecting authorial 
production. 
An early example of scholarship in this vein is the work of Mikhail Bakhtin a literary 
and social critic, who offers his dialogic theory, a theory representing a profound shift away 
from views expressed by theorists such as Ferdinand de Saussure. While de Saussure 
concentrated on the concrete identification and separation of signs and signiGers or on 
locating meaning in a single text or in the psychology and experience of the author, Bakhtin 
saw the force of meaning taking place in the coMnecfion or dialogue between author and 
audience, sign and signified, past and present. Pointing out the weakness in focusing 
exclusively on author imbued meaning, he argues, "Signs emerge, after all, only in the 
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process of interaction between one individual consciousness and another" ("Marxism and the 
Philosophy" 929). Bakhtin suggests that meaning is negotiated in those complex intersections 
where various real time, history, and cultural players meet. These players may include, but 
are not limited to the author, the audience, the author's own internal audience, and other 
social and historical influences. 
Bakhtin's notion of the polyvocal nature of authorship underscores the importance of a 
healthy public domain in that he recognizes that creativity is not inimitable and singular; new 
intellectual work depends on other voices and on cultural contributions. Increasing 
regulation that diminishes access to and the number of works (read: the number of voices) in 
the public domain neither benefits nor credits the audience. More importantly, severely 
limiting the public domain diminishes potential creative work that depends on the work of 
others—which depended on the work of others in perpetuity—ignoring the author-ity of 
polyvocality. 
Bakhtin, further supporting the idea of a shared cultural commons, takes issue with 
those who he feels deny other voices and the socio-historical embeddedness of creative work 
("Speech Genres" 945-946). He argues that defining meaning-making as the principle 
activity of the speaker (or writer) is a simplistic position that denies other contextual 
contributions. "[T]he schema distorts the actual picture of speech communication, removing 
precisely its most essential aspects. The active role of the other [in this schema] is thus 
reduced to a minimum" ("Speech Genres" 951) Not only does he recognize cultural and 
historical contributions of the non-authorial "other," Mikhail Bakhtin also recognizes the 
significance of the audience in the creation of meaning—the essential resultant activity of a 
creative work. 
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Two 1960's French poststructuralist social and literary critics, Michel Foucault and 
Roland Barthes, go a step further than Bakhtin and report the death of the Romantic author, 
arguing for the primary importance of the audience in textual creation and for the 
fundamental influencing reality outside of the text. Near the conclusion of his 1968 essay, 
"The Death of the Author," Barthes contends that the importance of a text is in the function 
of a reader—that the reader is the site where complex multivocal contributions to a text are 
focused, not where singular genius is realized. He says, "the birth of the reader must be at 
the cost of the death of the Author" (148). This idea of authorial death undermines the notion 
of the singular Romantic author and acknowledges the significance of the audience's role in 
constructing textual meaning. Barthe's emphasis on the function of audience in meaning 
making may also offer a rationale for legal and philosophical challenges to the DMCA's 
hyper-protectionist regulations. 
In support ofBarthes's emphasis on audience, Michel Foucault underscores the relative 
unimportance of the author in the final construction of meaning concluding that the author 
loses identity in both the writing of and in the reading of a text. He argues against a static 
author-imbued meaning, explaining that "the form, the complexity, and even the existence of 
this function [the author-function] are far from immutable^" (138) and he imagines a future 
without the need for a specific, identifiable genius, a future filled with written discourse of 
anonymous authorship. Although he seems to be negating the need for copyright protection, he 
1 Foucault defines the author function in the following excerpt from "What is an Author?" : 
[Tjhe "author-function" is tied to the legal and institutional systems that circumscribe, 
determine, and articulate the realm of discourses; it does not operate in a uniform manner in 
all discourses, at all times, and in any given culture; it is not defined by the spontaneous 
attribution of a text to its creator, but through a series of precise and complex procedures; it 
does not refer, purely and simply, to an actual individual insofar as it simultaneously gives 
rise to a variety of egos and to a series of subjective positions that individuals of any class 
may come to occupy" (130-131). 
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may be only speaking of cultural attitudes, but a cultural acceptance of the importance of the 
audience would undermine the over-protection of the singular and corporate author and would 
ultimately affect to whom the law assigns most of the benefits. Currently, however, digital 
copyright law remains unchanged in focus and so the singular author survives, notwithstanding 
recent legal challenges like the successful challenge of Andrew Brunner, a California teenager 
who posted the reverse engineered DVD code to the Internet. In doing so, Brunner invited the 
collaborative re-authorship of the code by the user, a direct example of the "immutability" of 
the author-function. Brunner's challenge to digital copyright law and others will be addressed 
in Chapter 5. The real problem of constructing fair copyright law is in balancing the financial 
and creative concerns of both audience and author especially in an educational context where a 
single person more often than not assumes the author and audience roles in researching other 
work and in integrating that work into his or her own work for publication. 
Michel Foucault both answers and debates Roland Barthes' idea of the death of the 
author in his work. He makes clear that his goal is not to support and describe cultural and 
historical contributions to creativity; instead, he examines today's "singular relationship that 
holds between an author and a text, the manner in which a text apparently points to this 
figure who is outside and precedes it" (115). This relationship is borne out by evidence that 
current writing not only points to itself (sign constituting content), but its signs also relate to 
the signifier. Foucault calls this the interplay of signs and signifier. Thus, the author has 
become more important today. Current evidence of an emphasis on the author, according to 
Foucault is in the proliferation of biographies and autobiographies of authors and in writing 
about the writing process—all writing that points to itself and to its author. Moreover, 
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especially in academic texts, front material like acknowledgements, dedications, prefaces, 
introductions, and forwards are abundant. This "meta"-material also constitutes writing that 
underscores authorial and textual value. 
The paradox embedded in the proliferation and importance of meta-text is the 
simultaneous importance of the author and the author's disappearance into the text. This 
paradox is also present in other genres beyond the front material. For example, the author's 
unique characteristics disappear in the expressions of characters and the narrative quality in 
fiction writing or in business conventions, genre expectations, and boilerplate of a text in 
professional communication. Foucault says "If we want to know a writer in our day, it will be 
through the singularity of his absence and in his link to death, which has transformed him 
into a victim of his own writing" (117), but "victim" may be too one-dimensional a term to 
describe the software redesigner or coursepack compiler; perhaps, creative collaborator is 
more appropriate. 
Foucault also interrogates the exclusive relationship between and author and text, as he 
explores just what an author's work is. Does a complete collection of a particular author's work 
include all notes, drafts, post-it note material, shopping lists, and so on? Where do we draw the 
line? Mwf imporfonf/y—What constitutes originality? Dzere/bre—What works must the law 
protect? In asking these questions, we search for the uniqueness that constitutes a particular 
author's work and, thus, the author's unique style in defining that work. We are examining 
what Foucault calls the author-function. 
The legal definition of uniqueness or originality has been elusive though. On one hand, 
the law, according to legal scholars, Catherine Innes and Charles C. Valauskas, says that 
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originality means "that the work was independently created and not copied from another work" 
and also that the work must exhibit "at least a minimal amount of creativity" (Cc#yngAf 
fX-ofecfzoM 2). On the other hand, certain compilations like databases have been denied 
copyright protection on the basis of non-originality and others, like anthologies, have been 
accepted for protection.^ An anthology's copyright implies "a minimal amount of creativity." 
Some anthologies, however, require little new creativity beyond organizational style and the 
"meta-textual" front materials (i.e., preface, introduction, table of contents). One could argue 
that if an anthology can be copyrighted, then the educator who compiles a coursepack should 
also be protected and defined as an author by law. After all, a coursepack is equivalent to an 
informal anthology and may also include front materials. Nevertheless, the coursepack's 
originality, at this point, has been ignored by law, as illustrated when the Court decided for 
Basic Books in the 1992 case, Azfic Booty v. A&z&o '& In this case, Kinko's was found guilty 
of copyright infringement for not gaining permission from author/owners before assembling, 
copying, and selling coursepacks to college students. The educator who compiled the 
coursepack did not even figure into the litigation discussion (758 F. Supp. 1522). Denial of 
protection for and even the legal existence of the coursepack compiler, acknowledges and 
protects the rights of the anthology compiler, privileges publishing houses, and ignores the 
academic author and audience. 
27 In Feist Publications, v. Rural Telephone Service (1991), the Supreme Court ruled that Rural Telephone's 
white pages were not eligible to be protected by copyright because it lacked the enough creativity to call it 
original (HI S. CL 1282) 
Conversely, in a May, 2000 decision in the case eBay v. Bidder's Edge, the United States District Court of 
Northern California found that eBay's auction item database was original enough to merit copyright protection. 
The court enjoined Bidder's Edge an auction site search engine from searching and using the data on eBay to 
inform its users of what was up for auction. This decision probably sets a precedent for protection of other 
online databases (100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
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Foucault's questions about what constitutes originality and thus authorial ownership 
is also a concern for compositionists and rhetoricians Andrea Lunsfbrd and Susan West, in 
their 1996 essay, "Intellectual Property and Composition Studies." The authors criticize our 
culture's increasing preoccupation with the ownership of such things as surgical methods and 
gene mapping, likening this possessive mentality to a two-year old's whining complaint of 
"Mine" (386). They draw a correlation between this possessive mentality and contemporary 
academic concepts of textual ownership and plagiarism, pointing out that "the academy has 
been obsessively concerned with plagiarism, with 'false' ownership" (398). They argue for 
collaborative knowledge production and question the cultural construction of the original 
genius, and like Michel Foucault, they imagine an academic context in which nothing can be 
deemed original. 
What happens if the producers of such knowledge, the Romantic "authors" or 
even "author functions," are so widely dispersed as to be invisible, parceled 
out in so many ways and through so many different hands that "ownership 
cannot be fixed? What happens if ... those associated with electronic 
technology effectively destroy old systems of the "right" to copy? What then? 
(399) 
Andrew Brunner's publication of the reverse engineered DVD code to an online bulletin 
board exemplifies what West and Ede refer to here. One can easily imagine that many 
individuals contributed to the engineering of the code—beginning with the person who first 
conceived of and employed the Binary Code.^* 
This authorial rush to ownership has provided the context not only for the passage of 
the DMCA, but also for the passage of a 20-year copyright term extension that rewards not 
necessarily the real author/creator, but rather the owner of copyrights (i.e., publishers, distant 
28 The Binary Code is an electronic coding scheme that communicates information by means of l's and O's. 
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relatives, corporate entities). This owner may be the originator or author, but most frequently 
is not, especially in a corporate setting because of the 1976 "work-fbr-hire" provision which 
broadly says that what is created in the employ of another belongs to the employer.^ 
Additionally, the anti-circumvention provision of the DMCA and the discounting of fair use 
strengthen the corporate owner and property union and guarantee a fertile source of revenue 
for business. 
In the digital realm, intellectual property is far-reaching. In providing new profit 
potential for corporations, recent copyright legislation has substantially diminished the digital 
public domain by forbidding the circumvention of password protection and anti-
circumvention code to those who would manipulate, improve, and produce new software for 
public use. In other words, the DMCA has reduced or made difGcult opportunities for 
creative collaboration with Ae ideas contained in the free public domain. 
Andrea Lunsfbrd has rejected the emphasis on exclusive and individual authorship of 
both traditional and hypertextual woik. Although the fragmented nature of postmodern 
authorship would appear to challenge old notions of singular authorship expressed by those 
like Foucault and Barthes, Lunsfbrd suggests, in her 1999 CoWege EngW; essay, "Rhetoric, 
29 The 1976 Copyright Act describes "work-for-hire" as 1.) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of 
his or her employment or 2.) a work specially ordered or commissioned as a contribution to a collective work, 
as part of a motion picture or other audio-visual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a 
compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly 
agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. 
In determining complex cases challenging "work for hire" the courts consider 13 factors described in the 1976 
Copyright Act. These factors include considerations such as whether the hired party worked at the hired party's 
place of business, the method of payment, and whether the hired party received any benefits from the hiring 
party. 
For additional information, as it applies to educators, read "Who Owns My Work? The State of Work for Hire 
for Academics in Technical Communication," by Tanya Herrington. Journal of Business and Technical 
Communication. Vol. 13, Issue 2 (April 1999). 
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Feminism, and Textual Ownership," that these postmodern attitudes actually reinforce the 
ideas of the importance of Romantic authorship, evidence which can be found in the increasing 
protectionism of copyright law. Postmodern ideas about the "death of the author" and 
powerful corporate ownership of intellectual property actually marginalize those who 
collaborate, many of whom are women. Lunsfbrd argues that this "sovereign 'author' 
construct" is especially prevalent in cyberspace (532). 
Moreover, she argues that the advances in computer technology have contributed to the 
increasing privileging of the corporate author and have also expanded the realm of intellectual 
property. 
In spite of their wide public use and the fact that they are the products of a 
wholly collaborative process, compute programs... are increasingly defined 
in the law as works of "originality" and "creative genius," that is, as works that 
611 within the expansive protection of copyright and author's rights [i.e., 
individual rights]. ("Rhetoric, Feminism" 532) 
However, Lunsfbrd, praises a few existing mavericks who support the Internet as collaborative 
site. Examples she offers are the software browser, Netscape Navigator, which released its 
source code to the public; Pamela Samuelson, law professor, who shares the html code to her 
teaching website and has railed against copyright laws that "infringe on the sharing of 
knowledge in society"; and the collaborative web designing feminist community, 
Spiderwoman ("Rhetoric, Feminism" 537). 
In his essay, "Agency and the Death of the Author: A Partial Defense of Modernism," 
John Trimbur, rhetoric and professional communication scholar, acknowledges the problems of 
an environment that privileges individual authorship while denying author-ity to collaborative 
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authorship. However, unlike Lunsfbrd, he does attempt to defend the modernist support of the 
singular producer of creative work in a capitalist society, contending that the academic trend 
toward acceptance of 'Death of the Author" is nothing more than a reaction of the 
marginalized against the powerful. He explains: 
In my view, what is needed is not a new theory of agency but the old modernist 
sense of solidarity: the workers against the bosses, the people against the ruling 
bloc, the oppressed against their oppressors. And just as I want to keep this part 
of modernism alive, I now want to go back and check the vital signs of the 
author. (295) 
Trimbur's neo-Marxist scenario of the ruling bloc and "the oppressed against their oppressors" 
would not impress those capitalist oppressors who make copyright law, the same capitalist 
oppressors who would (at least in theory) deny the importance of the audience and the innate 
collaborative nature of authorship supported by Lunsfbrd, West, and Bakhtin. 
Today, western culture strongly supports a capitalist vision of the corporate author and 
corporate ownership of intellectual property. An example of this vision is found in our 
government's quick support of CEO Michael Eisner and his Disney Corporation in supporting 
the 1998 CTEA. Although this vision of a corporate author as creative entity does not 
completely match the Romantic idea of the solitary genius in the garret, the legal structure is 
tailor-made to single author/owner protection and simply does not and cannot support 
collaborative authorship because of cultural attitudes and resulting legal structure. 
Defining ownership, in fact, is key to exploring current copyright theory. In her book, 
Cw&Mro/of/Yqperfie;. jW&ora/qp, and f&e law, law 
professor and cultural studies theorist, Rosemary Coombe explains that the commodiGcation of 
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creative work coincides with the late 18th century transition of the author from a hired creator 
supported by a wealthy patron to an independent producer protected by copyright. "No longer 
reliant upon the largesse of patrons, men [sic] of letters sought to distinguish their creative 
activities as artists who required freedom from the pressures of employment.. .exactly as texts 
were commodified" (254). A benefactor reaped the value of a creative work for the price of 
the room and board of an author. Copyright laws gave the author ownership and thus, 
independence—providing income without interference, and control of who could buy, adapt, 
compile, manipulate, or copy a text. The text, now out of the exclusive control of the 
benefactor, became a product to be marketed and sold for the economic benefit of its creator. 
Commodification of Intellectual Property 
A commodity appears, at first sight, a very trivial thing, and 
easily understood. Its analysis shows that it is, in reality, a 
very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and 
theological niceties (215). 
-Karl Marx, Capital 
The tension between corporate and academic interests both reflects and affects the 
"tension between the monopolistic character of intellectual property and its normative goal of 
enhancing the flow of information and ideas" (Bettig 8). Unfortunately, today's digital 
copyright law and term extension does not balance these dual purposes. Instead, it funnels 
intellectual property through a profit-making machine to the benefit of the corporate 
author/owner. Works of digital creativity are quickly becoming pure commodity, while little 
remains of the original and fertile digital public domain. Communication law theorist, 
Yochai Benkler contends, "this increasing propertization [i.e., commodification] is attained at 
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the expense both of innovation and of robust democratic discourse that a well-balanced 
intellectual property law could serve" ("From Consumers to Users" 570). And much of that 
innovation and democratic discourse begins and sustains on college campuses among both 
students and educators. To understand why the digital realm seems to be emerging as a 
medium for complete ownership, cultural studies scholars like Rosemary Coombe examine 
commodification as the concept that underpins ownership.** 
The commodification of anything is generated by two economic concepts—demand 
and perception of value. These two concepts interact. If there is no demand; there is no 
perception of value. And conversely, if there is no perceived value, then there is no demand. 
So how does a work gain value? And why are some works perceived to be more valuable 
than others? For example, why is a videotape of a Disney cartoon more valuable in the 
marketplace than an academic essay? They are both works of intellectual labor, both serve 
their audiences well, and both are in demand. The difference is in how large a market exists 
for each, not in how well they satisfy their intended audiences. Understanding why corporate 
creative activity is perceived as more valuable than academic creative activity might reveal 
something about why the law privileges the singular corporate author over academic authors 
and audiences. So how did the Disney cartoon gain such value as a commodity? And, why 
does recent copyright law protect increasing commodification of corporate-owned work to 
the disadvantage of educators and their students? This system supported by cultural 
attitudes, devalues academic creative activity, hyper-values corporate works, and also makes 
access to valued work more difGcult for those in academia. 
30 Commodification of intellectual property and resulting copyright law is extensively discussed in Coombe's 
book. The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties. See Works Cited page for complete citation. 
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Understanding the commodification of intellectual property—creations that have little 
consistent correlation to the labor required to produce them or to their inherent use-value— 
requires an understanding of Karl Marx's concept of fetishism.^ Marxist philosophy only 
adds to our understanding of how property gains value, it does not underpin this paper. Marx 
does offer what other theorists—including composition!sts, legal scholars, and cultural 
studies theorists—do not, a specific basis for understanding why corporations and the law as 
a cultural extension of corporations now hold certain traditional and digital intellectual 
properties in such high esteem, why these properties command such a high price, and why 
they are protected from easy access. 
In "Das Capital," Marx says that all goods begin as something from nature. Then 
those goods are manipulated in some way to change the natural resources into commodities 
with use-value. In the case of text, the freely available words, phrases, and ideas (in nature) 
are manipulated into a whole that conveys a unique meaning. The work becomes useful in 
that it entertains, informs, or persuades. But, according to Marx, the overvaluing does not 
originate at this stage. Something happens. The text becomes imbued with a mystical or 
mythical quality. In the case of intellectual property, that quality is a long-enduring cultural 
attitude defining authorship as Romantic genius and text as the characterization of that 
genius. That embodiment of Romantic intelligence is perceived as something that has 
relationships with other texts. It becomes personified. According to Marx, "The Fetishism 
31 In part III, section 2 of "Capital" Marx explains that use-value is the inherent value a commodity has defined 
by its usefulness and borne out by its basic value in exchange. A pair of shoes, for example, is a useful good, 
and in a money-less context would have exchange value. In referring to capitalist ideology, Marx says two 
goals exist in production of goods, "to produce a use-value that has a value in exchange, that is to say an article 
destined to be sold, a commodity; and secondly, the desires to produce commodity whose value shall be greater 
than the sum of the values of the commodities used in its production" (239). 
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[or overvaluing of commodities] has its origin ... in the peculiar social character of the 
labour that produces them" (217). In other words, copyright law protects what is perceived 
by culture as the quintessence of sacred genius—the Romantic author becomes the Romantic 
text 
Fig. 5 
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Consider again the case of a Disney cartoon. Walt Disney has been mythologized as 
the godlike entrepreneurial author/genius of wholesome fun and entertainment The qualities 
of wholesomeness and entrepreneurship are valued components of American identity 
mythology. This mythology is magnified by corporate marketing strategies, marketing 
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strategies that do not play much of a role in the audience/author/text or intellectual property 
triangle of the academic rhetorical situation. The Disney cartoon with its mystical quality, 
amplified through marketing strategy, has great economic exchange value as illustrated by 
the corporate rhetorical triangle shown above in Figure 5. 
Accordingly, the law casts a wide net to protect that value, as illustrated by the easy 
passage of the 20-year term extension, a law designed primarily to protect the earliest 
Mickey Mouse cartoon, which was due to enter the public domain in 
2003.^ Strict protection of intellectual property adds to the monetary value of a work in that 
whatever is difficult to attain (e.g. caviar or truffles) gains in value. A mystical or mythical 
quality, marketing strategies, and legal protection add to the perception of value of a work. 
Cultural studies and legal scholar, Rosemary Coombes finds similarities between the 
Marxist concept of fetishism and semiotic representation. In a semiotic analysis, the 
mythological characteristic of fetishism would be the signifying representation suggested by 
the sign (commodity). Commodities become self-re&rential when they are marketed as 
unreal representations of themselves. To increase the value, commodities are woven into the 
fabric of "American" ideals, as expressed in the General Motors slogan, "What's good for 
General Motors is good for America" (55). These commodities come to represent culturally 
accepted qualities of Americanism like entrepreneurship, individualism, patriotism, or 
wholesomeness; and these representations attract many consumers who willingly pay for 
those signified values. In referring to the recent protectionist changes in copyright law 
32 Michael Eisner, Disney Corporation's CEO donated thousands of dollars to the campaign coffers of several 
congresspersons who four months after the donations voted in favor of the copyright term extension (Newmyer 
2240) 
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resulting from the intensive marketing of representation (i.e., of ideals, of values), Coombes 
observes that: 
The twentieth century has witnessed a massive expansion of the legal 
protections available for publicly circulating forms of signifying property; in 
many sectors of the economy, texts deployed to market goods may be more 
valuable than the physical assets necessary to create the product (56) 
Consumers pay for and value the signified qualities—or as Marx would put it, the 
mythology—as much as the product itself. 
Most academic work does not inspire consumer spending, as much as corporate work 
does. Even though both corporations and academia share the same authorial myth, this 
inequity in economic value between academic and corporate products begs the following 
question: If both types of work are created by the culturally constructed and mythologized 
Romantic genius, then why aren't the works of both academia and corporations equally 
valuable in the marketplace and why doesn't law equally protect them both? 
The answer might be in where the Romantic mythology diverges. The Romantic 
academic author is subconsciously identified as a struggling artist, living in an unhealed 
garret and catching sparrows on his windowsill like Emile Zola. Therefore, economic wealth 
is not a component of academic authorial identity. However, instead of the poverty-stricken 
author, the successful American business entrepreneur characterizes the Romantic mythology 
of Disney and other corporate entities. Because profit is the basis of our marketplace 
economy, copyright law protects those who make the most profit or those our mythology 
associates with wealth—the corporate entrepreneurs. 
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Academic concerns, however, include not only the traditional copyright protection for 
profit and protection from theft, but also a reasonable public domain and a dependable 
educational exemption for the purpose of research, teaching and learning (see Fig. 2, Chapter 
1). Conversely, a corporate environment whose emphasis is on broadening the 
commodification of intellectual property perceives the public domain as proGt potential and 
the educational exemption as an erosion of profit potential. Because the DMCA and 20-
Copyright Term Extension are laws created by a legal system that reflects corporate ideals, 
these laws support the singular corporate author/owner, profit, and profit potential—not the 
research, teaching, and learning activities of the academy. 
The Fairness or Unfairness of Copyright Law 
fPe are m f&e of a j?zfc&ed Wf/e over f&e apofk of f&e fra%g/brma#on fo a 
<#g#a/(y nefworAed emwowne»f awf fAe ;?^ôrmafzoM economy. AaAeWJIerf 
^"om f&e oWer economy are xwwg /egw/afzow, yW;c:a/ cgpmfow, awf 
;/ifer»afio»a/ freafies fo refam fAe oW ffrwcfwe of orgamzzMg /yo<A^cf;oM w 
fAey coMfzwwe fo cowfro/ fAe empires fAey ve W/f or m&erifed CopyrigAf 
/aw/k/... Aeing wa/pe</ fo fAe f6e</ offAe A;erarcAica/ orgamizaffow of 
^gjfeyyear ("'7%e Baff/e " PQ). 
-TbcAa; Jenifer 
In the above passage, Yochai Benkler argues that copyright law bends to the needs of 
corporate hierarchies. In a marketplace economy, this legal and corporate duet is to be 
expected. In their essay, "The Author in Copyright: Notes for the Literary Critic," Monroe 
E. Price and Malla Pollack, literary critics, explain the value system that underpins our legal 
system regarding art and literature: "[T]he status of the creator (an approved artist or author) 
is not the determinant of protection, but more fundamentally the relationship of works of art 
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to the marketplace [is the determinant]" (451). Whether the mythology and value of the 
Disney cartoon, focaWzfa? is accepted by consumas is far more important than whether an 
individual cartoonist is recognized. The corporation's profit realized through the 
"relationship of works of art to the marketplace" is key to the livelihood of industry. 
Therefore, the focus of copyright law rests with protection of the product and thus, corporate 
profit, rather than with protection of the creative and original author, a concern in education, 
borne out by academic researchers and educators' passion for attribution. 
Unfortunately, laws that support this framework extend to an educational setting 
where a creative work seldom makes much if any profit, a setting in which creative work 
most often depends on other work for its existence, a setting where contributing authors are 
assiduously recognized through documentation and citation.^ The law neither recognizes, 
protects, nor encourages the academic manipulation of or collaboration with copyrighted 
works, especially within a digital environment because allowing academic players to 
"borrow" copyrighted material may erode potential profit—the prime motivation for 
creativity implied by Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution. Price and Pollack 
question the efficiency of a system that assumes that all authors' chief motivation for 
creativity is direct profit potential and they argue for a copyright system that accepts the 
innate collaborative nature of creativity asking, "[H]ow does one calibrate a legal structure so 
as to provide adequate incentives for creativity without, at the same time, discouraging the 
inventive scholarship that comes from the exploitation of existing ideas?" (452). Price and 
3 31 am not referring to  patented creative work here.  I  refer only to  copyrighted work,  which is  the focus of  my 
extended argument and research. Indeed patented works do provide significant profit for universities. For 
example, in January of 1999, Kenneth Campbell reported in MIT Tech Talk (an online journal) that university-
owned patents provide 246,000 jobs and $29 billion in revenue to educational institutions. 
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Pollack seem to be suggesting the availability of these "existing ideas," accessible through a 
free public domain or the educational fair use exemption is just as important an incentive to 
academic creativity as profit is. 
Unfortunately, DMCA regulations are antithetical and even detrimental to the 
academic need for a legal framework that supports the "inventive scholarship" of 
collaboration with existing digital work. Legal scholar, Lawrence Lessig describes the 
collaborative creativity that could be lost through current overregulation of the digital 
environment: 
[N]ow we have the potential to expand the reach of this creativity to an 
extraordinary range of culture and commerce. Technology could enable a 
whole generation to create—remixed 61ms, new forms of music, digital art, a 
new kind of storytelling, writing, a new technology for poetry, criticism, 
political activism—and then, through the infrastructure of the Internet, a&are 
that creativity with others. (9) 
And all the creative activities that Lessig describes above are also academic activities. 
A digital environment that promotes individual and collaborative creativity also 
must include a reliable fair use provision and a large and vibrant traditional and digital public 
domain. In protecting corporate concerns for profit potential, the DMCA undermines both 
concepts and undermines the interests of educators and students. 
Fair Use 
In her book, DzgzW Cqpyng&f, law professor, Jessica Litman attempts to shed light 
on the complexities the concept of fair use as it plays out in digital law (83-84). Traditional 
(as opposed to digital) copyright law provided the context for the creation of the fair use 
provision, so that non-profit organizations like universities and libraries could access work 
easily and cheaply. However, Air use was also applied in situations where one could 
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reasonably assume that permission to use the work would be given—as for parody or 
criticism. This is the area in which fair use has been severely undermined.^ Litman explains 
that argument offered by those who object to "implied assent" in the digital realm argue is 
that it is wrong and even unnecessary to make such an assumption (84). She explains why: 
"In its most extreme form, this argument suggests that fair use itself is an archaic privilege 
with little application to the digital world: where technology permits automatic licensing, 
legal fictions based on "implied assent" become unnecessary" (84). Litman goes on to warn 
that rejection of "implied assent" as unnecessary because of technological capabilities opens 
the door to even stricter control. In other words a software owner can put increasingly more 
efficient circumvention devices into play. A key provision of the DMCA, the anti-
circumvention provision, makes few allowances for educational and other non-profit uses. 
Lawrence Lessig, points to a logical inconsistency between the traditional guarantees 
of copyright law and the DMCA's current regulations and attitude toward Air use and the 
DMCA's anti-circumvention provision. The basis of his argument is that "fair use of 
copyrighted works is understood to be constitutionally required" as supported by traditional 
copyright legislation (188). In his book, fWwre of Akap, he explains: 
If copyright law must protect fair use—meaning the law cannot protect 
copyrighted material without leaving space for fair use—then laws protecting 
[anti-circumvention] code protecting copyrighted material should also leave 
room for Air use. You can't do indirectly (protect fair-use-denying-code 
34 Although digital copyright law weakens fair use for parody and criticism, the erosion of "fair use" for parody 
may have begun as early as the early 1990's in the case of Acuff-Rose Music v. Campbell In that case, an 
Appeals Court decided that 2 Live Crew's rap version of "Oh, Pretty Woman," a Roy Orbison/William Dees 
song, would adversely affect the market for the original song even though All lyrics of the original song were 
changed except the first line. However, the Supreme Court overturned that decision "in language that 
reaffirmed the value of critique" (773). 
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protecting copyright) what you can't do directly (protect copyright without 
protecting fair use). (188) 
The anti-circumvention provision of the DMCA prevents any entity—profit or non-profit— 
from navigating around controls without risking criminal prosecution. Additionally, the 
DMCA's support of anti-circumvention code devices might actually encourage the 
emplacement of more anti-circumvention devices considering the potential profit in charging 
gatekeeper's fees. A current and real example of increased code protection is illustrated by 
the trend of online journals like 77# Mew fort Timea and «Sb/oncom to become subscription 
sites. Many sites, like the online version of the CMcqgo began as an almost free 
site; then they slowly evolved into protected sites. The sites begin code protecting archived 
materials and finally the periodicals emerge as a total content subscription service (with the 
exceptions of a few short articles and marketing blurbs). 
The Public Domain 
According to legal scholars, Litman, Lessig, and Benkler, the anti-circumvention 
provision of the DMCA not only undermines fair use, but also directly diminishes work in 
the digital public domain by allowing and even encouraging controls that can effectively lock 
up any work. Suppose, for example, for educational purposes, I want access for my students 
to "Huckleberry Finn" a work that entered the public domain years ago. Then suppose that 
the A-q/ecf decides to put circumvention protection on the site containing the 
work. Without first gaining permission from the website owner, neither my students nor I 
can through any means circumvent the code that protects the site without committing a 
criminal offense according to the DMCA. Therefore, even though I should have an 
educational exemption through the Air use provision and even though "Huckleberry Finn" is 
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available in the public domain, I would not legally be able to access the work on the 
Gutenberg site without permission or without paying entrance to the site.35 
Despite my predicament as an educator, some would argue that the United States 
Constitution provides copyrights (like the anti-circumvention provision) to authors so that 
they will profit from control of their work. This rationale says that only if authors can profit, 
will they be motivated to create. Like Price and Pollack, Lawrence Lessig disputes this 
position, saying that most innovations on the Net occurred in a non-regulated environment 
and a free public domain. He says that in the midst of this creative environment, legal and 
corporate forces have taken over and threaten to constrain that creativity. 
[C]hanges in the architecture of the Internet—both legal and technical—are 
sapping the Internet of this power. Fueled by a bias in favor of control, 
pushed by those whose financial interests favor control, our social and 
political institutions are ratifying changes in the Internet that will reestablish 
control and, in turn, reduce innovation on the Internet and in society generally 
(15). 
Yochai Benkler proposes that a fair system of copyright laws would benefit not only 
those whose financial interests are at stake, but also such a position would benefit those 
whose creative activity doesn't result in profit, like educators and their students. Benkler's 
notion of a fair copyright system correlates with Herbert Morns' equal distribution of 
burdens and benefits, discussed in Chapter 1. Benkler says that such a system is tied to the 
"core values of democracy and autonomy that underlie the American commitment to freedom 
of speech and a free press" ("Property, Commons, and the First Amendment" 3). One could 
also add—a commitment to academic freedom. Benkler suggests that in order to build and 
maintain a body of copyright law that benefits all stakeholders, 
35 Project Gutenberg is not an anti-circumvention protected site. It currently houses over 6000 free ebooks. For 
information on the interesting history of this site, access the URL: http://promo.net/pg/history.html 
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[W]e must build a core common infrastructure that will allow commercial and 
noncommercial, professional and amateur, commodiGed and 
noncommodified, mainstream and fringe to interact in an environment that 
allows all to flourish and is biased in favor of none. ("Property, Commons 
and the First Amendment" 3) 
To build this infrastructure, it is necessary to maintain public domain for free creative play in 
each of three layers: the content layer, the code layer, and the physical layer. 
The next chapter (Chapter 3) begins with a discussion and analysis of academic 
discourse preceding the passage of the DMCA, a description of my DMCA artifacts, and 
explanation of the framework I employ far analyzing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
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Chapter 3 
DOCUMENTS AND METHODS 
This chapter accomplishes two tasks: 1) it describes my rationale for keying in on specific burdens 
and benefits; and 2) it explains the methodology I employ for analyzing my DMCA artifacts for 
the purpose of addressing my research question. The findings of the DMCA analysis appear in 
Chapter 4. 
Benefit» and Burdens as Identified by Academic Organizations in Pre Passage Discourse 
To answer my primary research question—Aow Aoc recenf cqpyrzgAf /egWaffo» 
f&e Wance of Me/kcfW /yoperfy aW Awrdlew acadkmzc awfAorf awf 
aiA&ewgf?—I Grst identify those benefits and burdens that aSect and concern educators and 
students in the digital copyright environment. Representative online documents constituting 
academic reporting, debate and discussion preceding the DMCA's passage in 1998 help 
unpack relevant academic issues pertaining to evolving digital copyright legislation. The 
documents selected for this study were published on academic organizations' websites and in 
the organizations' respective online periodicals. The intended audiences were the 
organizations' membership, as well as House of Representatives and Senate congresspersons. 
The Representative Organizations 
The organizations representing authors of discursive documents occurring in advance 
of the passage of the DMCA are the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), 
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the Conférence on College Composition and Communication (CCCC), and the National 
Council of Teachers of English (NCTE). The AAUP was chosen because it offers viewpoints 
representative of viewpoints in a variety of academic disciplines. I chose the NCTE and its 
subgroup CCCC for two reasons. First, they are specific to my own field of English and 
second, a surfeit of material concerning impending copyright legislation was available from 
both organizations. Bolh organizations maintain web pages devoted to term extension and 
digital copyright news and discussion; CCCC and NCTE online journal articles and position 
statements were filled with news of the proposed legislation for several years preceding its 
passage. 
The Academic Documents 
The documents chosen to establish academic concerns or "burdens" from the 
organizations described above are: 
* A November 1995 letter to the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. Senate expressing 
concern over the burdens imposed on writing teachers by the proposed digital copyright 
bill (an early version of the DMCA). 
* A similar letter by CCCC members in May 1996 to the House Committee on the 
Judiciary about the same bill. 
* An NCTE Cownc# C&rowc/e online article titled, "CCCC, NCTE Join Opposition to 
Copyright Legislation: CCCC Voices Concerns to Senate Judiciary Committee." 
* Another NCTE online article titled, "Copyright Bills Seek to Maintain Balance." 
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* An undated AAUP position statement, titled "Statement on Copyright," addressing 
digital technologies in the classroom. 
* An AAUP memo to the AAUP Government Relations Network from its associate 
director reporting on the passage of the DMCA. 
* Another AAUP memo from the associate director to AAUP Government Relations 
expressing concerns about a digital database provision. 
These documents were selected because they express concerns common to many disciplines, 
because they exemplify academic concerns expressed repeatedly in the many educational 
documents I consulted during my research process, and also because the documents 
specifically and clearly outline those concerns. Additionally, the documents represent a variety 
of genres framing opposition to the DMCA, effectively underscoring the ubiquity and thus, the 
significance of pie-passage academic discourse in establishing a shifting of the balance of 
benefits and burdens. These documents provide a natural touchstone for the analysis and 
discovery of identified concerns in the DMCA. 
The Organizational Discourse 
In this section I weave rhetorical analysis with history. The reason for including history 
is that the context is important as the DMCA evolves and moves through the legislative process 
over the course of several years, simultaneously prompting new academic burdens to surface at 
each stage. Therefore, I have arranged my discussion of the documents below in 
chronological order. 
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The CCCC s intellectual property committee, CCCC-IP, meet at the CCCC yearly 
conference in the Caucus on Intellectual Property and Composition Studies. In November of 
1995, six members of the Caucus—including Andrea Lunsfbrd, James Porter, Laura Gurak, 
John Logie, Lisa Toner, and Susan West—drafted a letter to the Judiciary Committee of the 
United States Senate. The letter addressed the proposed intellectual property bill that would 
evolve as the DMCA in 1998. The first paragraph of the letter describes the 1995 bill as 
"hostile to the interests of writing teachers and students" (Lunsfbrd et al. "November 7,1995"), 
thereby establishing an academic position antithetical to the bill's provisions early in the letter. 
The caucus members go on to ask Senate Judiciary Committee to "hold comprehensive 
hearings on S.1284 [the title of the bill at this point] with the aim of thoroughly scrutinizing the 
full range of implications of the bill and of making appropriate amendments to ensure the bill 
supports a fair and just copyright policy we can all live with."* This statement conveys a 
concern over the lack of input into the DMCA from educators and a sense that the legislation is 
inherently detrimental to academic concerns. The caucus letter is relevant to my research in 
that the caucus establishes those "implications" for academia very explicitly. 
To contextualize and support their objections to the bill, Lunsfbrd et al. describe the 
increasing importance of the "electronic network" to the composition classroom for research, 
conferencing, communicating, and publishing. Three very speciGc objections are delineated. I 
have retained the caucus's system of number and letter outlining and have italicized my own 
annotations. 
36 S.1284 is simply the Senate's designation for the digital copyright bill, which at that time was called Nil 
Copyright protection Act of 1995. Nil is an acronym for the National Information Infrastructure. This bill 
metamorphosed into the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act. 
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1. "[The bill] enforces an even more restrictive level of intrusion [than traditional 
copyright law] into people's use of digital information.... The legislation is an 
attempt to restrict to the point of near elimination any sense of educational Fair Use as 
it might apply to computer-generated materials." TTws aegmenf zwea afro/zg and 
emofzoMa/Zy /oa<Wwor<6 /zAe enforces, restrictive, intrusion, and near elimination fo 
gfve a fewe of f&e qpgveff rveweff of fAe j^qpofed /egkWzow awf fo cowvey fo 
Cowgrefj fAe weceff zfy fo revise wW f/ze awf/zorf fee af an ayzfz-edbcafzon 6;//. A a/fo 
&$fa6/k/zef fAe erofzon offazr L&e as a /ywxary acafWwc cower». 
2. "Writing teachers' views were never considered... .The philosophy undergirding the 
legislation serves the commercial interests of larger publishers, recording companies, 
and major motion picture producers at the expense of educational interests." TTzza poz/zf 
eafaWWzea f&e /Trfvz/egwzg of co/porafe mferefA over fAe WerefA of edlwcaforf awf 
f/zezr jfwdlgMA m U»zW &afef cqpyrzgAf /aw aW fugged dkmay over f/ze Cofzgre&y 'j 
meg/ecf M ac*?zow/e%zMg f&e z/^porfance qf acadewza ag a ffate/zoWer. 
3. "S. 1284 [a version of the DMCA] would have troubling implications for writing 
instruction." 
a) "[Although students would continue to be allowed to browse print resources in 
a library, they could not safely browse materials on the Internet without risking 
copyright violation." 77zzjjx)zfzfre/&r,sf0f/ze "wz /?rogre&;" aMff-cfrczoMveMdon 
/arovinoM. iSYWen# wow/d »of 6e a6/e fo view pa&yword or codle /yofecfed 
cqpyrzg/zfed wort; wzf/zo«f o6faz/zzMg^?ermkfzo» or /zcewef or eke, payz?zg 
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rpya/fzej fo f/ze owner of f/zo^e ^ orA?. TTze zdea of a /aw f/zaf wow/d fraw/brzn 
 ^fz^denf re^earc/zerf Wo crzznzna/f w on emofzona/ <%pea/ f/zaf emp/zanzea f/ze 
ZTMporkMce of acceff fo ecA^caforf and f fzzdenff. 
b) "The legislation would make universities, as service providers, liable for 
students' copyright infringements. Rather than face the level of liability this entails, 
universities will severely limit teachers' uses of Internet resources. The legislation 
would thus discourage the growth of new electronic educational innovations and 
encourage increased invasion of privacy by service providers." 77ns poznf was 
)&zr/y znfacf m f/ze DMCL4, a/f/zowg/z f/ze zznzverfzfy fervzce jarovzderf are 
/zo /onger a; ffr/cf/y /za6/e as f/zey were m f/z& vers zon. A/ow «n/verszfy O&P f Aave 
a /wf of crzferza aw/ acfzow f/zejy wwf faftg  ^znc/z/dzng wamzng z/^ zngers, 
reporfing wingers, and ezMzwafzMg cqpyrzg/zf zn/^ zngenzenf wz/ormafion zn 
order fo avozd/voaeczdzon^br ZM^-zngemeMf of f/ze/r zzger/cayfomer& Monef/ze/ess, 
f/zw /wznf esfa6/kAes L&zrverazfy OSP regzdafzon as a concern^br edwcafors. ^4gazn, 
f/ze zdea f/zaf f/ze /aw znzg/zf cz^rfaz/ an edz^cafor 's access fo and aMzfy fo «se cerfazn 
feac/zzng znaferzak i; an eznofzona/ appea/ f/zaf szfggesfs f/ze acadeznzc zz?yorfance 
of a ^ z/r/y regz /^afed «nzverszfy O&P. 
c) "This legislation would limit the kinds of writing that will occur on the computer 
networks. It will have a chilling effect on interactive hypertext designs and will 
discourage the interactive uses of the Internet that are currently being developed. If 
service providers are liable for infringing activity,... interactive, contributory 
forms of network activity will be viewed as too risky." TTzzs /xnnf rg/ers fo f&e 
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DMG4 jTrovwon fW any a/feroffon or mwi/pwWoM ofprofecfgd digW 
worjb—anofker aMff-cfrcimzvewfio» jwo/wWfioM and fAe CMT anfi-a/ferafioM 
jprovwfon fW^roA;6ffj fampermg wzfA copyrigAf maMagerngMf :M/brmaf%dM. TTze 
word;, "chilling ef&ct," fwggeff fW f/K /xrqpoW /egw/afzow coWd/wf on 
wwMedwzfe end fo Thfgmef Wgracfzon ;mp(y:Mg fAaf feacAmg and /eammg wow/d 6e 
fer%o%w(y and negafrwefy a^&cfed 
The Senate Judiciary letter establishes the significance of fair use very specifically in the first 
point above. However, fair use is also alluded to in points 3a and 3c because, as explained in 
Chapter 1, both the anti-circumvention and the anti-alteration provisions prevent educational or 
non-profit use of code-protected digital works. Although the public domain is not overtly 
referred to, we can assume that the public domain could reasonably be fenced in by code or 
password, thus preventing access by anyone, including educators and their students. 
The concerns (i.e., erosion of the fair use provision, shrinkage of the public domain, 
anti-circumvention, and anti-alteration) expressed in the Senate Judiciary letter are repeated 
throughout CCCC documents. Additionally, concern over regulation of university OSP's 
becomes increasingly significant as DMCA versions evolve. In a similar CCCC letter to the 
House Committee on the Judiciary from May 15,1996, caucus members complain that the 
bill's "overly restrictive language on transmission and service provider liability threaten to 
drastically eliminate traditional 'fair use' concepts crucial to education—concepts that have 
long been held to be a fundamental aspect of copyright law" (Gurak, Johnson-Eilola, and 
Logie). Here, Gurak, Johnson-Eilola, and Logic define and emphasize fair use as an 
educational right in intellectual property law. 
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In 1996, the CCCC-IP website reprinted an April 1996 NCTE Cozmc;/ CAromc/e article 
to reinforce the IP committee's opposition to the proposed bill. The title reads "CCCC, NCTE 
Join Opposition to Copyright Legislation: CCCC Voices Concerns to Senate Judiciary 
Committee." At this juncture, the CCCC Intellectual Property Caucus had been in existence 
for two years and, according to Andrea Lunsford and Susan West, an early draft of the DMCA 
had "started on a remarkably fast track through Congress after its introduction in late 
September" ("Intellectual Property" 384). The first paragraph of the article points out the 
growing academic momentum against the bill. 
A copyright revision bill that gives greater weight to proprietary rights than to 
public access to information is making its way through Congress. NCTE and 
the Conference on College Composition and Communication have joined with 
24 other education, library, technology, and civil liberties groups—including 
the American Council of Learned Societies, the American Library Association, 
and the National Humanities Alliance—in opposing the current bill, in an 
alliance called the Digital Future Coalition (DFC). (Flanagan) 
The article refers to the Senate Judiciary letter examined above. Anna Flanagan, the author and 
CCCC member, extensively quotes Peter Jaszi, Washington College of Law professor and one 
of the founders of the Digital Future Coalition mentioned above. Her choice of Jaszi says that 
law professors, as well as writing teachers are concerned about this bill—thus, strengthening 
her argument that the bill is harmful to academia in general. In the article, Jaszi expresses 
concern over the bill's implied regulation of any digital transmission of copyrighted work. His 
concern emanates from consideration of the extensive communication done on university 
listserves, chat rooms, bulletin boards, and other "electronic discursive spaces"—all facilitated 
by the university service provider. "So the issue of whether or not the person who maintains 
the electronic space is going to be deemed a violator of copyright when someone uses that 
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space to make an unauthorized transmission of protected information—is one with which we 
ought to be very concerned." Jaszi expresses worry that the anti-circumvention provision will 
"make it easier for those who control access to information that is currently in the public 
domain to lock that information up electronically and discriminate on the basis of willingness 
to pay." He repeats the CCCC themes of restricted access to public domain and the regulation 
of the university service provider. Therefore, it would be logical for the reader to assume also 
that a strong fair use provision for educators would help alleviate the problem, especially in 
cases where the educator may be the one maintaining an "electronic discursive space" on 
which someone commits copyright infringement. Again the idea of teachers and students as 
criminals underscores the seriousness of an eroded fair use provision. 
Anna Flanagan again reports on the looming digital copyright bill (in the fourth draft) 
in a February 1998 NCTE online article titled, "Copyright Bills Seek to Maintain Balance." 
The article urges educators to contact their House and Senate representatives to protest such 
issues as the regulation of university service providers and of transmission of protected works. 
Additionally, the article protests the bill's lack of provision for fair use. This plea to all 
educators to become involved in the struggle implies the urgency of the matter. Indeed, the 
DMCA was passed and signed into law in October of that year. 
The new theme of distance education surfaces in this piece. Although the bill exempts 
educators for using protected works in televised distance education, "there is no exemption for 
distance education conducted via digital networks." This type of information transmission 
includes the increasingly popular WebCT and ITV instructional delivery systems. The 
Distance Education section of the DMCA is anomalous, in that although digital transmission is 
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not exempted, the bill specifically refers to an educational exemption for transmitting some 
protected work to televised classes. This exemption is presented without mention of fair use. 
In fact, discussion of fair use or the educational exemption is mostly avoided in the DMCA, 
another complaint of educators. 
The final organizational documents expressing opposition to DMCA regulations come 
from the AAUP. An undated "Statement on Copyright" found on the AAUP website is 
important to determining specific academic burdens not only because it underscores CCCC and 
NCTE concerns, but also because the "Statement" adds new concerns to the list. The 
"Statement on Copyright" is subtitled to address various copyright provisions as they relate to 
education.^ The first header, "Academic Practice" repeats the concern that the distance 
education exemption not be limited to audio-visual transmission, but that digital copyright 
legislation should also exempt electronic transmission of copyright materials in course 
development. Another header, "New Instructional Technologies," is concerned with 
copyrights of faculty in an environment where the corporate university has supplied 
technological "delivery systems" like videotaping, editing, and by implication, other electronic 
hardware, like computers. In this document, the AAUP worries that, in a work for hire 
situation, the university may be considered by law to be a joint author. Even though this is a 
concern (hat harkens back to the 1976 work for hire provision, it does point to a legitimate 
issue for a digital environment—an issue that is not addressed in the DMCA. This concern 
reveals another burden that emerges because of its absence rather than its presence. 
37 Although this document refers to "works made for hire," "contractual transfers of copyright," and "joint 
works," these issues will not be discussed here because they do not address the digital environment. 
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The language in the "Statement" is relatively neutral, unlike language in the CCCC and 
NCTE documents, mainly because the document is a position statement, a genre that by 
convention is not emotional. However, genre does not fully explain the lack of emotional 
appeal because the style in this document, as well as all the AAUP documents analyzed here 
suggests an overall organizational writing style more formal than that of CCCC and NCTE. 
Another concern that arises in other AAUP documents is the potential of digital 
database regulation to interfere with academic access. For example, memo to the AAUP 
Government Relations Network from Mark F. Smith, Associate Director of Government 
Relations reports on the then recent passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the 
1998 20-year Copyright Term Extension Act The memo refers to an earlier version of the 
DMCA that "would have created a new form of intellectual property protection for databases 
and established penalties for the misappropriations of collections of information created with 
substantial investments of time and money." Imagine, for example, a database containing links 
to all articles on 19* century American authors. This type of electronic database could and has 
since been deemed illegal by the earlier version. Smith goes on to report that the provision was 
struck from the DMCA after AAUP sent a letter to digital copyright committee members. This 
memo is positive in that it expresses satisfaction at the database change. 
Almost exactly one year later on October 28,1999, Smith again memoed the AAUP 
Government Relations Network with an "alert" about a position reversal of the copyright 
committee. He reports that: 
The government relations Office has learned that the House of Representatives 
may take up HJL 354, the Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, next 
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week (November 1—November 5). This bill would extend copyright 
protection to databases and collections of facts, and would create civil and 
criminal penalties for "mis-appropriation" of data from those databases. 
("Legislative Alert") 
The database bill still remains in the proposal stage, but database litigation has flourished/* 
The CCCC, NCTE, and AAUP documents implicitly and overtly suggest several key 
concerns for digital copyright legislation: 
* the anti-circumvention provision 
» the anti-alteration provision 
* the regulation of university OSP's, work for hire in a digital environment 
* and the regulation of databases and digital distance education. 
Underpinning all of these concerns is the reduced accessibility to the public domain and the 
lack of the fair use exemption in educational venues/* What these academic concerns suggest 
is that any analysis must be able to examine and identify regulation of content, as well as 
electronic code and even the hardware itself (as suggested by regulation of the university 
OSP's). 
Although these organizations address regulations in several earlier versions of the DMCA, 
for the purpose of my analysis, I examine only the last version of this artifact. The next section 
38 The following two court opinions exemplify court opinions that upheld regulation of electronic databases: 
* eBay v. Bidder's Edge 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) 
* Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic, No. CV 98-7840-MMM (AJWx) (C.D. Cal. 1999) 
39 Mitigating these two issues is 1.) the passage of the term extension act, which erodes the public domain and 
also, 2.) the Kinko's defeat in Basic Books v. Kinko's, which effectively and further undermines the educational 
exemption. 
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describes that version plus additional materials. Following a brief discussion of my artifacts is a 
description of the methodology that underpins my analysis. 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
The DMCA analyzed in this paper is actually made up of several components including 
the Final Joint Version of the DMCA, Appendix V of the DMCA, H.R. 2215 and the 
Copyright Office Summary. 
The Final Joint Version of the DMCA 
Description. The core of my analysis in the next chapter is a full-text version of the 
DMCA. This version, available online at the Copyright OfGce website, is a legal document, 
101 pages in length in the pdf format. The particular version I examine here is the sixth drafL 
This draft, also called the Final Joint Version, was passed by Congress and signed into law by 
President Clinton in October 1998, and from there was integrated into Title 17 of the United 
States Code.40 The Final Joint Version of the DMCA is comprised of five sections called 
"Titles." The main points of each title are offered below: 
1. Title I, the "WIPO Treaty Implementation," describes the terms of an international 
agreement concerning reciprocal intellectual property rights among WIPO members 
(World Intellectual Property Organization). The two main provisions of the DMCA 
explained are prohibition of circumvention of access controls (anti-circumvention) and 
the prohibition against tampering with copyright management information (CM! or 
repair and specifically refers to academic research. 
40 The 106th Congress' working title of the Final Joint version is H.R. 2281. 
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2. Title H regulates online service providers and specifically refers to the university OSP's 
in prescribing both regulation and punishment for infringement 
3. Title m regulates management of computer maintenance and repair. 
4. Title IV contains six "miscellaneous provisions" concerning the "functions of the 
Copyright OfGce, distance education, the exceptions in the Copyright Act for libraries 
and for making ephemeral recordings/* 'webcasting'^  of sound recordings on the 
Internet, and the applicability of collective bargaining agreement obligations in the case 
of transfers of rights in motion pictures." 
5. Title V, the "Vessel Hull Design Protection Act," provides protection for boat hull and 
other distinctive designs. 
Rationale for Document Choice. The Final Joint Version was chosen because it was 
the last and most complete of the six versions. The fifth version, the Conference Report, is 
essentially identical in content, but because it emerged with extensive suggestions for a final 
Congressional vote from a joint House and Senate committee, the document's organization was 
quite different It began with sixty-two pages of suggested changes and ended with thirty-two 
pages of an intact fourth version, which provided a challenge to navigating the document for 
the purpose of analysis. The Final Joint Version includes the integrated suggestions in 
chronological order according to titles, making it much easier to read and to locate information. 
41 Ephemeral recordings refer to motion pictures and audio-visual works. 
42 Broadcasting ephemeral recordings (See footnote 27) over the Internet. 
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Appendix V of the DMCA 
Description. Appendix V of the DMCA, titled "Additional Provisions of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act," contains an order to the Register of Copyrights to report back to 
Congress with recommendations for amending distance education regulations after consulting 
with "representatives of copyright owners, nonprofit educational institutions, and non profit 
libraries and archives" and after considering certain elements prescribed by Congress. This 
appendix amends Title IV of the DMCA under Section 403, titled "Limitations on Exclusive 
Rights; Distance Education." 
Rationale for Document Choice. A decision on reeulatine distance education (Title 
IV) was postponed bv Congress for six months after the DMCA passage durinp which time the 
Register of Copyrights was directed by Congress to research a list of eight elements the 
Register must consider. Appendix V provides a lens through which to view significant 
legislative goals as they correlate with academic issues concerning distance education. These 
legislative goals are eventually reflected in the final revisions to Title TV prescribed in H.R. 
2211 
&R.2215 
Description. H.R. 2215, "The Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization 
Act," amends and adds to the DMCA. It is four pages long and addresses educational 
exemptions with regard to digital performances and displays in "mediated instructional 
activities transmitted via digital networks"—or distance education. 
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Rationale for Document Choice. H.R. 2215 responds to the Congressional order 
outlined in Appendix V, describing in detail not only the exemptions and regulations for 
distance education, but also what an exempt classroom should look like under DMCA 
regulations. This document was necessary to a more thorough analysis of the layers of 
regulation in the distance education environment 
Copyright OfGce Summary 
Description. The Copyright OfBce summary is an eighteen-page document that 
summarizes the main concepts embedded in each of the five Titles. The language is clear and 
free of legal jargon. 
Rationale for Document Choice. Because I am not legally trained, this document was 
invaluable to me for clarifying, summarizing, and locating concepts written in the sometimes-
confusing legal language of the full-text Final Joint Version. Because of its "reader-
friendliness," I have also included the Summary in an appendix to this paper for the 
convenience of my readers. 
All in all, the DMCA is a legal document filled with regulations that could impede 
teaching, research, and writing in an academic setting. To identify significant changing 
copyright regulations as they affect the balance of burdens and benefits, I employ Benkler's 
Theory of Layers. As the academic documents above suggest, regulation that affects educators 
and students occurs not only at the textual level, but also at the physical (i.e., OSP equipment) 
and code (Le., anti-circumvention) levels. Benkler's framework for analysis is suitable for 
examining and uncovering regulation at all levels. The remainder of this chapter offers a more 
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complete rationale for Yochai Benkler's Aamewodc as the most suitable approach for 
examination of the DMCA and provides a more detailed description of Benkler's framework as 
applied to analysis of DMCA regulation. 
Benkler's Theory of Layers 
wceM/wafzMg f&ose oAnWef fec/wo/ogy fW 
TMoAe if a jMfenfW ve/wc/e _/br acMevzng a 6nx%f dWnWfo» q/^acc&gf 
fo, cW/wficyafzoM fAe focW 
^"Com/MMMZcafiow Az/)wfr«cf%rg " 
-fbcW Benifer 
To answer my research question, my examination of DMCA documents must unpack 
digital copyright regulation aSecting educators and their students, as well as any regulation 
favoring corporate groups over educators and students. Yochai Benkler disagrees with any 
such privileging, arguing above that a goal for regulation must be an equal distribution of 
access in digital communication. As discussed in Chapter 1, Article 1 Section 8 of the United 
States Constitution implies that in establishing copyright law, Congress must ensure an equal 
distribution of benefits to both author/owners and to user/audiences. These benefits include the 
equal "access to, and participation in, the social processes of knowledge production" in a 
digital environment as emphasized by Benkler above (184). 
The most effective framework for analysis is one that allows me to evaluate the 
document closely, by segments, as well as holistically, to uncover any specific undermining of 
academic access, as well as any overall erosion of this access. Furthermore, because the CCCC, 
NCTE, and AAUP documents suggest that burdensome regulation occurs in the textual 
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content, in computer code and even in the equipment belonging to university Online service 
providers, the DMCA analysis must work within a flexible framewoik that allows examination 
of regulation of access at more than just the content or textual level. 
Professor Yochai Benkler's communication theory of layers provides an effective 
approach to this type of multi-leveled analysis because Benkler's framework can be used to 
address not only the content layer of digital communication, but also the code layer and the 
actual physical environment of computers and wires. In his article, "From Consumers to 
Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User 
Access," Benkler explains why regulation at all three layers may have serious future 
implications in the digitally networked environment 
As the digitally networked environment matures, regulatory choices abound 
that implicate whether the network will be one of peer users or one of active 
producers who serve a menu of prepackaged information goods to consumers 
whose role is limited to selecting from this menu. These choices occur at all 
levels of the information environment: the physical infrastructure layer—wires, 
cable, radio frequency spectrum—the logical infrastructure layer—software 
[and code]—and the content layer [images and text]. 562 
Above, Benkler expresses concern that because of increasing regulation, the digital 
environment will evolve to a consumer-passive, from the now consumer-active environment 
In this scenario, instead of being able to choose and manipulate information, consumers will be 
offered a limited menu of information, as is already the case with television and radio. The 
ability to manipulate information is especially important to academia because an educational 
environment, by tradition and definition, is one where knowledge is created and manipulated 
An environment that impedes access to digital text, code, and hardware, also 
impedes knowledge creation. 
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In establishing a baseline from which to identify increasing control of digital access, 
Lawrence Lessig explains that, in the 70 s and 80% constraints came not from legal 
regulations, but rather from the limited number of available computers. In other words, the 
physical scarcity constrained an otherwise free code and content layer. Lessig describes this 
early digital environment: 
The physical layer of the "computer-communications architecture was 
controlled; the very nature of its expense forced users to locate to the machines. 
Locating the machines in particular places made it easy to control access. The 
logic [or code layer] of the machine may have been open, but only those with 
permission were allowed in the "machine room." And finally, while the source 
code for these machines may not have been controlled (content layer, open), the 
small number of these machines meant that the value of the open code was 
limited. Coding, and the creativity realized in coding, was dictated by this 
architecture that mandated control. (113) 
Below, I apply Benkler's theory to the three regulatory layers in the 1970's and 80's digital 
environment Lessig. Notice that in this early environment, no legislative regulation inhibited 
access and any layer and that the only control is exerted by those who own the machines. 
* Physical Layer (or architecture)—controlled 
* Code Layer (or logical layer)—free of regulation, but controlled by limited access to 
physical layer 
* Content Layer (or text and images)—free of regulation, but controlled by limited access 
to physical layer 
A major concern for Benkler, Lessig and other academics is that, unlike the Lessig's 
early environment described above, the digital public domain under the DMCA is diminishing 
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due to draconian anti-circumvention regulation. Benkler underscores the societal importance 
of identifying and sustaining a public commons at all levels of digital communication, arguing 
that the commons is crucial to innovation and creativity in a digital environment ("From 
Consumers to Users"). The theory of layers helps identify which level of public commons is at 
risk. Regulation of the public commons is Benkler's main focus in his theory of layers; 
however, his approach is also useful for uncovering specific regulation concerning education as 
well. 
Lawrence Lessig appreciates the flexibility of Benkler's theory in its ability to reveal 
constraints at all three layers, as well as its ability uncover the extent of regulation and/or 
control in any communication venue—traditional or digital. Lessig illustrates this flexibility as 
he applies the Benkler's Framework to the following communication environments— 
Speaker's Comer in London's Hyde Park, Madison Square Garden, the telephone system, and 






Content Free Free Free Controlled 
Code Free Free Controlled Controlled 
Physical Free Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Source: Lawrence Lessig, 7%e Fwfwre ofA&ac. f/ze fafe off/ze Comzmow z» a Cowzecfecf 
fFbr&f. New York: Random House, 2001,25. 
cable TV (23-24). Under Benkler's framework, designating a layer as "free" means that no 
regulation prevents access to that layer, nor does the regulation privilege any individual or 
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group over another. Designating a layer as "controlled" means that the layer is not regulated 
by law or by individual or organizational control. The early computer environment Lessig 
describes above illustrates an example of individual or organizational control. In this 
environment any organization or individual that owned a computer could prevent access by 
simply saying "no" to a user or by locking the door. 
What is important to note here and what reveals itself in my DMCA analysis results in 
the next chapter is that increasing control appears in more layers as the technology becomes 
more sophisticated. The Speakers' Comer, the first venue illustrated in Table 1, is a low-tech 
environment in Hyde Park where anyone can speak on anything to whoever is in the park at the 
time. Therefore, the content or topic of the speech is unregulated, the language or code is 
unregulated, and the physical environment is also unregulated. The telephone system adds 
technology and thus, control increases. Although content is free because a consumer may pass 
any message over the phone lines, the physical infrastructure and code that allows a message to 
be passed is owned and controlled by the telephone company. At the far right end of the 
regulation spectrum is Cable TV. The content or broadcast itself and the code that determines 
what shows are broadcast, in addition to the cable and wires are all controlled by the cable 
company. In other words, no choice, other than what channel to watch, is left to the consumer 
(24-25). 
Lessig explains that the digital environment is not as straightforward as the examples in 
Table 1 might suggest, in that "it mixes freedom with control at different layers" (25), 
especially at the code and content levels. Additionally, although Benkler's approach 
effectively identifies layered controls in cyberspace, control of one layer may influence control 
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at another layer and any analysis must reflect these interactions. For example, the intellectual 
properties available for download on the Project Gutenberg site are in the public domain. 
However, if the site owners put password or code protection at the portal of the site, then the 
public domain works become protected by that code. They are no longer free. So, although 
the content is technically free, the code is regulated and the regulation prohibits users from 
accessing the work without paying for and obtaining a license. Moreover, if the computer itself 
can only be operated by means of a key or a code, we could say that the physical infrastructure 
is regulated. In the case of a locked up physical infrastructure, neither code nor content are 
accessible—free or not 
Another complicating aspect to my analysis is determining what DMCA restriction or 
regulation falls into which layer. For instance: Coded computer language is content, as well as 
code in that when it is applied to a portal, it is a code that allows or prevents passage to a site, 
but when someone takes the code apart in an act of reverse engineering, then modifies it in 
some way, the code can be classified as content or modified text. I was forced to consider how 
I would treat those regulations that constrain accessibility to more than one layer, as in the 
Gutenberg example above, and how I would quantify or describe the amount of regulation. As 
to the first concern, I have chosen to describe the effects as primary or secondary and to 
explain the effect of one regulation of one layer on other layers in my analysis. A "primary" 
effect assignation means that a particular was targeted for regulation by the DMCA. Other 
layers affected by the "primary" effect layer are designated as "secondary" effect layers. As 
for my concern about quantifying the results of my analysis of the DMCA, I have added my 
own interpretation of the impact on education the 70's and 80's baseline that Lawrence Lessig 
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describes above, factoring in the burdens identified in my non-legal documents. Another 
quantification issue is how to measure the shift in balance of burdens and benefits provoked by 
the DMCA. Because the shift in the balance of burdens and benefits is an abstract concept, it is 
also immeasurable, so I will simply offer my qualitative assessment, based on the analysis, to 
determine whether there is a shift. 
My findings in Chapter 4 are organized as the DMCA itself is organized in that I identify 
key regulations and restrictions identified as burdensome by my non-legal document analysis 
beginning with Title I and ending with Title V in each layer.^ I begin with the content layer. 
Areas where regulations and restrictions indicate increased burdens or increased benefits to 
educators and their students are then categorized into the physical infrastructure, code, and or 
content layers according to Yochai Benkler's framework. Some concepts fit into more than 
one layer and these are noted and discussed. I conclude the chapter with an overview of 
control that emerges from the analysis at all levels. 
43 Appendix V actually appears at the end of the DMCA and H.R. 2215 was actually passed a year after the 
passage of the DMCA, but I have included both in my Title IV analysis because Appendix V and H.R. 2215 
address the same topic that appear in that title. That topic is Distance Education. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FINDINGS OF DMCA ANALYSIS 
This chapter is organized according to Yochai Benkler's layers of control in digital 
legislation. * The subtitled layers—content, code, and physical infrastructure—also serve as 
units of analysis for determining a shift in benefits and burdens in DMCA Titles I through V. 
Sonja K. Foss identifies the process of deriving methods from theories or concepts as 
"generative criticism.' In her book, TfWorzca/ Cnfzcw/n. Exp/orofion aWfrac/zce, she briefly 
explains the function of the units of analysis in generative criticism: 
On of the most important steps in the process of rhetorical criticism is the 
critic's selection of a unit of analysis to answer the research question. This is 
the unit the critic uses as the vehicle or lens for examining the artifact, and it 
directs the critic to focus on some aspects of the artifact rather than others. 
(483) 
She explains that the units of analysis for research can be drawn from a particular concept or 
theory or from the research question itself Because my research question asks Abw recent 
copyright legislation has shifted the balance, I needed a unit of analysis that would identify 
areas of concern for educators and students in the DMCA. Benkler's communication theory of 
44 Benkler describes these layers in several of his articles. Among them are "Communications Infrastructure 
Regulation and the Distribution of Control over Content/' "From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper 
Structures of Regulation Toward a Sustainable Commons and User Access," and "Property, Commons, and the 
First Amendment: Towards a Core Common Infrastructure." Complete citations can be found at the end of this 
paper in the Works Cited pages. 
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layers provides my units of analysis because his framework deals with locations of copyright 
control, which helps me answer the 
For the purposes of this analysis the following terms will be used interchangeably to 
signify the units of analysis: 
* Content layer and textual layer. Both of these terms mean what you see on the screen 
of a computer. "Textual" indicates writing symbols and "content" refers to all 
representations that appear on the screen, including text and images. 
* Code layer and logical layer. Both terms refer to the binary code that tells the computer 
to operate in a certain way, that makes software work, and that allows or prevents users 
from using software or accessing certain material 
* Physical infrastructure layer and architecture. This layer includes all hardware, 
including wire, cables, computer components, discs, cd's, and so on. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, some regulation directly regulates a particular 
layer, but may also have the secondary effect on another layer or layers for educators and their 
students. Therefore, each regulation that shifts the balance of burdens toward faculty and 
students will be labeled as either jwwMary or aecow&py effects in a specific layer. Primary 
effects mean that a particular regulation was intended to affect a certain layer (textual, code, or 
physical) and thus, the regulation primarily affects academia at a certain layer. Secondary 
effects mean that, as a result of the primary effects at a certain level, other levels are also 
affected, even though the explicit goal of the DMCA was not to control access at the secondary 
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effects level. An example would be Lessig's early computer environment, in which whoever 
had ownership or control of the physical computer itself controlled the physical layer, so primary 
effects were at the physical layer. However, because a user could be prevented from even 
turning on the computer, the user is also prevented from accessing the code and the textual level. 
Therefore "secondary" effects are felt at those two additional levels. 
Control in the Content or Textual Layer 
For the purposes of this dissertation, the Content or Textual layer in the digital realm refers to 
any material that is moved from place to place electronically. In his book Fwfwre of 
Tide#?, fAe of f&e Commow 1» f&e Cofznecfed PPbr&f, Lawrence Lessig minimally 
describes the content layer as "the actual stuff that gets said or transmitted across [the 
electronic] wires. Here we include digital images, texts, on-line movies, and the like" (23). 
More simply put, this layer is comprised of anything we can see on the computer screen. 
TMe I 
Title F s purpose is the implementation of treaties in correlation with WIPO organizational 
law—copyright legislation agreed upon by a number of industrialized countries. The goal of 
these treaties is to harmonize U.S. intellectual property law with that of the WIPO so that 
United States protected intellectual property is equally protected in WIPO member countries 
and vice versa. The DMCA's new digital regulations in Title I were eventually adopted and 
integrated into the United States legal code, a body of federal legal guidelines. 
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Primary Effects in Content Layer 
No direct control of the Content or Textual Layer is discernible. Title I provisions 
primarily affect the Code Layer. 
Secondary Effects in Content Layer 
One of the two provisions in this title secondarily affects content because it denies user access 
to content by preventing circumvention of the code that protects content.^ This content is not 
accessible via the educational exemption. 
More specifically, the circumvention provision in Section 1201, in prohibiting 
circumvention of code, secondarily restricts access to all digital content or text on the other side 
of a digitally-coded portal. Access is even denied to work in the public domain on the other 
side of this portal. No educational fair exemption neutralizes the secondary effects of the anti-
circumvention provision. In the DMCA's only reference to fair use, the Copyright OfGce 
Summary explains what happens at this intersection of fair use and the anti-circumvention 
provision as follows: 
Since copying of a work may be a fair use under appropriate circumstances, 
section 1201 does not prohibit the act of circumventing a technological measure 
that prevents copying. By contrast, since the fair use doctrine is not a defense to 
the act of gaining unauthorized access to a work, the act of circumventing a 
technological measure in order to gain access is prohibited. (4) 
Gaining access to code protected work may require a re-authorship or manipulation of 
the code that prevents certain people from entering, activity sometimes used in research of 
45 The treaties described in Title I includes two main regulatory provisions: 1.) Prohibition against 
circumvention of computer access code, which is referred to in this paper as the anti-circumvention provision. 
2.) Prohibition against altering or tampering with copyright management information (CMI). 
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computer codes (see Pel ten case described in Chapter One). Title I prohibits this type of re-
authorship. Because computer code is a form of binary text, the anti-circumvention provision 
prevents access to text for the purpose of re-authoring its message from "You cannot enter here 
at this time" to "You can enter here now." 
Title I (by means of its anti-circumvention provision) prevents access to both coded 
(and binary) and traditional text, with no allowance for Air use for educational purposes nor 
respect to whether or not the intellectual property is in the public domain. Therefore, impeded 
access to textual material marks a definite shift in burdens for academic authors and audiences, 
and a shift in benefits toward copyright owners. 
Titien 
Title ITs purpose is the regulation of Online Service Providers (OSP's). Although most of 
this title is dedicated to the regulation of commercial service providers, a short, but very 
specific section discusses university OSP's in Subsection 1A (1A through C and 2). 
Primaxy Effects in Content Layer 
No primary effects exist at this level. Only secondary effects on educators and students 
exist at this level because the regulation primarily affects physical infrastructure layer, 
Secondary Effects in Content Layer 
Although this Title H primarily affects the OSP-owned physical infrastructure, it also 
increases regulatory control of content layer by mandating and describing punishment for 
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university OSP users who do not abide by the anti-circumvention and anti-alteration 
regulations, regulations that secondarily affect the content layer (referred to in Title I above). 
The content layer is affected by Title H in this way: Suppose an educator copy and 
pasted an article 6om an online code-protected academic journal article; then photocopied it 
for her students without getting permission from the author/owner of that article.** 
Photocopying the code-protected article without permission would constitute infringement. If 
the infringement were reported, the teacher may be subject to denial of access to the university 
OSP and may also be burdened with criminal charges under DMCA regulations. The 
punishment mandated under Title II regulates access to the physical infrastructure of the OSP, 
by threatening denial of access; however, denial of access and even the threat of denial of 
access to the OSP's physical system, secondarily also impedes the teacher's access to code-
protected content. 
Title m 
Also called the "Computer Maintenance Competition Assurance Act," this is the shortest of 
the five titles. Section 302 of this title provides very narrow exemptions for copying 
copyright protected intellectual property and for the circumventing of code protection for the 
purpose of repair or maintenance. 
Primary Effects in Content Layer 
No primary effects exist at this level. Title III primarily affects the physical 
infrastructure layer. 
46 In some cases, the publisher may own copyrights. 
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Secondary Effects in Content Layer. 
No secondary effects exist at the content or textual layer that would directly and 
immediately affect education. However, there might be tertiary or future effects on 
education deriving from the trend of a crossover of patent protection to copyright protection 
and its possible effects on education. A discussion of these possible effects is included at the 
end of this chapter. 
Title IV 
This title contains a group of miscellaneous provisions including those affecting distance 
education. Title IV also includes exemptions for libraries and regulations regarding the 
making of ephemeral recordings, "webcasting of sound recordings on the Internet, and the 
applicability of collective bargaining agreement obligations in the case of transfers of rights 
in motion pictures." The Title IV item that most directly concerns educators and students is 
regulation of distance education. Section 403 of the final Joint version, however postpones 
legislative decisions concerning distance education and "directs the Copyright OfGce to 
consult with affected parties and make recommendations to Congress on how to promote 
distance education" (Summary 15). An appendix to the DMCA, which is more specific than 
Section 403, directs the Copyright OfGce to research the following legislative goals 
regarding distance education for consideration by Congress before more specific regulation is 
decided upon:*^ 
* possible exemptions for educators and students 
47 This is not an all-inclusive list. The Summary of the DMCA (see appendix) explains that Congress also 
directs the copyright office to consider "the extent to which the availability of licenses should be considered in 
assessing eligibility for any exemption; and other issues as appropriate" (15). 
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* types of works that should be exempted and limits on digital copies 
* who should receive digitally transferred intellectual property 
* what kind of code protection should be mandated to limit access to distance education 
materials 
Modifications to the regulations of distance education resulted from research into the 
above items and from presentation of this research to Congress by Marybeth Peters, the 
Register of Copyright** These modifications were passed by Congress as H.R. 2215 and they 
are integrated into and described in Section 110 of U.S. Code Title 17.** Although Section 110 
was subsequently re-modified and several of its regulations reversed in the "Technology, 
Education and Copyright Harmonization Act" (TEACH), passed in November of2002, only 
Section 110 will be considered in this chapter because the task I have laid down for this 
dissertation is the analysis of the DMCA only. TEACH will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 5. See Appendix H for the text of the TEACH Act 
48 Ms. Peters' report to the 106th Congress addresses six issues: 1.) the current "nature of distance education," 
2.) licensing for the purpose of distance education delivery of copyrighted materials, 3.) technology with 
regard to materials delivery and protection issues, 4.) whether traditional copyright law can be applied to 
distance education technology, 5.) "prior initiatives concerning distance education," and 6.) "whether the law 
should be changed" considering the Register's research into distance education. The text of Ms. Peters speech 
can be found at the following U.S. Copyright Office URL: 
<http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat52599.html> 
49 Section 110 has been modified since the DMCA passage in October of 1998. On November 2nd, 2002, the 
"Technology, Education and Copyright Harmonization Act" (the TEACH Act) was signed into law by President 
Bush. This act reverses previous DMCA restrictions concerning distance education in that 1.) transmission of 
most performance and display materials are now allowed, 2.) a classroom is no longer defined in traditional 
terms (face to face instruction in unmediated place and in real time), and 3.) analog materials can now be 
digitized for distance education purposes. See ALA (American Library Association) web site for a user friendly 
and non-legal explanation of these changes to the original H.R. 2215. The web page URL is 
<http://www.ala.org/Template.cfin7Section~Distance Education and the_TEACH Act^Template=/ContentM 
anagement/ContentDisplay.cfin&ContentID=25939#benefits>. Because I am discussing the DMCA and its 
particular effects on academic authors and audiences, I do not include discussion of these changes here. 
88 
Primary Effects in Content Layer 
Section 110 of Title IV (formerly H.R. 2215) describes regulation that directly affects 
the content level in that it controls the type of works allowed to be transmitted within a distance 
education context Title IV prohibits transmission ofwoiks "produced or marketed primarily 
for performance or display" (Section 110; U.S. Code Title 17),^ including movie videos and 
certain musical performances that are not in the public domain, works that normally could be 
transmitted in a conventional classroom setting. In other words, an instructor cannot broadcast 
the movie, Dead foe# Soczefy, to a distance education class that meets in a venue other than a 
traditional classroom—if students view the class from a dorm room, ibr example. 
Secondary Effects in Content Layer 
Some secondary effects to content layer from the provision described in Section 110; 
Subsection 2A and 2B. This subsection forbids conversion of text from analog to digital 
format For example, the scanning of a copyright-protected Word document for the sake of 
digital transmission on WebCT or an ITV class is prohibited by the DMCA distance education 
provisions; therefore, certain content, by virtue of this code control, is also regulated and the 
balance of burdens and benefits shifts.^ 
Title V 
This title is titled, the "Vessel Hull Design Protection Act" and specifically protects 
reproduction of vessel hull designs. 
50 See Footnote no. 49. 
See Footnote no. 49. 
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Primary Effects in Content Layer 
No discernible primary effects exist in Title V at the content layer. This title controls 
the physical design of a boat 
Secondary Effects in Content Layer 
No discernible effects on educators and students exist in Title V at the content layer. 
Summary of Control in Content or Textual Layer 
The Content or Textual Layer's effects are mostly secondary (See Table 2 below). 
Secondary effects on education in Titles I and II derive chiefly from the anti-circumvention 
Table2 
CONTROL AFFECITNG ACADEMIC AUTHORS AND AUDIENCES AT THE CONTENT LAYER 
IN DMCA TITLES I THROUGH V 
Effect Level Title: TitleH Title 
m 












OSP regulation and 
description of user 
punishment for infringement 





and anti-alteration provisions described in Title I, provisions which primarily control code 
circumvention and CMI alteration, but which also affect access to content Secondary effects 
in Title I result from the punishment prescribed from infringement on university OSP's. This 
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punishment discourages access to content controlled by the Title I anti-circumvention 
provision. 
The Content Layer is most directly affected by the control of specific types of 
distance education transmissions like performance and display works. Because Title IV 
denies access to these works in other than a traditional classroom, students are denied the 
benefit of viewing an Internet broadcast of a ballet or a televised debate, for example, if they 
view it in their dorm rooms for the purposes of distance education class. Therefore, the most 
obvious shifting of burdens and benefits occurs at this level, as the burden of access to these 
restricted materials increases for educators and students. 
Table 2 above illustrates that Titles m (computer maintenance provisions) and Title 
V (protection of vessel hull designs) regulations have no immediate discernible effects on the 
academic audience and author. 
Control in the Code Layer 
The code layer includes the coded language that allows or forbids the transmission of 
content. Code also describes the binary system that provides a structure to software and that 
facilitates communication between and among intemetted and intranetted computers. It is the 
layer between content and hardware that allows the hardware to transmit content. 
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TMe I 
To reiterate, Title I establishes two new provisions to harmonize with international 
copyright law: 1) The anti-circumvention provision. 2) The CMI anti-alteration or anti-
tampering provision. Section 1201 of Title I prohibits not only code circumvention and CMI 
tampering, but also the "manufacture, sale, distribution, or trafficking of tools and technologies 
that make circumvention possible." 
Primary Effects in Code Layer 
Both the anti-circumvention and the CMI anti-alteration provision directly address the 
code that facilitates transmission of content. Because the manipulation and redesign of 
computer code, prohibited by the anti-circumvention provision, can be an academic activity, 
education is directly affected. The Gutenberg example used in Chapter 2 illustrates one of the 
burdens this provision places on educators and students. If the "Gee access" GMfewAer# frq/ecf 
site were to become a restricted access site due to the site owners' employment of anti-
circumvention so Aware, even works in the public domain, like Finn, could not be 
legally accessed by users without gaining permission from the owners and probably paying a 
fee or buying a subscription. 
Another more subtle regulation of academic activity is found in Section 1202, which 
prohibits the altering of CMI. CMI is defined as 
the information that identifies the work, the author of the work, the owner of 
any right in the work, or information about the terms and conditions of use of 
the work, and any numbers or codes that represent such information, when any 
of these items of information is attached to a copy of a work or appears in 
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connection with the communication of the work to the public,. (Section 1202; 
subsecL C) 
Although this prohibition seems fair to all and innocuous to education, what defines CMI 
according to subsection (c) is broad enough to contain information that also acts as code 
protection, again invoking the anti-circumvention provision and impeding those in education 
who would research security systems. According to EFF (Electronic Frontier Foundation), 
who describe themselves as "a non-profit group of passionate people — lawyers, volunteers, 
and visionaries — working to protect your digital rights," the SDMI/Felten case discussed in 
Chapter One suggests that anti-circumvention absolutism will 
ultimately result in weakened security for all computer users (including, 
ironically, for copyright owners counting on technical measures to protect their 
works) as security researcher shy away from research that might run afoul of 
section 1201 [anti-circumvention and CMI anti-tampering provisions]. ("EFF 
Whitepaper Unintended Consequences") 
Since academics and their students are often involved in research, anti-circumvention 
absolutism may effectively discourage some research activity. The anti-circumvention 
provision directly controls the code layer and results in a detectable shift in burdens and 
benefits because no reliable fair use provision allows educational use of code protected content 
Secondary Effects in Code Layer 
No discernible secondary effects exist in Title I at the code layer. All efkcts are 
primary and directly control and protect computer code. 
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Title H 
Describes control of University OSP's and prescribes speciGc frnes and criminal 
punishment for violating users, while exempting university OSP's from liabilitiy in cases of 
user infringement if: 
* materials are protected by obvious copyright, and if permission to use and copy those 
materials was not granted by copyright owner 
* the university has not received at least two previous notification of infringing 
activities by the student or faculty member currently accused and if the accused 
faculty member or graduate student was not provided with nor recommended 
teaching the copyrighted materials 
* the university has complied with the U.S. Code regulation mandating dissemination 
to users information "describing and promoting compliance" with copyright law 
Primary Effects in Code Layer 
No discernible effects on educators and students in Title H at the code layer. DMCA 
regulation in this Title primarily controls physical infrastructure. 
Secondary Effects in Code Layer 
Because punishment is both mandated and prescribed in Title II for infringers of the 
anti-circumvention and CMI anti-tampering provisions, which directly regulate code, this 
Title strengthens control of code. Even though Title II most directly regulates the OSP 
physical infrastructure, both code and content layers are affected for the same reasons. The 
previous example of the teacher who is impeded from copying a code-protected online 
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journal article also applies here, in that if that teacher loses physical access to the OSP 
environment, she not only loses access to such materials as journal articles, she also loses 
access to the code that allows the university licensed virus software to scan a student's floppy 
disk before she opens it 
Tide m 
Title m regulates computer maintenance activity and provides very narrow 
exemptions for circumventing code protection for the sake of computer repair and 
maintenance, provided that repair and maintenance results in a machine that is restored "to 
the state of working in accordance with its original specifications and any changes to those 
specifications [are] authorized for that machine" (Section 302 d2). 
Primary Effects in Code Layer 
Because Title III directly addresses the manipulation of code during maintainence, 
this layer is directly affected. Title HI forbids any modification in its directive that, after 
repair or maintenance, the machine must be restored to the "original specifications. Title 
Ill's narrow exemption allowing the circumvention of code (restricted in Title II) is 
undermined by this directive, resulting in the impeded creativity of a university computer 
science student or technical support intern who discovers a way to alter the circumvention 
code to more easily repair or maintain a machine. In altering a code for easier access, the user 
breaks the law. 
Secondary Effects in Code Layer 
No discernible effects on education exist in Title II at the code layer. Title III 
primarily regulates code and physical infrastructure. 
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Title IV 
As stated earlier, this title addresses a group of miscellaneous regulations. The most relevant 
provisions directly address distance education venues and the transmission of various 
educational materials in those venues. This Title's information comes from Appendix V to 
the DMCA and from Section 110 of the U.S. Code because decisions were postponed until a 
researched report concerning distance education issues was delivered to Congress six months 
after the passage of the DMCA. 
Primary Effects in the Code Layer 
The area of code control prescribed by Title IV concerns the prohibition of "the 
conversion of print or other analog versions of works into digital formats" if "no digitized 
version is available to the institution; or the digital version of the work that available to the 
institution; or the digital version of the work that is available to the insitution is subject to 
technological protection measures" (Section 110; Subsection 2A and B).^ This regulation 
controls the code that makes it possible, for example, to scan a word processed document 
into digitized instructional materials for the purpose of transmitting to a distance education 
class. In other words, it is, for example. Title IV forbids an instructor to convert a pdf or 
html print newspaper article to digitized format. 
52 See Footnote no. 49. 
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Secondary Effects in Code Layer 
Title IV also contains a provision that forbids transmission of worts "marketed 
primarily for performance or display" during distance education class period.^ While this 
provision directly controls content, it also regulates code to a lesser degree because the 
digital code that permits transmission of these types of materials is not to be used by law 
because students can view this material with non-students in a remote location and this 
viewing by non-students would violate the educational purposes exemption. 
Title V 
Again, the "Vessel Hull Protection Act" does not directly affect academic audiences. 
Summary of Control in Code Layer 
At the code layer of the DMCA, there appears to be much more legislative control 
than at the content level (see Figure 3 below) and primary control appears in Titles I, m, and 
IV. Title II is controlled in the code area only because of threat of punishment for those who 
infringe via circumvention or CMI tampering. In other words, threat of punishment increases 
control of the code in Title II. Title V, which controls distance education is concerned 
mainly with the transmission and conversion of certain materials. Direct prohibition of 
conversion from analog to digital format has primary effects in the code layer on educators in 
that the Title severely restricts the available materials for classroom use. Secondary effects 
derive from the prohibition of transmission of performance and display works in a distance 
53 See Footnote no. 49. 
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education venue because transmission is facilitated by code.54 The controls prescribed by at 
the code layer did not exist before the DMCA. Those controls—including the anti-
circumvention and anti-CMI alteration provisions, new prescribed punishment for infringers 
on OSP's, and restrictions pertaining to distance education—place additional burdens on 
educators and students at all three layers of the digital environment; therefore the balance of 
burdens increases. 
TableS 
CONTROL AFFECTING ACADEMIC AUTHORS AND AUDIENCES AT THE CODE LAYER 
IN THE DMCA TITLES I THROUGH V 
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display works for 
distance education 
54 See Footnote no. 49. 
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Control in the Physical Infrastructure Layer 
Control at the physical infrastructure layer includes regulation of computer hardware 
(computers, wires, cable, etc.) and anything pertaining physical venue. It is the layer that the 
content travels on, in, or across. The eaily computer history included only control at this layer 
because there were so few computers. Whoever had the computer controlled the digital 
physical infrastructure and when access to physical infrastructure is controlled, so is access to 
content and code. 
Title I 
Title I provisions directly control protection control codes and copyright management 
information codes. 
Primary Effects in Physical Infrastructure Layer 
No discernible primary effects exist in Title I at the physical in&astructure layer.. 
Secondary Effects in Physical Infrastructure Layer 
No discernible secondary effects exist in Title I at the physical in&astructure layer. 
Title H 
Title II describes regulations applying to online service providers and specifically 
university OSP's. 
Primary Effects in the Physical Infrastructure 
Title II regulates the physical in&astructure layer, in that it describes conditions under 
which users can be denied access to the OSP-owned Internet providing equipment. It also 
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describes the conditions under which an OSP can be denied a license to provide Internet 
access to its users. This Title specifically states that faculty and graduate students can be 
held liable for infringement For, example, if a graduate teaching assistant were to use 
images of password protected homepages or websites for the purpose of demonstrating 
effective website design or effective visual rhetoric may be violating the anti-circumvention 
provision described in Title I. Even if the graduate student were ignorant of the law, if the 
infringement occurred and was reported more than twice, the student would be liable and 
could be denied access to the physical infrastructure. 
Secondary Effects in the Physical Infrastructure 
No discernible effects exist in Title II at physical infrastructure layer. 
Title m 
Title III concerns and regulates activities of computer maintenance and repair. 
Primary Effects in Physical Infrastructure 
Because Title III specifically orders that the computer be restored "to the state of 
working in accordance with its original specifications [factory specifications]," tech support 
personnel and computer scientists and students, for example, may not modify a machine's 
code or hardware to make it work more efficiently or to install permanent "non-original" 
changes that would help the user avoid break-downs and freeze-ups. The physical 
infrastructure is thereby controlled and limited to its factory specifications. In an academic 
setting, prohibition of these types of modi fications can restrict technological progress and 
impede research by preventing the emplacement of modifications that would improve 
efficiency of the technology and that might eventually benefit the non-academic user. 
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Secondary Effects in Physical Infrastructure 
No discernible secondary effects on education exist in Title III at the physical 
infrastructure layer. 
Title IV 
This title controls not only what is transmitted and how something is transmitted in a distance 
education class, it also puts limits on the physical venue of the online class.^ 
Primary Effects on Physical Infrastructure 
Section 110 of Title 17 concerns the transmission of display and performance pieces. 
Section 110, Title 17 of the U.S. Code restricts performance to "reception in classrooms or 
similar places normally devoted to instruction." This section limits "performance or display 
of a work by instructors or pupils in the course of face-to-face teaching activities of a 
nonprofit educational institution" to "a classroom or similar place devoted to instruction." 
The physical infrastructure layer, therefore, affected because the DMCA, as integrated into 
U.S. code regulates the physical environment in which a movie or video can be shown. 
Because the viewing by "non-students" cannot be controlled outside the classroom, 
performance material can only be shown in a traditional classroom setting/* 
Secondary Effects on Physical Infrastructure Layer 
No discernible secondary effects on education exist in Title IV at the physical 
infrastructure layer. 
55 See footnote no. 49. 
56 See footnote no. 49. 
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Title V 
The "Vessel Hull Design Protection Act" does not directly affect academic audiences and 
authors at this time, but future effects will be discussed at the end of this chapter. 
Summary of Control In Physical Infrastructure Layer 
Effects of control at the physical infrastructure layer are exclusively primary (See 
Figure 4 below. DMCA control at this level occurs in Titles H, IE, and IV, as it relates to 
academic audiences and authors. Restricting access at the physical level results in restricted 
access at both the content and code layers. In other words, if the computers, wires, cables, 
and other hardware are controlled, access is automatically restricted at the other two levels. 
Control of physical environment for distance education, prohibition of modifications 
resulting from computer maintenance activities, and prescribed punishment from infringers at 
Table 4 
CONTROL AFFECTING ACADEMIC AUTHORS AND AUDIENCES AT THE PHYSICAL 
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this layer illustrate an increase of control due to DMC A legislation. The burdens on 
education resulting from the DMCA controls at this level indicate a noticeable shift in 
balance of benefits away from educators and students, as compared to the digital 
environment before the DMCA. 
Summary of DMCA Control m All Layer» of the Digital Environment 
Table 5 on the following page illustrates regulatory controls that I identify in the an 
examination of the DMCA as they emerge within Yochai Benkler's communication layers in a 
title by title analysis of the DMCA regulations affecting academic audiences and authors. The 
specific DMCA regulations that shift the balance of burdens away from copyright owners and 
toward academic stakeholders and, conversely, the benefits toward copyright owners and away 
from academic stakeholders, can be broadly described as follows: 
* Title Ts anti-circumvention and CMI anti-tampering provisions 
* Control of University OSP's specifically with regard to the imposition of punishment 
for individual faculty and graduate student infringers 
* Computer maintenance regulations that mandate that equipment be returned to 
"original specifications after repair and maintenance activities 
* Distance education regulations defining appropriate classroom venue for display of 
certain materials, prohibition of transmission of display and performance materials, and 
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prohibition of conversion of analog materials to digital materials for the purpose of 
electronic display or transmission. 
Table 5 below indicates DMCA regulations that shift the balance of burdens toward 
and the balance of benefits away from educators and students. Each regulation primarily 
targets a specific area of the digital environment, represented in the table by a Benkler layer. 
The particular layer (i.e., content, code or physical infrastructure) corresponds with the DMCA 
title (i.e., Title 1, Title 2, Title 3, etc.) in which the regulation can be found. Regulations in 
these primary control areas are indicated in bold. 
Some layers are secondarily affected as a result of regulation of primary targeted layers 
(in bold). The regulations in layers that are secondarily affected are indicated in wnWaW 
f&zfwa. 
A box marked NO DISCERNIBLE EFFECTS ON ACADEMIC STAKEHOLDERS simply means 
that I could detect no obvious and immediate effects on academic stakeholders in the particular 
DMCA title and the corresponding Benkler layer. By "academic stakeholders," I am referring 
only to educators and their students, not to the university as an institutional stakeholder 
because, as explained in Chapter 2, sometimes university and educators interests, concerns and 
burdens diverge. 
Four characteristics of DMCA control, affecting the balance of burdens and benefits for 
academics and their students, emerge from Table 5 above: 
104 
Table 5 
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EFFECTS ON EDUCATORS AND STUDENTS IN A LAYER BY LAYER 
ANALYSIS OF THE DMCA TITLES I THROUGH V 
Benkler's Title 1 Title 2 Title 3 Title 4 TitleS 
Layers (distance 
education) 
Content anti- imposition of NO DISCERNIBLE prohibition of No 
circumvention punishment for CONTROL transmission of DISCERNIBLE 
university OSP EFFECTS ON display& CONTROL 
CMI anti- user infringing ACADEMIC performance EFFECTS ON 









Code and- imposition of computer prohibition of No 
circumvention punishmentfor maintenance conversion of DISCERNIBLE 
university OSP code & machine analog to CONTROL 
CMIand- user infringing altering digital format EFFECTS ON 
tampering activities restrictions for electronic ACADEMIC 







Physical NO DISCERNIBLE imposition of computer venue for NO 
CONTROL punishment maintenance performance & DISCERNIBLE 
Infrastructure EFFECTS ON for university code & machine display CONTROL ACADEMIC OSP user altering materials EFFECTS ON 
STAKEHOLDERS infringing restrictions limited to face ACADEMIC 
activities to face STAKEHOLDERS 
classroom 
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1. The code layer contains more controls affecting academia than the other two layers. 
And what is immediately noticeable is that the code layer is regulated by every Title 
except Title V, which has no effects on academic audiences and authors at any level. 
That the code layer is most heavily regulated by the DMCA is not surprising because 
one purpose of digital copyright law (as explained in Chapter 1) is to address 
technological changes not covered by previous intellectual property law. Digital code 
is unique to computer technology and, up to the passage of the DMCA, had never been 
regulated. 
2. That whenever the code layer is regulated, content is also regulated with the exception 
of the computer maintenance provision. However, one could argue that because 
everything must be returned to "original specifications" in maintaining or repairing a 
computer, text, even binary text, must also be included. However, I chose not to 
include it in this table because content is not normally manipulated during computer 
maintenance and the transmission of content is not the purpose of computer 
maintenance. In regulating code, the anti-circumvention provision denies educators 
and their student's access to the public commons in a digital environment—key content 
burdens identified in the academic non-legal documents. In his book, Fwfwre of 
Ideas, Lawrence Lessig explains the importance of the interaction between the code and 
content layers in a reflection on the state of the public commons in the early 1990's 
(pre-DMCA) when code was relatively free. 
This commons had three aspects. One is a commons of code—a commons of 
software that built the Net and many of the applications that run on the Net. A 
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second is a commons of knowledge—a free exchange of ideas and information 
about how the Net, and the code that runs on the Net, runs. Andathirdisthe 
resulting commons of innovation built by the first two together—the 
opportunity, kept open to anyone, to innovate and build upon the platform of 
the network (48). 
Access to a healthy public commons and a reliable fair use provision for educators and 
students is at the foundation of all other concerns identified in the CCCC, NCTE, and 
AAUP documents. What the anti-circumvention regulation does at each layer is to 
undermine these foundational elements and shift the balance of benefits away from 
academic stakeholders. 
3. The third significant characteristic of DMCA regulation illustrated in Table 5 is the 
variety and abundance of control at every level that Title IV (the Distance Education 
title) prescribes, including prohibition of digital transmission of copyright protected 
materials, prohibition of the broadcasting of performance and display materials and 
conversion from analog to digital format for the purpose of display and transmission. 
Also, primary control exists at both the code and physical infrastructure level with 
secondary control existing at the content level of Title IV. This control is especially 
troubling because the future of distance education, an ever-expanding trend in 
education depends on effective and efficient technology delivery systems. If the 
technology is controlled in a way that prevents student or teacher access or that 
prevents the transmission of materials, the delivery system becomes inefficient in 
delivering or displaying learning materials. 
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4. The final aspect illustrated by Table 5 is that all physical infrastructure control is 
primary control that affects other layers secondarily. Control of university OSP's, 
performance and display materials, and computer maintenance all have both primary 
and secondary controlling effects on the code and content layers. The far-reaching 
control at the physical level makes elemental sense because—to use Lessig's Speakers 
Comer example in Table 2—if you do not have access to the park (physical layer) you 
cannot deliver (code) your message (content). 
The answer to the question—Has recent digital copyright legislation shifted the balance 
of intellectual property benefits and burdens for academic authors and audiences?—must be an 
unqualified "Yes, the DMCA shifts the burdens toward academic authors and shifts the 
benefits toward owners in every Title of the legislation and at every level described by Yochai 
Benkler." 
The answer to my research question—How has recent digital copyright legislation 
shifted the balance?—can be found in points one through four above. A comparison of the 
digital environment before the DMCA's passage and after shows restrictions in access to 
materials, an almost non-existent fair use provision, and a shrinking public domain due in large 
part to a prohibition against circumventing code protection (even for the purpose of accessing 
materials in the public domain). These restrictions were not in place before the DMCA and 
they directly affect academic activity. 
The only Title that does not affect education is Title V, the "Vessel Hull Design 
Protection" provision. However, even Title V may indicate a protectionist trend that portends a 
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new direction of intellectual property protection. That is, certain patentable designs could, in 
the future, be protected by the longer term of copyright protection. This trend may afkct 
academia because the public domain containing intellectual property formerly protected by 
patent would no longer be available to student or Acuity researchers after only fourteen years 
or seventeen years, the two current terms of patent protection. The new term would be up to 95 
years under copyright, a definite advantage for owners. It is reasonable to assume, considering 
the recent and historical increase of benefits to the owner, that the vessel design might be just 
the first design to move from patent to copyright protection. 
The increase of benefits to owners of copyright occurs in concert with the shifting of burdens 
to educators and students. For example, if owner "A" places an anti-circumvention code on a 
site or in software, "A" can deny access or charge for admission to public domain works 
traditionally freely available to all. In other words, for educators and students, the burden of 
accessing digital works has increased, while the benefit of fair use has decreased. Jessica 
Litman believes that denial of access to works in the public domain does not uphold the 
principles of copyright law, which should work on a gw&f /wo gwo foundation. In the chapter of 
her book titled, "Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age," Litman urges revision of 
current digital copyright law, arguing that copyright owners should be able to gain profit from 
protected work, and at the same time, users and audience should have a right to freely access 
unprotected work. 
[U]ntil the enactment of the DMCA, the public had, and the public should have, 
an afGrmative right to gain access to, extract, use, and reuse the ideas, Acts, 
information, and other public domain material embodied in protected works. 
That affirmative right should include a limited privilege to circumvent any 
technological access controls for that purpose, and a privilege to reproduce, 
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adapt, transmit, perform, or display so much of the protected expression as is 
required in order to gain access to the unprotected elements. (185) 
Although Litman does not specifically refer to the educational exemption, she does suggest 
revising the DMCA, so that audience would have automatic fair use privileges to any public 
domain work protected by anti-circumvention code in order to return to the original 
constitutional idea of an equal distribution of burdens and benefits to author/owners and 
audience/users. 
Most significantly, these findings suggest an overall climate of restricted or impeded 
access to materials resulting from the anti-circumvention and CMI anti-tampering provisions, 
which underpin most other areas of control, like regulation of university OSP's and computer 
maintenance. Even regulations in distance education, at their core, are justified through the 
anti-circumvention restriction. For example, conversion of a word-processed document for 
digital transmission is prohibited by Title IV's addendum because the two formats have 
different codes and Title I prevents tampering with, changing, or converting those codes. The 
same code difference restriction applies to transmission of performance and display works in a 
distance education venue.57 What this code restriction emphasizes is that without code, and 
because for the most part fair use exemptions are ignored in the DMCA, there is no 
unproblematic route around that code. 
Yochai Benkler worries that current overregulation of the digital environment 
represents a shift toward an inflexible non-participatory communication network—much like 
radio and television mediums. In such a future context, copyright owners become the principal 
57 See footnote no. 49. 
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beneficiaries and potential creative input from user-audiences is lost. He urges regulation that 
allows all—user/audiences, owner/authors, corporations, and individuals—to participate 
equally in a collaborative creation of a digital future. In his article, "From Consumers to Users: 
Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access," 
Benkler argues for a protected and robust commons at every layer of the digital environment. 
He explains why legal protection of the digital commons needs to be encouraged now. 
The emergence of the digitally networked environment makes possible the 
development of a robust, open social conversation in which all can participate 
as peers. This technological and economic possibility is not, however, 
preordained. Decisions about the organization and regulation of the content, 
logical, and physical layers of the Internet will determine whether the digital 
environment will eventually, in large measure, replicate the mass media model, 
or whether it will indeed change the deep structure of our information 
environment (579) 
As of now, for educational stakeholders, the halcyon days of the 70's and 80's 
computer environment described by Lessig in the last chapter no longer exist—access to 
content and code is no longer solely controlled by simple access to a computer thanks to 
increasing regulation at all levels prescribed by the DMCA. Moreover, the trend toward 
further copyright control via increasing corporate litigation concerning ownership threatens 
academic access to all levels. The next chapter discusses some of this litigation and additional 
legal changes as they affect educational issues and shift of balance of copyright benefits and 
burdens. 
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This chapter further establishes a shift in burdens toward and shift of benefits away 
from educators and students in an analysis of recent legislation and litigation regarding the 
DMCA. Perhaps, if academic stakeholders had played a larger part in constructing the DMCA, 
educators would have gained a more reliable fair use exemption and a more secure public 
domain, resulting in more evenly distributed benefits and burdens among all corporate and 
academic stakeholders—audience/users and author/owners alike. However, as Binder and 
Weisberg suggest above from their book, lifermy CrificiMW of low, at the foundation of any 
law is the goal of the United States legal system, which is, that law provide a framework to 
support and protect the profitability of our marketplace economy. Those of us in academia 
who decry the protectionist trend in copyright law would like to "humanize" the marketplace 
so that non-profit concerns (read: educators and students) also benefit from copyright law, but, 
as Binder and Weisberg suggest in the excerpt above, this humanizing cannot compromise 
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laws' symbiosis with the marketplace, nor can it so humanize law, that its existence is no 
longer necessary. 
However, academics also serve a marketplace function in preparing students to become 
professional and effective participants in the economy. To efficiently prepare these students 
for this role and to "right" the balance of benefits and burdens for educators, digital copyright 
law needs concrete provisions that specifically outline a reliable fair use exemption, and that 
protect some of the digital public domain. These two changes could ensure a continuation of 
digital creativity from academic researchers through an unimpeded access to digital materials 
and equipment And, if there is to be digital creativity, there also must be a guarantee of 
academic rights to publish and present the results of this academic productivity. 
The next two sections of this chapter looks at changes and challenges to digital law that 
affect fair use, public domain, and academic freedom—including federal legislation concerning 
distance education and also state, district, and federal court opinions concerning DMCA 
regulations. This discussion reveals a continuous shifting back and forth of copyright burdens 
and benefits between author/owners and audience/users interacting in a digital environment, 
further underscoring the need for a reliable fair use exemption, a healthy and safe public 
commons, and the right to publish and present research results. 
New Copyright Legislation Concerning Distance Education 
The two most burdensome DMCA titles are Title I, which protects anti-circumvention 
measures and Title H, which describes regulation in a distance education environment 
Although Title I remains intact as of this writing, Title II has been modified somewhat, to the 
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benefit of educators and their students. Congress passed these modifications, known as the 
"Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act" (the TEACH Act). The TEACH 
Act was signed into law by President Bush on November 2,2002. See Appendix II for the 
TEACH Act 
According to website information, the AAUP was active in supporting the changes to 
distance education during the TEACH Act's movement through Congress. The AAUP site 
provides one reason for legislative consideration of modifications, explaining, "The TEACH 
Act draws on the recommendations of the Copyright Office Report, extending the principles of 
fair use to distance education courses." AAUP Anther urges members to actively support 
TEACH. ("TEACH Act: S.487"). 
Surprisingly, no information about the TEACH Act exists on either the NCTE or 
CCCC websites, with the exception of a link to an American Library Association (ALA) 
article. This lack of information is surprising considering both organizations' vociferous and 
active opposition to CTEA and DMCA in the years preceding their passage. 
The ALA appears to have been one of the most active organizations in lobbying for the 
distance education modifications. Information about the Act can be found on its website, 
which also includes a summary of ALA lobbying activities.58 In an article dated November 4, 
2002, ALA announced the passage of TEACH: 
TEACH establishes new opportunities for educators to use copyrighted works 
without permission and without payment of royalties, but those opportunities 
38 For information about ALA lobbying activities, go to the following URL: <http://www.ala.org/Content 
/NavigationMenu/Our_Association/Governance/Treasurers_Page/lobbying.htm>. 
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are subject to new limits and conditions. The American Library Association 
joined with numerous other associations and groups representing educators, 
librarians, and academic administrators to negotiate the language of the TEACH 
Act and to vigorously support its passage. ("Major Copyright Bill Affecting 
Distance Education Becomes Law") 
This announcement suggests that academic stakeholders were involved in this part of copyright 
law revision. As a result of TEACH, the benefits of copyright shift toward educators and 
students. 
Although the "limits and conditions" referred to in the ALA article above complicate 
distance education regulations, the TEACH Act does ease some of the most burdensome 
DMCA restrictions concerning distance education in that: 
« transmission of most performance and display works are now allowed 
* a classroom, mo# casea, is no longer defined in traditional terms as face to face 
instruction in an unmediated venue in real time 
* analog materials can now be digitized for distance education purposes 
cerfam on gwanfAy 
These modifications signal a shift in benefits toward educators and students and a relaxation of 
control of digital communication in a distance education environment Access to performance 
and display works affects the code layer; an expansion of the definition of a classroom aSects 
the physical infrastructure layer; and allowing conversion of analog materials to a digital 
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format affects the content layer. Thus, educational stakeholders claim benefit at all three 
layers, modifying the findings in Chapter 4/* 
The next section discusses legal challenges resulting from the DMCA and the effects of 
the challenges on burdens and benefits to educators and students. 
DMCA Litigation 
To distinguish trends in the balance of burdens and benefits of copyright legislation and 
to extend my research question into the future, this chapter briefly surveys major legal 
challenges to the DMCA, and there have been many. The trends are important to identify, as 
they underscore a possible increase in the erosion of fair use and the public domain—the two 
most important benefits of copyright law to academic stakeholders. 
Dozens of intellectual property litigations involving the newest digital regulations have 
surfaced since the 1998 passage of the DMCA. Many cases are most significant to the 
academic concerns identified in the AAUP, CCCC, and NCTE pre-DMCA passage discourse. 
Many address the anti-circumvention provisions, provisions that affect all of Benkler* s three 
levels in the digital communication environment. Although all of the cases discussed here 
involve academic concerns identified in the pre-passage documents, only a few cases involves 
an educational venue, but most are important to establishing trends in the shifting balance of 
academic burdens and benefits in copyright law and to underscore the corporate and academic 
59 See the ALA (American Library Association) website for a user friendly and non-legal explanation of these 
changes to the original H.R. 2215 (now integrated into Sec. 110 of the U.S. Code. The web page URL is 
<http://www.ala.org/Template.cfm?Section=Distance_Education_and_the TEACH Act&Template+ZContent 
Management/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID+25939#benefits>. 
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dialect concerning intellectual property law. The cases I discuss here are as follows (in 
chronological order): 
* fe/fy v. jfrriAa Cwp. 1999 WL 1210918 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15,1999). Deals 
with two issues: (1) Whether fair use protects a visual search engine (a group of 
thumbnail sized images). (2) Database creation. 
» fe/fgM v. 7M4L4 June 6,2001 (U.S. District Court of New Jersey). Addresses the 
anti-circumvention provision and also the right of educators to publicly present 
research findings of reverse engineered code. See Chapter 2 for a summary of the 
case. 
* .Mew Tort Tïmea v. June 25,2001 (U.S. Supreme Court). Concerns the 
issue of whether a database can contain the work of a freelance author without that 
author's permission. 
* DKD Copy CoM/ro/ v. vdrndrew Brwwier, November 1,2001 (Sixth 
Appellate District Court of California). Concerns the publication of a protected 
code to an online bulletin board. 
* LWW Aafea v. -E/comcq#, December 17,2002 (U. S. Supreme Court). Concerns a 
Soviet PhD student who developed software that converts one format (Advanced 
eBook Processor) to another (PDF). The defendant, Dmitry Skylarof was arrested 
and jailed. 
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Unless otherwise cited, all uncited quotations used in the case discussions are extracted 
directly from the case text itself! 
v. Gofpormdow. 
Case Summary 
In 1999, one year after the passage of the DMCA, Leslie A. Kelly brought legal action 
against Arriba Soft Corporation for copyright infringement of original photographs from two 
websites. Arriba Soft Corporation was a search engine called Arriba Vista Image Searcher that 
randomly captured visual images from the Internet and transformed them into thumbnail 
images in a database for computer users to peruse.** Kelly claimed that, in addition to 
reproducing copyrighted images, Arriba removed all copyright information from each image in 
violation of the DMCA Title I's CMI anti-alteration or anti-tampering provision. 
Court's Decision 
The District Court of Northern California ruled that 
On apparent first impression, the Court holds the use by an Internet "visual 
search engine" of others' copyrighted images is a prima facia copyright 
violation, but it may be justified under the "fair use" doctrine. The Court finds 
that, under the particular circumstances of this case, the "fair use" doctrine 
applies, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act is not violated. (Case No. 
SA CV 99-560 GLT[JW]) 
60 The Arriba site is now called "Ditto" and can be reached at URL: http://ditto.com/ 
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The court additionally ruled that although copyright management information was missing 
from the thnmhnAil images, Title I's CMI anti-alteration or anti-tampering provision was not 
violated because 
• Arriba's searching software unintentionally removed copyright information so the 
removal was merely a "side effect" of the web crawler operation. 
• Information was provided for linking the site 6om which the image came. 
« A warning was posted on the search site that advised users that some images may be 
copyrighted and that restrictions for use may apply. 
Discussion 
Two aspects of the District Court's opinion are significant for education. First, despite 
the absence of fair use consideration in the DMCA, the Court chose to base part of its decision 
on a meticulous consideration of all four legs of the fair use provision.61 Even though the 
Court found that only two of the four legs favored granting Air use, the fourth leg, the effect of 
use on the value and market, to be the most important element; therefore, Air use was granted. 
Law's connection to and support of the market economy is emphasized in this portion of the 
decision. However, education could indirectly benefit because this case establishes Air use as 
a precedent for future digital copyright cases. In Act, Gary L. Taylor, the District Judge who 
61 The four legs of the fair use provision according to the 1976 copyright act are: 
• The purpose and character of use 
• The nature of the copyrighted work 
• The amount and substantiality of the portion used 
• The effect of use on the potential market or value 
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wrote the Arriba opinion specifically supports the educational exemption in the following 
excerpt from his decision: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106 A, the fair use of a 
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or 
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such 
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (zMcfwdbzg am/fzp/e cqpfea _/br 
c/asaroofM [italics mine], or research, is not an infringement of 
copyright 
The second significant aspect for education is that Kelly's claim that Arriba violated the 
CMI protection provision was struck down due to the lack of intention to infringe by Arriba, 
and also because Arriba notified the search engine users that copyright restrictions may apply. 
Title I has specific language prohibiting the removal or alteration of CMI before the act of 
distribution of copies. However, the provision also considers intention to conceal copyright 
information and that was the aspect of this provision the Court heeded. What this emphasis on 
intention does is to open the door a little for the educational exemption in cases where the 
intention is tampering with CMI for non-profit educational purposes. In other words, the CMI 
anti-tampering provision may be circumvented if one can prove non-economic intent, and this 
affects balance in that the Air use exemption was designed for non-profit use of copyright 
protected materials. This decision strengthens fair use, a primary educational concern, thereby, 
shifting the balance a bit toward educators and students. 
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fWkw v. JRM4. 
Case Summary 
While Aie/fy v. <Sb/? Co^p. was based on a charge of infringement of the Title I's 
CMI anti-alteration provision, Felten v. RIAA addresses the other leg of Title I, the anti-
circumvention provision. 
Preceding this case computer scientist, Edward W. Felten, and a team of faculty and 
graduate students responded to an online challenge from the Secure Digital Music Initiative 
Foundation (SDMI) to "crack" a code protecting digital music from copyright infringement 
under Title 1.^ Felten's group succeeded, reported their findings to SDMI, wrote up their 
research findings, and planned to present these findings at an academic conference. However, 
the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), an organization that used the very 
technology that SDMI offered in the challenge, threatened to sue if the research were made 
public. This threat effectively stopped presentation and publication of the code cracking 
research. Felten and his group took the matter to the U.S. District Court of the District of New 
Jersey to receive some guarantee that publication and presentation of this and future academic 
research would not result in litigation. They also charged that the anti-circumvention provision 
of the DMCA was unconstitutional and therefore, should be struck down. 
62 As cited in the Felten v. RIAA complaint text: "SDMI is 'a forum that brings together more than 180 
companies and organizations representing information technology, consumer electronics, security technology, 
the worldwide recording industry, and Internet service providers. SDMl's charter is to develop open 
technology specifications that protect the playing, storing, and distributing of digital music such that a new 
market for digital music may emerge.'" http://www.sdmi.org/ 
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Court's Decision 
In November of2001, U.S. District Court Judge Garret E. Brown dismissed the charges 
for two reasons. First, in the period between the Sling of charges and the dismissal of the case, 
SDMI, the Attorney General's office, and RIAA assured Felten's team that they would not be 
prosecuted for presenting or publishing their findings.63 Judge Brown felt that this was 
assurance enough and therefore, the Court's additional assurance was unwarranted and 
unneeded.6* 
Second, Judge Brown declared that the concern of Felten et al. was a "political, rather 
than a legal concern, one that can best be pursued in the halls of the Legislature until they 
[Felten et al.] have a real case or controversy to bring before this Court." In other words, the 
Court refused to strike down the anti-circumvention provision, claiming that any action to 
eliminate the provision should take place in the legislative, not the judicial branch of 
government 
Discussion 
This case addresses the anti-circumvention provision, identified by my research 
findings in 6e last chapter and by AAUP, CCC, and NCTE as the one of the most significant 
to academic concerns. What is important here is the secondary effect—the chilling effect on 
academic right to publish and present research. This right, supported the Air use provision 
63 Of the four papers to be published and presented, two were the work of graduate students. 
64 Judge Brown poked fun at Felten's group in his decision saying, "The plaintiffs liken themselves to modern 
Gallileos persecuted by authorities. I fear that a more apt analogy would be to modern day Don Quixotes 
feeling threatened by windmills which they perceive as giants. There is no real controversy here." 
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outlined in the 1976 Copyright Act, was all but ignored in the 1998 DMCA, and Judge 
Brown did not reference fair use in his dismissal of charges. 
It is obvious, because of public activist organizational support and the activist past 
activities of Edward Felten with regard to the DMCA, that this case was a political rallying cry 
for protest against the abridgement of academic rights in digital copyright law. One could also 
assume that SDMI and RIAA sensed the political weight of this protest, and consequently, 
withdrew their threats to avoid negative publicity for an industry still trying to mend bridges 
after the demise of Napster. So each side had strong political interests in the outcome of this 
case. 
Although no concrete changes or precedent occurred as a result of this case, it does 
accomplish two tasks. It draws attention to the anti-circumvention provision's potential for 
harm to academic interests and it establishes a public academic position for legislators to 
consider when creating future digital law. Nonetheless, the threat of further litigation involving 
academic interests and prohibition of circumvention protection remains. So, in this case, 
although Felten and his group benefit from RIAA and SDMI's legal retreat, the additional 
burden of strict anti-circumvention restrictions to educators and students remains. This decision 
does little to strengthen the fair use exemption, so the balance remains in favor of owners. 
Win# fork jHrnaef oi v. TbdWef 
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Case Summary 
In this case, freelance authors, who wrote articles for the Mew Ybr& Times and other 
publications, charge the Times and the other publications with copyright infringement because 
the periodicals licensed and sold the articles to such computerized databases as LEXIS/NEXIS. 
The databases to which the works were sold are universally-used university reference 
subscription databases. 
Court's Decision 
The District Court ruled for the publishers arguing that the authors' works belonged to 
the original collective work (e.g., an issue of the New York Times) to which the authors 
originally submitted their work. The Second Circuit Court reversed that decision and on June 
25th, 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision because "the Databases 
reproduce and distribute articles standing alone and not in context" Therefore, according to 
the court, the works are not considered to be an integral part of a collective work once they 
have been individually handed over to the database company. Both the database company and 
the original periodical were held responsible for infringement of the author's copyrights. The 
Court ruled that the original copyright belongs to the author and therefore, it is the author who 
must contract with the database company. 
Discussion 
The Tasini decision in some ways mirrors the Basic Books, Inc v. Kinko's case. As 
described in Chapter 2 of this paper, Kinko's copying company was found guilty of copyright 
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infringement for not gaining permission from author/owners before assembling, copying, and 
selling coursepacks to college students. Although referred to as a database, the Tasini database 
has similar characteristics to the coursepack, in that both are used in universities and both 
contain essays, articles, and possibly, works of fiction. They are not databases in the sense that 
a telephone directory is. Another similarity is that both cases concern works of which college 
students and educators make frequent use. Therefore, it is safe to assume that since both 
compilation assemblers were found guilty, the results of the Tasini and Kinko's cases will be 
similar. Consequently, we can probably anticipate a rise in college library subscription rates 
for online databases as database owners scramble to seek copyright permission from each 
author. Also the assembling of databases may take longer, since the search for authors will 
slow the process, and could, in some cases, result in less timely delivery of relevant material. 
In any case, access to and delivery of material is impeded—a blow to fair use. In a 1996 article 
titled "Intellectual Property and Composition Studies," Andrea Lunsfbrd and Susan West 
describe the eGects of the Kinko's decision on education: 
With this decision, the technology of photocopying (generally regarded as a 
boon for the educational community) felt the force of an accelerating high 
protectionist trend in copyright, a shift toward expanded rights for creators and 
publishers at the expense of information users—like teachers and students. As 
a result intermediaries sprang up to collect (and skim of some) fees for all kinds 
of materials, including essays,.. .and the price of coursepacks rose 
dramatically, often beyond the ability of students to purchase them or the will of 
Acuity to require them. (384) 
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It is not a far leap to conclude that the results of the Tasini decision will mirror the results 
Lunsfbrd and West describe above. 
Even though the Court relied on copyright law written before the DMCA, the decision 
does affect the digital realm regarding academic concerns. And just as in the Kinko's case, fair 
use is not interpreted to apply here. This decision again shifts the benefits toward the owners 
and away from educational stakeholders. 
DKD Copy Cbmfrof X&mMxodoM v. Andrew jfrwmner. 
Case Summary 
In 1999, DVD Copy Control Association (DVDCCA) Sled for, but was not granted, a 
temporary restraining order against Andrew Brunner and any other website operator to prevent 
them from posting the DVD anti-circumvention code on websites, online bulletin boards or 
chat rooms.65 DVDCCA is a security organization similar to SDMI, the organization that 
issued the code cracking challenge in the Felten case. The code that Andrew Brunner was 
accused of posting to his web site was an anti-circumvention code. This code, called DeCSS 
"consists of computer source code which describes a method for playing an encrypted DVD on 
a non-CSS-equipped DVD player or drive." Brunner extracted the code from an Internet chat 
room after it had been uploaded by a 15-year old Norwegian, Jon Johansen. 
65 A DVD is five-inch thin disk used for a large amount of data, not only textual data, but also motion pictures 
and music. 
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In January of2000, DVDCCA requested an injunction requiring Brunner to cease 
publishing or using the code. A preliminary injunction was issued on January 21st. The case 
discussed here is Brunner's attempt to have the injunction lifted in 2001. 
Court s Decision 
The Court of Appeal of the State of California, on November 1,2001, lifted the 
injunction against Andrew Brunner and awarded him appellate costs. The basis of DVDCCA's 
argument was that Brunner's posting of the code could be considered infringement because it 
violated the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA). Brunner argued that the injunction impinged 
on his First Amendment rights "because it exerts prior restraint." Prior restraint, in simple 
terms, means that the government, in placing its injunction on Brunner, prevents him from 
expressing himself before expression occurs. He also argued that since the code was reverse-
engineered in Norway, which does not prohibit reverse engineering, that U.S. license 
agreements and prohibitions do not apply. 
The Court ruled that Brunner's prior restraint of free speech argument was more 
compelling than the DVDCCA's trade secrets argument, saying: 
DVDCCA's statutory right to protect its economically valuable trade secret is 
not an interest that is more fundamental than the First Amendment right to 
freedom of speech. Our respect for the Legislature and its enactment of the 
UTSA cannot displace our duty to safeguard the rights guaranteed by the First 




In some respects, this case resembles the Felten case because, in both cases, prior 
restraint was used to prevent future speech. Although this case is not about a student or 
educator, it can apply to cases where research is posted online. 1% for example a student 
assembles a database of links to sites and works by 20* century Irish-American authors for a 
literature class, an injunction could require that student to disassemble the website and not to 
reveal the sources of that information. However, in more parallel examples, student computer 
scientists may reverse engineer the code that prevents converting a pdf file to an analog file in a 
demonstration of the weakness of code protection. Would a publication of the code to a 
website then be infringement? If so, imagine the creative improvements that are suppressed by 
the resulting injunction. In supporting free speech in this case, the Court weakens the anti-
circumvention provision, which negatively affects educational concerns in all three levels of 
the digital communication. Therefore, the balance of burdens moves a little toward 
corporations and correspondingly, the benefits of a more reliable fair use and more accessible 
public domain increase for educators and students. 
Case Summary 
First of all, court records are not yet available for this case from the Ninth Circuit Court 
of California. All information in this summary and the following court opinion discussion has 
been gleaned from online sources. 
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In 2001, Russian graduate student and ElcomSoft company computer programmer, 
Dmitry Skylarof, was arrested for promoting software he developed that allowed users to print 
and make copies of books licensed for use on the Adobe Acrobat eBook Reader Software. 
Skylarof was jailed for several weeks until prosecutors offered to release him in exchange for 
testimony against his company (Bowman). On December 17th, both Skylarof and ElcomSoft 
were acquitted of all charges, which included circumvention infringement and for marketing 
tools used for circumvention ("US v. ElcomSoft & Skylarof FAQ"). 
Court's Decision 
This was a jury trial, and therefore, no judicial opinion exists. However, in an interview, 
jury foreman Dennis Strader claimed that the jury was impressed with the defense's fair use 
argument. ElcomSoft and Skylarof s attorneys argued that users who buy the eBook Reader 
should hé able to print and make copies (prevented by Adobe's code protection) of work that 
becomes theirs through the purchase of the Adobe software under the fair use provision ("IT 
Firm Cleared in Copyright Case"). 
Strader also said that the jury did not believe that either Skylarof or ElcomSoft intended 
to infringe on copyright He explains: 
"We [the jury] didn't understand why a million-dollar company would put on 
their Web page an illegal thing that would (ruin) their whole business if they 
were caught.Strader added that the panel found the DMCA itself 
confusing, making it^asy for jurors to believe that executives from Russia 
might not fully understand it [the DMCA]. (Bowman) 
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Discussion 
This case illustrates an advance in technology that controls fair use, if a user buys 
software that is licensed to access certain protected works. This could bode ill for education if 
software companies obtain licenses to increasing numbers of educational works for 
dissemination to students and faculty. These software companies could feasibly charge a per 
copy fee for printing or copying, increasing the burden on academics. The arrest of Dmitry 
Skylarof also discourages international creative digital works from making it into U.S. markets, 
which could impede technological progress and hinder foreign and U.S. collaboration in the 
research and development of improved software designs. Fortunately the jury in the case 
considered both fair use and intent in deciding for the defendants. 
Although the jury found the defendants innocent, Adobe's action of bringing the suit is 
ominous. Not only did the company intend to circumvent fair use by means of anti-
circumvention devices, they also tested the new criminal punishments put in place by the 
DMCA. Elcomsoft could have been fined as much as $2 million and Skylarof could have been 
given additional jail time ("IT Firm Cleared in Copyright Case"). If a company like Adobe 
appeals to a non-juried court, the decision might not have considered Skylarof and ElcomSoft's 
probable ignorance of as grounds for dismissal of charges. Ignorance of the law may be a 
strong emotional appeal to a jury, but it is not a reliable defense to judges. Because the most 
important precedent-setting decisions occur at the non-juried state supreme and U.S. Supreme 
Court levels, this decision does little for education. The fact that Skylarof was arrested and 
detained at all is disturbing in that it underscores power of the new criminal charges defined by 
the DMCA. Where the balance shifts in this case is unclear. 
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Summary of Case Activity and Court Decisions 
The preceding cases indicate two significant trends for educators and students. First of 
all the DMCA is not as impregnable as the Chapter 4 analysis would suggest. Fair use is still 
alive and well-considered in some cases such as Xie/fy v. and v. Efcomsq/) 
and IWfry SAy/arc# despite its absence in the DMCA. On the other hand, in other cases 
where academic concerns are directly at stake, such as the Felten case, the fair use provision is 
not applied by the courts. Also, the anti-circumvention and CMI anti-alteration provisions are 
not always strictly enforced. In DKD Cqpy Confro/ v. Andrew Brenner and the 
Skylarof cases, circumvention was allowed—in the first case because of potential infringement 
on free speech; in the second because of fair use considerations and lack of intent to infringe. 
What these cases indicate is that the DMCA is unevenly applied by the courts, even though it is 
also clear that control at all levels has increased and simultaneously, the burdens have shifted 
toward academic authors and audiences. 
The second trend is the rush by corporate and individual author/owners to claim the 
remaining bits of the public commons present in the code and content layers of the digital 
environment. To use the previous cases as examples, Adobe creates and markets software to 
eliminate fair use considerations, and individual owners like Leslie Kelly and Jonathon Tasini 
attempt to claim profit from databases. Perhaps the balance of benefits and burdens will be 
determined by the way these two trends dictated by court decisions and corporate greed play 
out. Hopefully, the court will consider the constitutional mandate for equal benefits to both 
owners and audiences. 
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The Felten case indicates another possible trend and that is the willingness of corporate 
concerns, demonstrated by SDMI and RIAA, to challenge a basic academic freedom—the right 
to publish and present research. Even though the case was dismissed, we should shine a light 
on any future challenges to this right, as the power of these two powerful organizations was 
mitigated by the fear of public castigation. 
Lawrence Lessig's sees powerful organizations like RIAA and SDMI only becoming 
more controlling of the digital realm. His book, The Future of Ideas: the Fate of the Commons 
M o CowiecW fFbr/d does not hold out hope for a democratic, interactive, and innovative 
digital environment in the future. He believes that, "The opportunity to innovate outside of the 
dominant players has again evaporated" (266). He claims that individuals and small companies 
will soon be squeezed out as dominant players like Microsoft gain increasingly more control of 
the digital public commons. 
To construct a model of copyright laws that privileges not only players like Microsoft, 
but also that is equitable to all stakeholders, we should review Herbert Morris advice that a fair 
system should have "a mechanism designed to prevent a maldistribution in the benefits and 
burdens" (322). Although his article refers to the creation of a system of punishment, rather 
than the creation of a system of law, because both systems are symbiotic, fairness must be the 
guiding principle in both. In expanding upon the idea of fairness in law, Morris argues that 
legal system must interfere only when necessary because: 
The primary function of the system of rules [in the United States] was to 
provide individuals with a sphere of interest immune from interference. Given 
this goal, it is determined tobea greater evil for society to interfere 
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unjustifiably with an individual by depriving him of good than for the society to 
fail to punish those that have unjustifiable interfered. (323) 
What this means for copyright law is that academic "spheres of interest" should be free from 
interference, as academic goals are ultimately beneficial to society. A system of copyright 
laws that protect both academic and corporate interests should include specific and irrevocable 
laws prescribing a reliable fair use provision, a stable public commons, and a protected 
academic right to publish and present as the mechanisms that prevent the "maldistribution of 
benefits and burdens." Unfortunately, the commons, at this point, is not only affected by the 
DMCA regulations, it has also been diminished by the CTEA's addition of twenty more years 
to the term of copyright 
All the same, I am hopeful when I read about organizational protests like those of 
CCCC's Intellectual Property Caucus and NCTE's consistent lobbying of Congress for 
copyright laws that advantage, instead of disadvantaging education. I am also hopeful when 
observing academics like Lawrence Lessig, Yochai Benkler, and Jessica Litman (all 
academics) write books and articles about the unfairness of the DMCA. Despite these hopeful 
signs, a subtle and insidious erosion of academic freedoms with regard to digital copyright 
seems to be occurring with little fanfare. To make any change in the law, we have to be active 
in encouraging those in power to consider the importance of education's stake in digital 
communication. Digital communication delivery systems are the future of education, and 
consistent flow of innovation and collaboration on these systems ensures that we remain 




THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998 
U.S. Copyright OfBce Summary 
December 1998 
INTRODUCTION 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)1 was signed into law by 
President Clinton on October 28,1998. The legislation implements two 1996 World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) treaties: the WIPO Copyright Treaty and 
the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. The DMCA also addresses a 
number of other significant copyright-related issues. 
The DMCA is divided into five titles: 
# Tide I, the "WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonogram* 
Treaties Implementation Act of 1998," implements the WIPO 
treaties. 
# Tide II, the Online Copyright Infringement Liability limitation 
Act," creates limitations on the liability of online service providers for 
copyright infringement when engaging in certain types of activities. 
# Title III, the Computer Maintenance Competition Assurance 
Act," creates an exemption for making a copy of a computer program 
by activating a computer for purposes of maintenance or repair. 
# Title IV contains six miscellaneous provisions, relating to the 
functions of the Copyright Office, distance education, the exceptions 
in the Copyright Act for libraries and for making ephemeral recordings, 
"webcasting" of sound recordings on the Internet, and the applicability 
of collective bargaining agreement obligations in the case of transfers 
of rights in motion pictures. 
# Tide V, the "Vessel Hull Design Protection Act," creates a new form 
of protection for the design of vessel hulls. 
This memorandum summarizes briefly each title of the DMCA. It provides 
merely an overview of the law's provisions; for purposes of length and readability a 
significant amount of detail has been omitted. A complete understanding of any 
provision of the DMCA requires reference to the text of the legislation itseK 
'Pub. L. No. 105-304,112 Stat. 2860 (Oct 28,1998). 
Page / 
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TITLE I: WIPO TREATY IMPLEMENTATION 
Title I implements the WIPO treaties. First, it makes certain technical 
amendments to U.S. law, in order to provide appropriate references and links to the 
treaties. Second, it creates two new prohibitions in Title 17 of the U.S. Code—one on 
circumvention of technological measures used by copyright owners to protect their 
works and one on tampering with copyright management information—and adds civil 
remedies and criminal penalties for violating the prohibitions. In addition, Title I 
requires the U.S. Copyright Office to perform two joint studies with the National 




The WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) each require member countries to provide protection to 
certain works from other member countries or created by nationals of other member 
countries. That protection must be no less favorable than that accorded to domestic 
works. 
Section 104 of the Copyright Act establishes the conditions of eligibility for 
protection under U.S. law for works from other countries. Section 102(b) of the 
DMCA amends section 104 of the Copyright Act and adds new definitions to section 
101 of the Copyright Act in order to extend the protection of U.S. law to those works 
required to be protected under the WCT and the WPPT. 
Restora tiou of Copyright Protection 
Both treaties require parties to protect preexisting works from other member 
countries that have not fallen into the public domain in the country of origin through 
the expiry of the term of protection. A similar obligation is contained in both the 
Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement. In 1995 this obligation was imple­
mented in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, creating a new section 104A in the 
Copyright Act to restore protection to works from Berne or WTO member countries 
that are still protected in the country of origin, but fell into the public domain in the 
United States in the past because of a failure to comply with formalities that then 
existed in U.S. law. or due to a lack of treatv relations. Section 102(c) of the DMC A 
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The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 
Registration as a Prerequisite to Suit 
The remaining technical amendment relates to the prohibition in both treaties 
against conditioning the exercise or enjoyment of rights on the fulfillment of 
formalities. Section 411(a) of the Copyright Act requires claims to copyright to be 
registered with the Copyright Office before a lawsuit can be initiated by the copyright 
owner, but exempts many foreign works in order to comply with existing treaty 
obligations under the Berne Convention. Section 102(d) of the DMCA amends section 
411(a) by broadening the exemption to cover all foreign works. 
Technological Protection and Copydght Management System» 
Each of the WIPO treaties contains virtually identical language obligating 
member states to prevent circumvention of technological measures used to protect 
copyrighted works, and to prevent tampering with the integrity of copyright 
management information. These obligations serve as technological adjuncts to the 
exclusive rights granted by copyright law. They provide legal protection that the 
international copyright community deemed critical to the safe and efficient exploitation 
of works on digital networks. 
Circumvention of Technological Protection Measures 
Gemeeal approach 
Article 11 of the WCT states: 
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protec­
tion and effective legal remedies against the circumven­
tion of effective technological measures that are used 
by authors in connection with the exercise of their 
rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention and 
that restrict acts, in respect of their works, which are 
not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted 
by law. 
Article 18 of the WPPT contains nearly identical language. 
Section 103 of the DMCA adds a new chapter 12 to Title 17 of the U.S. Code. 
New section 1201 implements the obligation to provide adequate and effective 
protection against circumvention of technological measures used by copyright owners 
to protect their works. 
Section 1201 divides technological measures into two categories: measures that 
prevent unauthorized access to a copyrighted work and measures that prevent 
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unauthorized copying of a copyrighted work. Making or selling devices or services that 
are used to circumvent either category of technological measure is prohibited in certain 
circumstances, described below. As to the act of circumvention in itself, the provision 
prohibits circumventing the first category of technological measures, but not the 
second. 
This distinction was employed to assure that the public will have the continued 
ability to make fair use of copyrighted works. Since copying of a work may be a fair use 
under appropriate circumstances, section 1201 does not prohibit the act of circumvent­
ing a technological measure that prevents copying. By contrast, since the fair use 
doctrine is not a defense to the act of gaining unauthorized access to a work, the act of 
circumventing a technological measure in order to gain access is prohibited. 
Section 1201 proscribes devices or services that fall within any one of the 
following three categories: 
• they are primarily designed or produced to circumvent; 
• they have only limited commercially significant purpose or use other 
than to circumvent; or 
• they are marketed for use in circumventing. 
No mandate 
Section 1201 contains language clarifying that the prohibition on circumvention 
devices does not require manufacturers of consumer electronics, telecommunications 
or computing equipment to design their products affirmatively to respond to any 
particular technological measure. (Section 1201(c)(3)). Despite this general 'no 
mandate' rule, section 1201 (k) does mandate an affirmative response for one particular 
type of technology: within 18 months of enactment, all analog vidéocassette recorders 
must be designed to conform to certain defined technologies, commonly known as 
Macrovision, currently in use for preventing unauthorized copying of analog 
vidéocassettes and certain analog signals. The provision prohibits rightholders from 
applying these specified technologies to free television and basic and extended basic tier 
cable broadcasts. 
^'Copying" is used in this context as a short-hand for the exercise of any of the exclus­
ive rights of an author under section 106 of the Copyright Act. Consequently, a technological 
measure that prevents unauthorized distribution or public performance of a work would fall 




Section 1201 contains two general savings clauses. First, section 1201(c)(1) 
states that nothing in section 1201 affects rights, remedies, limitations or defenses to 
copyright infringement, including fair use. Second, section 1201(c)(2) states that 
nothing in section 1201 enlarges or diminishes vicarious or contributory copyright 
infringement. 
Exception* 
Finally, the prohibitions contained in section 1201 are subject to a number of 
exceptions. One is an exception to the operation of the entire section, for law 
enforcement, intelligence and other governmental activities. (Section 1201(e)). The 
others relate to section 1201(a), the provision dealing with the category of technological 
measures that control access to works. 
The broadest of these exceptions, section 1201 (a)(l)(B)-(E), establishes an 
ongoing administrative rule-making proceeding to evaluate the impact of the 
prohibition against the act of circumventing such access-control measures. This 
conduct prohibition does not take effect for two years. Once it does, it is subject to 
an exception for users of a work which is in a particular class of works if they are or are 
likely to be adversely affected by virtue of the prohibition in making noninfringing uses. 
The applicability of the exemption is determined through a periodic rulemaking by the 
librarian of Congress, on the recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, who is 
to consult with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and 
Information. 
The six additional exceptions are as follows: 
1. Nonprofit library, archive and educational institution exception 
(section 1201(d)). The prohibition on the act of circumvention of 
access control measures is subject to an exception that permits 
nonprofit libraries, archives and educational institutions to circumvent 
solely for the purpose of making a good faith determination as to 
whether they wish to obtain authorized access to the work. 
2. Reverse engineering (section 1201(f)). This exception permits 
circumvention, and the development of technological means for such 
circumvention, by a person who has lawfully obtained a right to use a 
copy of a computer program for the sole purpose of identifying and 
analyzing elements of the program necessary to achieve interoperability 
with other programs, to the extent that such acts are permitted under 
copyright law. 
3. Encryption research (section 1201 (g)). An exception for encryption 
research permits circumvention of access control measures, and the 
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development of the technological means to do so, in order to identify 
flaws and vulnerabilities of encryption technologies. 
4. Protection of minors (section 1201(h)). This exception allows a court 
applying the prohibition to a component or part to consider the 
necessity for its incorporation in technology that prevents access of 
minors to material on the Internet. 
5. Personal privacy (section 1201 (i)). This exception permits circumven­
tion when the technological measure, or the work it protects, is capable 
of collecting or disseminating personally identifying information about 
the online activities of a natural person. 
6. Security testing (section 1201®). This exception permits circumven­
tion of access control measures, and the development of technological 
means for such circumvention, for the purpose of testing the security 
of a computer, computer system or computer network, with the 
authorization of its owner or operator. 
Each of the exceptions has its own set of conditions on its applicability, which 
are beyond the scope of this summary. 
Integrity of Copyright Management Information 
Article 12 of the WCT provides in relevant part: 
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate and effective 
legal remedies against any person knowingly performing 
any of the following acts knowing, or with respect to 
civil remedies having reasonable grounds to know, that 
it will induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an infringe­
ment of any right covered by this Treaty or the Berne 
Convention: 
(i) to remove or alter any electronic rights 
management information without authority; 
(ii) to distribute, import for distribution, broad­
cast or communicate to the public, without authority, 
works or copies of works knowing that electronic rights 
management information has been removed or altered 
without authority. 
Article 19 of the WPPT contains nearly identical language. 
New section 1202 is the provision implementing this obligation to protect the 
integrity of copyright management information (CMI). The scope of the protection 
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is set out in two separate paragraphs, the first dealing with false CMI and the second 
with removal or alteration of CMI. Subsection (a) prohibits the knowing provision or 
distribution of false CMI, if done with the intent to induce, enable, facilitate or conceal 
infringement. Subsection (b) bars the intentional removal or alteration of CMI without 
authority, as well as the dissemination of CMI or copies of works, knowing that the 
CMI has been removed or altered without authority. Liability under subsection (b) 
requires that the act be done with knowledge or, with respect to civil remedies, with 
reasonable grounds to know that it will induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an 
infringement. 
Subsection (c) defines CMI as identifying information about the work, the 
author, the copyright owner, and in certain cases, the performer, writer or director of 
the work, as well as the terms and conditions for use of the work, and such other 
information as the Register of Copyrights may prescribe by regulation. Information 
concerning users of works is explicitly excluded. 
Section 1202 is subject to a general exemption for law enforcement, intelligence 
and other governmental activities. (Section 1202(d)). It also contains limitations on the 
liability of broadcast stations and cable systems for removal or alteration of CMI in 
certain circumstances where there is no intent to induce, enable, facilitate or conceal 
an infringement. (Section 1202(e)). 
Any person injured by a violation of section 1201 or 1202 may bring a civil 
action in Federal court. Section 1203 gives courts the power to grant a range of 
equitable and monetary remedies similar to those available under the Copyright Act, 
including statutory damages. The court has discretion to reduce or remit damages in 
cases of innocent violations, where the violator proves that it was not aware and had 
no reason to believe its acts constituted a violation. (Section 1203(c)(5)(A)). Special 
protection is given to nonprofit libraries, archives and educational institutions, which 
are entitled to a complete remission of damages in these circumstances. (Section 
1203(c)(5)(B)). 
In addition, it is a criminal offense to violate section 1201 or 1202 wilfully and 
for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain. Under section 1204 
penalties range up to a $500,000 fine or up to five years imprisonment for a first 
offense, and up to a $1,000,000 fine or up to 10 years imprisonment for subsequent 
offenses. Nonprofit libraries, archives and educational institutions are entirely 




Copyright OfBce and NTIA Studies Relating to Technological Develop­
ment 
Title I of the DMCA requires the Copyright Office to conduct two studies 
jointly with NTIA, one dealing with encryption and the other with the effect of 
technological developments on two existing exceptions in the Copyright Act. New 
section 1201(g)(5) of Title 17 of the U.S. Code requires the Register of Copyrights and 
the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information to report 
to the Congress no later than one year from enactment on the effect that the 
exemption for encryption research (new section 1201(g)) has had on encryption 
research, the development of encryption technology, the adequacy and effectiveness 
of technological measures designed to protect copyrighted works, and the protection 
of copyright owners against unauthorized access to their encrypted copyrighted works. 
Section 104 of the DMCA requires the Register of Copyrights and the Assistant 
Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information to jointly evaluate (1) 
the effects of Title I of the DMCA and the development of electronic commerce and 
associated technology on the operation of sections 109 (first sale doctrine) and 117 
(exemption allowing owners of copies of computer programs to reproduce and adapt 
them for use on a computer), and (2) the relationship between existing and emergent 
technology and the operation of those sections. This study is due 24 months after the 
date of enactment of the DMCA. 
TrrLElI: ONLINE COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT INABILITY LIMITATION 
Tide II of the DMCA adds a new section 512 to the Copyright Act3 to create 
four new limitations on liability for copyright infringement by online service providers. 
The limitations are based on the following four categories of conduct by a service 
provider: 
1. Transitory communications; 
2. System caching; 
3. Storage of information on systems or networks at direction of users; 
and 
4. Information location tools. 
New section 512 also includes special rules concerning the application of these 
limitations to nonprofit educational institutions. 
'The Fairness in Musical licensing Act, Title II of Pub. L. No. 105-298,112 Stat. 2827, 
2830-34 (Oct. 27,1998) also adds a new section 512 to the Copyright Act. This duplication of 
section numbers will need to be corrected in a technical amendments bill. 
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Each limitation entails a complete bar on monetary damages, and restricts the 
availability of injunctive relief in various respects. (Section 5120). Each limitation 
relates to a separate and distinct function, and a determination of whether a service 
provider qualifies for one of the limitations does not bear upon a determination of 
whether the provider qualifies for any of the other three. (Section 512(n)). 
The failure of a service provider to qualify for any of the limitations in section 
512 does not necessarily make it liable for copyright infringement. The copyright 
owner must still demonstrate that the provider has infringed, and the provider may still 
avail itself of any of the defenses, such as fair use, that are available to copyright 
defendants generally. (Section 512(1)). 
In addition to limiting the liability of service providers, Tide II establishes a 
procedure by which a copyright owner can obtain a subpoena from a federal court 
ordering a service provider to disclose the identity of a subscriber who is allegedly 
engaging in infringing activities. (Section 512(h)). 
Section 512 also contains a provision to ensure that service providers are not 
placed in the position of choosing between limitations on liability on the one hand and 
preserving the privacy of their subscribers, on the other. Subsection (m) explicitly 
states that nothing in section 512 requires a service provider to monitor its service or 
access material in violation of law (such as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act) 
in order to be eligible for any of the liability limitations. 
EHgibmtyfwIjmltadans Generally 
A party seeking the benefit of the limitations on liability in Title II must qualify 
as a "service provider." For purposes of the first limitation, relating to transitory 
communications, "service provider" is defined in section 512(k)(l)(A) as "an entity 
offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online 
communications, between or among points specified by a user, of material of the user's 
choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or received." For 
purposes of the other three limitations, "service provider" is more broadly defined in 
section 512(k)(l)(B) as "a provider of online services or network access, or the operator 
of facilities therefor." 
In addition, to be eligible for any of the limitations, a service provider must 
meet two overall conditions: (1) it must adopt and reasonably implement a policy of 
terminating in appropriate circumstances the accounts of subscribers who are repeat 
infringers; and (2) it must accommodate and not interfere with "standard technical 
measures." (Section 512(i)). "Standard technical measures" are defined as measures 
that copyright owners use to identify or protect copyrighted works, that have been 
developed pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright owners and service providers 
in an open, fair and voluntary multi-industry process, are available to anyone on 
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reasonable nondiscriminatory terms, and do not impose substantial costs or burdens 
on service providers. 
limitation for Transitory Communication* 
In general terms, section 512(a) limits the liability of service providers in 
circumstances where the provider merely acts as a data conduit, transmitting digital 
information from one point on a network to another at someone else's request. This 
limitation covers acts of transmission, routing, or providing connections for the 
information, as well as the intermediate and transient copies that are made automatically 
in the operation of a network. 
In order to qualify for this limitation, the service provider's activities must meet 
the following conditions: 
• The transmission must be initiated by a person other than the provider. 
• The transmission, routing, provision of connections, or copying must 
be carried out by an automatic technical process without selection of 
material by the service provider. 
• The service provider must not determine the recipients of the material. 
• Any intermediate copies must not ordinarily be accessible to anyone 
other than anticipated recipients, and must not be retained for longer 
than reasonably necessary. 
• The material must be transmitted with no modification to its content. 
limitation for System Caching 
Section 512(b) limits the liability of service providers for the practice of 
retaining copies, for a limited time, of material that has been made available online by 
a person other than the provider, and then transmitted to a subscriber at his or her 
direction. The service provider retains the material so that subsequent requests for the 
same material can be fulfilled by transmitting the retained copy, rather than retrieving 
the material from the original source on the network. 
The benefit of this practice is that it reduces the service provider's bandwidth 
requirements and reduces the waiting time on subsequent requests for the same 
information. On the other hand, it can result in the delivery of outdated information 
to subscribers and can deprive website operators of accurate "hit" information — 
information about the number of requests for particular material on a website — from 
which advertising revenue is frequently calculated. For this reason, the person making 
the material available online may establish rules about updating it, and may utilize 
technological means to track the number of "hits." 
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The limita ri on applies to acts of intermediate and temporary storage, when 
carried out through an automatic technical process for the purpose of making the 
material available to subscribers who subsequently request it. It is subject to the 
following conditions: 
• The content of the retained material must not be modified. 
• The provider must comply with rules about "refreshing" mate­
rial—replacing retained copies of material with material from the 
original location— when specified in accordance with a generally 
accepted industry standard data communication protocol. 
• The provider must not interfere with technology that returns "hit" 
information to the person who posted the material, where such 
technology meets certain requirements. 
@ The provider must limit users' access to the material in accordance with 
conditions on access (e.g., password protection) imposed by the person 
who posted the material. 
• Any material that was posted without the copyright owner's authoriza­
tion must be removed or blocked prompdy once the service provider 
has been notified that it has been removed, blocked, or ordered to be 
removed or blocked, at the originating site. 
limitation for Information Braiding on System# or Networks at the 
Direction of Users 
Section 512(c) limits the liability of service providers for infringing material on 
websites (or other information repositories) hosted on their systems. It applies to 
storage at the direction of a user. In order to be eligible for the limitation, the 
following conditions must be met: 
The provider must not have the requisite level of knowledge of the 
infringing activity, as described below. 
If the provider has the right and ability to control the infringing activity, 
it must not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the 
infringing activity. 
Upon receiving proper notification of claimed infringement, the 
provider must expeditiously take down or block access to the material. 
In addition, a service provider must have filed with the Copyright Office a 
designation of an agent to receive notifications of claimed infringement. The Office 
provides a suggested form for the purpose of designating an agent 
(http://www.loc.gov/copyright/onlinesp/) and maintains a list of agents on the 
Copyright Office website (http:/ /www.loc.gov/copyright/onlinesp/list/). 
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Under the knowledge standard, a service provider is eligible for the limitation 
on liability only if it does not have actual knowledge of the infringement, is not aware 
of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent, or upon gaining 
such knowledge or awareness, responds expeditiously to take the material down or 
block access to it. 
The statute also establishes procedures for proper notification, and rules as to 
its effect. (Section 512(c)(3)). Under the notice and takedown procedure, a copyright 
owner submits a notification under penalty of perjury, including a list of specified 
elements, to the service provider's designated agent. Failure to comply substantially 
with the statutory requirements means that the notification will not be considered in 
determining the requisite level of knowledge by the service provider. If, upon receiving 
a proper notification, the service provider promptiy removes or blocks access to the 
material identified in the notification, the provider is exempt from monetary liability. 
In addition, the provider is protected from any liability to any person for claims based 
on its having taken down the material. (Section 512(g)(1)). 
In order to protect against the possibility of erroneous or fraudulent 
notifications, certain safeguards are built into section 512. Subsection (g)(1) gives the 
subscriber the opportunity to respond to the notice and takedown by filing a counter 
notification. In order to qualify for the protection against liability for taking down 
material, the service provider must promptly notify the subscriber that it has removed 
or disabled access to the material. If the subscriber serves a counter notification 
complying with statutory requirements, including a statement under penalty of perjury 
that the material was removed or disabled through mistake or misidentification, then 
unless the copyright owner files an action seeking a court order against the subscriber, 
the service provider must put the material back up within 10-14 business days after 
receiving the counter notification. 
Penalties are provided for knowing material misrepresentations in either a 
notice or a counter notice. Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents that 
material is infringing, or that it was removed or blocked through mistake or misidentifi­
cation, is liable for any resulting damages (including costs and attorneys' fees) incurred 
by the alleged infringer, the copyright owner or its licensee, or the service provider. 
(Section 512(f)). 
limitation for Information Location Tools 
Section 512(d) relates to hyperlinks, online directories, search engines and the 
like. It limits liability for the acts of referring or linking users to a site that contains 
infringing material by using such information location tools, if the following conditions 
are met: 
December 1998 Page 12 
146 
7% 
• The provider must not have the requisite level of knowledge that the 
material is infringing. The knowledge standard is the same as under the 
limitation for information residing on systems or networks. 
• If the provider has the right and ability to control the infringing activity, 
the provider must not receive a financial benefit directiy attributable to 
the activity. 
• Upon receiving a notification of claimed infringement, the provider 
must expeditiously take down or block access to the material. 
These are essentially the same conditions that apply under the previous 
limitation, with some differences in the notification requirements. The provisions 
establishing safeguards against the possibility of erroneous or fraudulent notifications, 
as discussed above, as well as those protecting the provider against claims based on 
having taken down the material apply to this limitation. (Sections 512(f)-(g)). 
Special Rules Regarding Liability of Nonprofit Educational Institutions 
Section 512(e) determines when the actions or knowledge of a faculty member 
or graduate student employee who is performing a teaching or research function may 
affect the eligibility of a nonprofit educational institution for one of the four limitations 
on liability. As to the limitations for transitory communications or system caching, the 
faculty member or student shall be considered a "person other than the provider," so 
as to avoid disqualifying the institution from eligibility. As to the other limitations, the 
knowledge or awareness of the faculty member or student will not be attributed to the 
institution. The following conditions must be met: 
• the faculty member or graduate student's infringing activities do not 
involve providing online access to course materials that were required 
or recommended during the past three years; 
• the institution has not received more than two notifications over the 
past three years that the faculty member or graduate student was 
infringing; and 
• the institution provides all of its users with informational materials 
describing and promoting compliance with copyright law. 
TlTLE HI: COMPUTER MAINTENANCE OR REPAIR 
Title III expands the existing exemption relating to computer programs in 
section 117 of the Copyright Act, which allows the owner of a copy of a program to 
make reproductions or adaptations when necessary to use the program in conjunction 
with a computer. The amendment permits the owner or lessee of a computer to make 
or authorize the making of a copy of a computer program in the course of maintaining 
or repairing that computer. The exemption only permits a copy that is made 
automatically when a computer is activated, and only if the computer already lawfully 
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contains an authorized copy of the program. The new copy cannot be used in any 
other manner and must be destroyed immediately after the maintenance or repair is 
completed. 
TITLE IV: MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
Clarification of the Authority of the Copyright OfBce 
Section 401(b), adds language to section 701 of the Copyright Act confirming 
the Copyright Office's authority to continue to perform the policy and international 
functions that it has carried out for decades under its existing general authority. 
Ephemeral Recording* for Broadcaster# 
Section 112 of the Copyright Act grants an exemption for the making of 
"ephemeral recordings." These are recordings made in order to facilitate a transmis­
sion. Under this exemption, for example, a radio station can record a set of songs and 
broadcast from the new recording rather than from the original CDs (which would 
have to be changed "on the fly" during the course of a broadcast). 
As it existed prior to enactment of the DMCA, section 112 permitted a 
transmitting organization to make and retain for up to six months (hence the term 
"ephemeral") no more than one copy of a work if it was entitled to transmit a public 
performance or display of the work, either under a license or by virtue of the fact that 
there is no general public performance right in sound recordings (as distinguished from 
musical works). 
The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 (DPRA) 
created, for the first time in U.S. copyright law, a limited public performance right in 
sound recordings. The right only covers public performances by means of digital 
transmission and is subject to an exemption for digital broadcasts (i.e., transmissions 
by FCC licensed terrestrial broadcast stations) and a statutory license for certain 
subscription transmissions that are not made on demand (Le. in response to the specific 
request of a recipient). 
Section 402 of the DMCA expands the section 112 exemption to include 
recordings that are made to facilitate the digital transmission of a sound recording 
where the transmission is made under the DPRA's exemption for digital broadcasts or 
statutory license. As amended, section 112 also permits in some circumstances the 
circumvention of access control technologies in order to enable an organization to 
make an ephemeral recording. 
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Distance Education Study 
In the course of consideration of the DMCA, legislators expressed an interest 
in amending the Copyright Act to promote distance education, possibly through an 
expansion of the existing exception for instructional broadcasting in section 110(2). 
Section 403 of the DMCA directs the Copyright Office to consult with affected parties 
and make recommendations to Congress on how to promote distance education 
through digital technologies. The Office must report to Congress within six months 
of enactment. 
The Copyright Office is directed to consider the following issues: 
• The need for a new exemption; 
• Categories of works to be included in any exemption; 
• Appropriate quantitative limitations on the portions of works that may 
be used under any exemption; 
• Which parties should be eligible for any exemption; 
• Which parties should be eligible recipients of distance education 
material under any exemption; 
• The extent to which use of technological protection measures should 
be mandated as a condition of eligibility for any exemption; 
• The extent to which the availability of licenses should be considered in 
assessing eligibility for any exemption; and 
• Other issues as appropriate. 
Exemption for NonproGt libraries and Archives 
Section 404 of the DMCA amends the exemption for nonprofit libraries and 
archives in section 108 of the Copyright Act to accommodate digital technologies and 
evolving preservation practices. Prior to enactment of the DMCA, section 108 
permitted such libraries and archives to make a single facsimile (i.e., not digital) copy 
of a work for purposes of preservation or interlibrary loan. As amended, section 108 
permits up to three copies, which may be digital, provided that digital copies are not 
made available to the public outside the library premises. In addition, the amended 
section permits such a library or archive to copy a work into a new format if the 
original format becomes obsolete—that is, the machine or device used to render the 
work perceptible is no longer manufactured or is no longer reasonably available in the 
commercial marketplace. 
Webcasting Amendments to the Digital Performance Right in Sound 
Recordings 
As discussed above, in 1995 Congress enacted the DPRA, creating a 
performance right in sound recordings that is limited to digital transmissions. Under 
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that legislation, three categories of digital transmissions were addressed: broadcast 
transmissions, which were exempted from the performance right; subscription 
transmissions, which were generally subject to a statutory license; and on-demand 
transmissions, which were subject to the full exclusive right. Broadcast transmissions 
under the DPRA are transmissions made by FCC-licensed terrestrial broadcast stations. 
In the past several years, a number of entities have begun making digital 
transmissions of sound recordings over the Internet using streaming audio technolo­
gies. This activity does not fall squarely within any of the three categories that were 
addressed in the DPRA. Section 405 of the DMCA amends the DPRA, expanding the 
statutory license for subscription transmissions to include webcasting as a new category 
of "eligible nonsubscription transmissions." 
In addition to expanding the scope of the statutory license, the DMCA revises 
the criteria that any entity must meet in order to be eligible for the license (other than 
those who are subject to a grandfather clause, leaving the existing criteria intact). It 
revises the considerations for setting rates as well (again, subject to a grandfather 
clause), directing arbitration panels convened under the law to set the royalty rates at 
fair market value. 
This provision of the DMCA also creates a new statutory license for making 
ephemeral recordings. As indicated above, section 402 of the DMCA amends section 
112 of the Copyright Act to permit the making of a single ephemeral recording to 
facilitate the digital transmission of sound recording that is permitted either under the 
DPRA's broadcasting exemption or statutory license. Transmitting organizations that 
wish to make more than the single ephemeral recording of a sound recording that is 
permitted under the outright exemption in section 112 are now eligible for a statutory 
license to make such additional ephemeral recordings. In addition, the new statutory 
license applies to the making of ephemeral recordings by transmitting organizations 
other than broadcasters who are exempt from the digital performance right, who are 
not covered by the expanded exemption in section 402 of the DMCA. 
Assumption of Contractual Obligations upon Transfers of Rights in 
Motion Pictures 
Section 416 addresses concerns about the ability of writers, directors and screen 
actors to obtain residual payments for the exploitation of motion pictures in situations 
where the producer is no longer able to make these payments. The guilds' collective 
bargaining agreements currently require producers to obtain assumption agreements 
from distributors in certain circumstances, by which the distributor assumes the 
producer's obligation to make such residual payments. Some production companies 
apparently do not always do so, leaving the guilds without contractual privity enabling 
them to seek recourse from the distributor. 
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The DMCA adds a new chapter to Title 28 of the U.S. Code that imposes on 
transferees those obligations to make residual payments that the producer would be 
required to have the transferee assume under the relevant collective bargaining 
agreement. The obligations attach only if the distributor knew or had reason to know 
that the motion picture was produced subject to a collective bargaining agreement, or 
in the event of a court order confirming an arbitration award under the collective 
bargaining agreement that the producer cannot satisfy within ninety days. There are 
two classes of transfers that are excluded from the scope of this provision. The first 
is transfers limited to public performance rights, and the second is grants of security 
interests, along with any subsequent transfers from the security interest holder. 
The provision also directs the Comptroller General, in consultation with the 
Register of Copyrights, to conduct a study on the conditions in the motion picture 
industry that gave rise to this provision, and the impact of the provision on the 
industry. The study is due two years from enactment. 
TITLE V: PROTECTION OF CERTAIN ORIGINAL DESIGNS 
Title V of the DMCA, entitled the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act 
(VTIDPA), adds a new chapter 13 to Title 17 of the U.S. Code. It creates a new system 
for protecting original designs of certain useful articles that make the article attractive 
or distinctive in appearance. For purposes of the VHDPA, "useful articles" are limited 
to the hulls (including the decks) of vessels no longer than 200 feet. 
A design is protected under the VHDPA as soon as a useful article embodying 
the design is made public or a registration for the design is published. Protection is lost 
if an application for registration is not made within two years after a design is first made 
public, but a design is not registrable if it has been made public more than one year 
before the date of the application for registration. Once registered, protection 
continues for ten years from the date protection begins. 
The VHDPA is subject to a legislative sunset: the Act expires two years from 
enactment (October 28, 2000). The Copyright Office is directed to conduct two joint 
studies with the Patent and Trademark Office—the first by October 28,1999 and the 
second by October 28, 2000—evaluating the impact of the VHDPA. 
EFFECTIVE DATES 
Most provisions of the DMCA are effective on the date of enactment. There 
are, however, several exceptions. The technical amendments in Title I that relate to 
eligibility of works for protection under U.S. copyright law by virtue of the new WIPO 
treaties do not take effect until the relevant treaty comes into force. Similarly, 
restoration of copyright protection for such works does not become effective until the 
relevant treaty comes into force. The prohibition on the act of circumvention of access 
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control measures does not take effect until two years from enactment (October 28, 
2000). 
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AN ACT 
To amend chapter 1 of title 17, United States Code, relating 
to the exemption of certain performances or displays 
for educational uses from copyright infringement provi­
sions, to provide that the making of copies or 
phonorecords of such performances or displays is not 
an infringement under certain circumstances, and for 
other purposes. 
1 # ewzcW by f&e jfWafe mW of Tkpresewfo-
3 SECTION 1. EDUCATIONAL USE COPYRIGHT EXEMPTION. 
4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 
5 "Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization 
6 Act of 2001". 
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1 (b) EXEMPTION OF CERTAIN PERFORMANCES AND 
2 DISPLAYS FOR EDUCATIONAL USES.—Section 110 of title 
3 17, United States Code, is amended— 
4 (1) by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the 
5 following: 
6 "(2) except with respect to a work produced or 
7 marketed primarily for performance or display as 
8 part of mediated instructional activities transmitted 
9 via digital networks, or a performance or display 
10 that is given by means of a copy or phonorecord that 
11 is not lawfully made and acquired under this title, 
12 and the transmitting government body or accredited 
13 nonprofit educational institution knew or had reason 
14 to believe was not lawfully made and acquired, the 
15 performance of a nondramatic literary or musical 
16 work or reasonable and limited portions of any other 
17 work, or display of a work in an amount comparable 
18 to that which is typically displayed in the course of 
19 a live classroom session, by or in the course of a 
20 transmission, if— 
21 "(A) the performance or display is made 
22 by, at the direction of, or under the actual su-
23 pervision of an instructor as an integral part of 
24 a class session offered as a regular part of the 
25 systematic mediated instructional activities of a 



























governmental body or an accredited nonprofit 
educational institution; 
"(B) the performance or display is directly 
related and of material assistance to the teach-
ing content of the transmission; 
"(C) the transmission is made solely for, 
and, to the extent technologically feasible, the 
reception of such transmission is limited to— 
"(i) students officially enrolled in the 
course for which the transmission is made; 
or 
"(h) officers or employees of govern­
mental bodies as a part of their official du­
ties or employment; and 
"(D) the transmitting body or 
institution— 
"(i) institutes policies regarding copy­
right, provides informational materials to 
faculty, students, and relevant staff mem­
bers that accurately describe, and promote 
compliance with, the laws of the United 
States relating to copyright, and provides 
notice to students that materials used in 
connection with the course may be subject 
to copyright protection; and 
8 487 E8 
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1 "(ii) in the case of digital 
2 transmissions— 
3 "(I) applies technological meas-
4 ures that reasonably prevent— 
5 "(aa) retention of the work 
6 in accessible form by recipients of 
7 the transmission from the trans-
8 mitting body or institution for 
9 longer than the class session; and 
10 "(bb) unauthorized further 
11 dissemination of the work in ac-
12 cessible form by such recipients 
13 to others; and 
14 "(H) does not engage in conduct 
15 that could reasonably be expected to 
16 interfere with technological measures 
17 used by copyright owners to prevent 
18 such retention or unauthorized further 
19 dissemination;"; and 
20 (2) by adding at the end the following: 
21 "In paragraph (2), the term 'mediated instruc-
22 tional activities' with respect to the performance or 
23 display of a work by digital transmission under this 
24 section refers to activities that use such work as an 
25 integral part of the class experience, controlled by or 
S 487 E8 
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1 under the actual supervision of the instructor and 
2 analogous to the type of performance or display that 
3 would take place in a live classroom setting. The 
4 term does not refer to activities that use, in 1 or 
5 more class sessions of a single course, such works as 
6 textbooks, course packs, or other material in any 
7 media, copies or phonorecords of which are typically 
8 purchased or acquired by the students in higher edu-
9 cation for their independent use and retention or are 
10 typically purchased or acquired for elementaiy and 
11 secondary students for their possession and inde-
12 pendent use. 
13 "For purposes of paragraph (2), 
14 accreditation— 
15 "(A) with respect to an institution pro-
16 viding post-secondary education, shall be as de-
17 termined by a regional or national accrediting 
18 agency recognized by the Council on Higher 
19 Education Accreditation or the United States 
20 Department of Education; and 
21 "(B) with respect to an institution pro-
22 viding elementary or secondary education, shall 
23 be as recognized by the applicable state certifi-
24 cation or licensing procedures. 
S 487 E8 
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1 "For purposes of paragraph (2), no govem-
2 mental body or accredited nonprofit educational in-
3 stitution shall be liable for infringement by reason of 
4 the transient or temporary storage of material car-
5 ried out through the automatic technical process of 
6 a digital transmission of the performance or display 
7 of that material as authorized under paragraph (2). 
8 No such material stored on the system or network 
9 controlled or operated by the transmitting body or 
10 institution under this paragraph shall be maintained 
11 on such system or network in a manner ordinarily 
12 accessible to anyone other than anticipated recipi-
13 ents. No such copy shall be maintained on the sys-
14 tem or network in a manner ordinarily accessible to 
15 such anticipated recipients for a longer period than 
16 is reasonably necessary to facilitate the trans-
17 missions for which it was made.". 
18 (c) EPHEMERAL RECORDINGS.— 
19 (1) IN GENERAL.—Section 112 of title 17, 
20 United States Code, is amended— 
21 (A) by redesignating subsection (f) as sub-
22 section (g); and 
23 (B) by inserting after subsection (e) the fol-
24 lowing: 


























"(f)(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 
106. and without limiting the application of subsection 
(b), it is not an infringement of copyright for a govern­
mental body or other nonprofit educational institution en-
titled under section 110(2) to transmit a performance or 
display to make copies or phonorecords of a work that is 
in digital form and, solely to the extent permitted in para­
graph (2), of a work that is in analog form, embodying 
the performance or display to be used for making trans­
missions authorized under section 110(2), if— 
"(A) such copies or phonorecords are retained 
and used solely by the body or institution that made 
them, and no further copies or phonorecords are re­
produced from them, except as authorized under sec­
tion 110(2); and 
"(B) such copies or phonorecords are used sole­
ly for transmissions authorized under section 
110(2). 
"(2) This subsection does not authorize the conver­
sion of print or other analog versions of works into digital 
formats, except that such conversion is permitted here-
iirider, only with respect to the amount of such works au-
thorized to be performed or displayed under section 
110(2), i^-



























"(A) no digital version of the work is available 
to the institution; or 
"(B) the digital version of the work that is 
available to the institution is subject to technological 
protection measures that prevent its use for section 
110(2).". 
(2) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMEND­
MENT.—Section 802(c) of title 17, United States 
Code, is amended in the third sentence by striking 
"section 112(f)" and inserting "section 112(g)". 
(d) PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE REPORT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of enactment of this Act and after a 
period for public comment, the Undersecretaiy of 
Commerce for Intellectual Property, after consulta­
tion with the Register of Copyrights, shall submit to 
the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and 
the House of Representatives a report describing 
technological protection systems that have been im­
plemented, are available for implementation, or are 
proposed to be developed to protect digitized copy­
righted works and prevent infringement, including 
upgradeable and self-repairing systems, and systems 
that have been developed, are being developed, or are 
proposed to be developed in private voluntary indus-
8 487 ES 
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1 try-led entities through an open broad based con-
2 sensus process. The report submitted to the Com-
3 mittees shall not include any recommendations, com-
4 parisons, or comparative assessments of any com-
5 merciaily available products that may be mentioned 
6 in the report. 
7 (2) LIMITATIONS.—The report under this 
8 subsection— 
9 (A) is intended solely to provide informa-
10 tion to Congress; and 
11 (B) shall not be construed to affect in any 
12 way, either directly or by implication, any provi-
13 sion of title 17, United States Code, including 
14 the requirements of clause (ii) of section 
15 110(2)(D) of that title (as added by this Act), 
16 or the interpretation or application of such pro-
17 visions, including evaluation of the compliance 
18 with that clause by any governmental body or 
19 nonprofit educational institution. 
Passed the Senate June 7, 2001. 
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